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NGOs in India
By examining how NGOs operate in southern India in the early 2000s, this book
discusses the challenges faced by small, local NGOs in the uncertain times of
changing aid dynamics. The key ﬁndings focus on what empowerment means for
Indian women, and howNGO accountability to these women is an important part of
the empowerment being realized.
The notion of community empowerment, in which the ‘solidarity’ of a group can
be a path to individual empowerment, is discussed, as well as analysing how
empowerment can be a useful concept in development. Based on case studies of
15 NGOs as well as in-depth interviews with 80 women’s self-help groups, the
book highlights the key features of effective empowerment programmes. The
author uses innovative statistical analysis tools to show how a key factor in
empowerment of marginalized women is the accountability relationship between
themselves and the supporting NGO. The book goes on to discuss the ways that
NGOs can work with communities in the future, and recognizes the limitations
of a donor-centric accountability framework. It provides a useful contribution to
studies on South Asia as well as Gender and Development Studies.
Patrick Kilby is a political scientist with the School of Archaeology and
Anthropology in the College of Arts and Social Sciences at the Australian
National University. His research interests include NGOs, poverty and women’s
empowerment.
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Introduction
NGOs are seen to have a central role in development practice, but the question that
remains unanswered, and probably never can be answered, is: what role (or roles)
should this be? This is not a new question; ever since NGOs as institutional forms
came to have a role in social development in the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries, governments have seen them as service providers, while the NGOs’
supporters have seen them as advocates for social change. For example, William
Wilberforce and the anti-slavery movement, and the host of other social service
organizations he was associated with, were devoted to both social service and social
change. Two hundred years later, little has changed, with the same old debates
continuing as to what roles NGOs should have, and how they can be effective. This
book proposes to move the debate forward by looking at the factors that make
NGOs’ work effective, and the issues that NGOs face in meeting these require-
ments. In this book I will look at local NGOs in southern India as a case study, as
they are well established, have a strong social change focus mainly through
women’s empowerment programmes, and are undergoing rapid structural change
as a result of India’s rapidly growing economy and the related change in their
funding sources.
Indian NGOs have been involved in development work of one sort or another for
over 100 years and have been important in Indian government programmes, as well
as being partners for international NGO (INGO) donors since the nation’s inde-
pendence in 1947. My own interest comes from my work with Oxfam Australia
since the mid-1980s, when Indian NGOs were an important part of the rural and
urban development scene, while at the same time being treated rather warily by the
government at the time. As this was before the deregulation of the 1990s, it was a
period when the Indian state was more pervasive in people’s daily lives and NGOs
were under some surveillance. Since then, NGOs have become mainstream actors in
development with not only INGOs supporting them, but also bilateral, multilateral,
and a broader range of Indian state agencies being involved in NGO programmes.
During the mid-1980s, while local Indian NGOs were involved in broader social
justice programmes, at a local level NGO programmes focused on income genera-
tion and the like for marginalized groups, with an increasing focus on women.
SEWA an NGO in Ahmedabad, for example, had been looking at gender justice
issues as well as income generation programmes for women since the mid-1970s,
and by the mid-1980s their model was being picked up by NGOs across India, and
the idea of the ‘empowerment of women’ was gaining currency. By the mid-1990s
women’s empowerment was a part of the lexicon, and all NGOs felt they had to
subscribe to it, often with little idea of what it meant. The 1990s was also a time
when NGO effectiveness was being questioned, after the optimism of the 1980s
regarding the value of NGO work, and INGOs in particular were undertaking more
evaluations of themselves and their partners’work, to ensure quality, and to be able to
assure both their public and government supporters that they were being effective.
The other debate in the mid-1990s was the focus on women’s programmes and
empowerment, and the important issue of gender implicit in these programmes.
This was energized by the Beijing women’s conference, and the move in the
debates from women and development (WID) to gender and development
(GAD). A key feature of most NGO work in India, and certainly in southern and
western India since the mid-1980s, was that the work was with mainly with women
and the self-help group programmes were targeting women. In the 1990s there was
also a shift in focus from income generation programmes for women, which
invariably meant the household production of high labour low value products,
towards a self-help group model which focused on saving within a group and with
those savings gaining access to additional credit, which was then meant to be
invested in assets for income generation and the like. While this was an improve-
ment on income generation per se, often the NGOs’ focus was still on income
generation from relatively low value products, while discouraging using the savings
and credit from the groups for household consumption, even if consumption was for
improved health and education.
Being involved in some of these debates through this time I became interested in
the empowerment question, particularly in the self-help group and microﬁnance
context. Empowerment seemed to be one of those terms used in development that
are slowly washed and bleached of any real meaning, to become more of a
soundbite than a meaningful objective. Even politicians now use it as an election
catchphrase. At the same time it seemed that looking at empowerment and the
factors that may affect it, in a more direct sense, might give some insight into
the effectiveness of local NGOs in India, and touch on the general challenges they
face as NGOs. These debates and questions resulted in my ﬁeld studies with NGOs
in Karnataka and Maharashtra in India in the early 2000s, which have led to this
book. A problem with this type of research is that during the time it may take to
process and publish ﬁndings the context may have changed. Sometimes this can be
for the better, as discussed in Chapter 4 with the rapid advances made by the waste-
picker union in the ten years since this study started, to protect their livelihoods and
rights in the face of social and technical change. In other cases, as outlined in
Chapter 3, a changing context can lead to challenges and changes in the way local
NGOs operate as the traditional INGO donors leave the prosperous southern Indian
states, to be replaced by the more restrictive Indian Government funding. While the
contexts have changed, the central ﬁndings about the relationship of empowerment
and accountability are still a key issue, and one that provides challenges for the
Indian NGOs as they adapt to the changing environment in which they operate.
2 Introduction
This book is structured in three broad parts. The ﬁrst part, Chapters 1 and 2,
set out the historical context of NGO work in India, particularly its often fraught
relationship with the state. It examines how NGOs operate in the Indian context of
the early 2000s, with the emphasis on the self-help group (SHG) as an approach to
development work. The SHGs had their origins in southern India in the late 1970s,
and now the use of SHGs is the preferred approach by Government and NGOs alike
in community development work. It is in these chapters that the concept of
empowerment is introduced as a development approach, and why it is seen to be
important in development work. Chapters 3 and 4 look at NGO case studies and
the local contexts where they were working: Chapter 3 focuses on NGOs in two
districts of Karnataka, while Chapter 4 focuses on one case study, that of the waste-
picker programme supported by an NGO in Pune City, Maharashtra. Although the
waste-picker programme is urban based, while the rest of the book deals with rural
areas, it is an important case as it provides a contrast and highlights the components
for an effective programme of empowerment of a very marginalized group. A
number of the case studies look at what can be done with ambitious and ﬂexible
approaches that don’t easily ﬁt the conventional project approach. Chapter 5 looks at
the results of the ﬁeld research from interviewing around 80 self help groups, and
analysing what their members saw as empowering, while Chapter 6 looks at the
factors that lead to strong empowerment outcomes; in particular, the vexed question
of NGO accountability to the recipient groups they are working with, when facil-
itating empowerment programmes. Chapter 7 concludes with a discussion of the
implications of these ﬁndings for NGO practice.
The analysis I have taken is a broad analysis with a large data set, rather than a
few case studies, in order to get an indication of the breadth of changes across
communities and groups rather than more in-depth ethnographic studies. I have
tried, though, to capture where I can the insights from women of what change has
meant for them. Likewise, even though the study is about women’s empowerment
and a gender analysis was undertaken, the limitations were that the strong
patriarchal structure behind the marginalization of women in India is heavily
gendered and that starts with household relations, which most NGOs avoid. The
NGO programmes looked at did not seek to change these basic gender relations at
the household level, and where they did change them it was marginal and hard to
quantify (see Chapter 5). What they tended to do was to change women’s access
to a broader range of social and community domains which in many cases were
highly gendered. The researcher’s starting point was to look at these NGO pro-
grammes on their own terms and the changes that had occurred in women’s lives as
a result of these interventions.
This book highlights challenges faced by small local NGOs in southern India in
the uncertain times of changing aid dynamics. The key ﬁndings are about what
empowerment means for poor Indian women, and how accountability to these
women’s groups is an important part of women’s empowerment being realized. The
book concludes with some challenges for NGOs in how they work with commu-
nities, and how they may shift their concerns about accountability more to the
people they serve than to the people who fund and regulate them.
Introduction 3
1 Non-governmental organizations
in India
Introduction
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in India have a rich and vibrant history,
but one which has been characterized by a ﬂuid relationship with the state and state
instrumentalities. Over the past 150 years Indian governments, both colonial and
postcolonial, have played a key role in shaping Indian NGOs, both in terms of how
they function in society and their often fraught relationships with the state.
Likewise, at key times in India’s history, NGOs themselves have played a part in
shaping the state. Generally, though, Indian NGOs are reluctant to admit that the
state determines both the scope and nature of the work that they can undertake, and
to some extent their structural forms – but like it or not, the relationship with
the state is a deﬁning feature of Indian NGOs. So who or what are these NGOs? Put
simply, in India NGOs are those organizations that have some form of institutional
base, are private, non-proﬁt, self-governing, voluntary in nature, and registered
with the government (Nandedkar 1987). The problem is that it is difﬁcult to assess
the range of NGOs in India that have NGO status from government, as there is no
central mechanism to determine those that have been registered with the various local,
state and national government instrumentalities (Sen 1993). This simple deﬁnition
I have used hides a rather complex reality, which is the Indian NGO scene.
Estimates of the total number of voluntary organizations in India that are in some
way or other recognized by the state, range from 1 to 2 million (Salamon and Anheier
1999). This rather indeterminate number of voluntary organizations working in
India is in some way testament both to the difﬁculty in measuring numbers, and also
to the importance that voluntary work is given in Indian society ‘… a timeless
sphere conterminous with Indian civilization itself…’ (Blamey and Pasha 1993: 14).
This broad set of NGOs ranges from small village associations such as funeral
societies and Parents and Citizens associations, all of which have some form of
registration, to very large organizations that provide services to hundreds of
thousands of people across several states. To narrow the scope of this vast ﬁeld,
this book is only concerned with those NGOs that work with poor and marginalized
communities – ‘development NGOs’ of which there are around 80,000 (Salamon
and Anheier 1999: 70). These numbers, like those for the broader NGO category, are
still only estimates, as development NGOs are registered under Indian individual
state legislation as either Trusts or Associations, and so these ﬁgures are notoriously
hard to compile centrally with any accuracy. The only accurate number is the
32,144 NGOs which in 2006 were federally registered to receive foreign funds
(Ministry of Home Affairs 2007), with a little over half of those registered actually
receiving foreign funds in that year. So even with these ﬁgures, it is still hard to
determine whether those that did not receive funding are still active in their host
communities. They may well be active, but with reduced resources, given that
many international NGO donors are reducing funding to many parts of India, a
point that will be returned to in Chapter 3. There are of course the many NGOs that
do development work, and do not wish to receive foreign funding but are supported
by local resources, either voluntary or from Indian government instrumentalities
(Jalali 2008).
The larger Indian development NGOs, had been mainly supported by foreign
sources for their funding until the early 2000s, and received Rs7,877 crore or
$US1.85b. in 2006 (Ministry of Home Affairs 2007: ii). In the past this accounted
for over 90 per cent of the total formal funding of Indian NGOs involved in
development work (Sen, S. 1999); however, from around 2005 Indian government
funding started to displace international funding, particularly for the more secular
NGOs in the more economically successful states in southern India.
NGOs small and large that had relied on foreign funds have begun to actively
explore ways to raise money from domestic sources … [with] many NGOs
actively seeking and entering closer funding relationships with the state.
(Kudva 2005: 248)
Again these statistics can hide a more complex reality, as there is a very high level
of voluntary time given to NGOs, particularly the smaller ones that make up the
bulk of the sector, and this has not been valued with any accuracy, but Tandon
(2002) estimates the voluntary time together with private donations as being on the
same scale as government and international funding combined. The high level of
foreign funding to NGOs in the late 1990s and early 2000s reﬂected the popularity
of NGOs as a conduit for foreign aid for poverty alleviation programmes, believing
them to be more reliable and effective than government channels (Murthy and Rao
1997; Rajasekhar 1998). The limits placed by the Indian government on the number
of bilateral donors it deals with saw all but six bilateral aid relationships terminated
in 2003 (Times of India 2 June), provided new opportunities for both the Indian
government and international NGOs, at least in the short term, to pick up the slack.
This leads to the question of what makes the NGO sector such an important sector
for donors and government funders alike?
What makes NGOs tick? Some theory
A recurring theme in modern development discourse is the role of NGOs in
providing mechanisms for strengthening civil society for poor and marginalized
communities (for example, see World Bank 1996). This process includes organizing
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and ‘empowering’ marginalized communities and, as such, is seen as an integral
part of overcoming disadvantage and marginalization, as the poor and marginalized
can gain improved access to government and community resources, their access to
which was previously limited. One recurring question is: whether development
NGOs themselves are part of civil society? Most NGOs working in development
will argue that they are part of civil society, a useful deﬁnition of which is:
‘that segment of society that interacts with the state, inﬂuences the state and yet is
distinct from the state’ (Chazan 1992: 281). As such, they can play both an
empowering and a representative role. However, NGOs generally are not governed
or ﬁnanced on the basis of a membership like a union or a cooperative (Fowler
2000a); and NGO boards tend to be self-appointed, usually from local elites, rather
than from a broad membership base (Townsend and Townsend 2004). Thus, it can
be easily argued that despite NGOs’ own claims to the contrary, in practice they can
only play a limited role as civil society representatives (Sabatini 2002; Trivedy and
Acharya 1996). Nevertheless there is still ambiguity, as much of the civil society
discourse still relates to NGOs as if they are part of civil society (for example, see
Finn et al. 2008).
Whether part of civil society or not, NGOs see their role as promoting certain
values, and advancing what they see as broader community interests as public
beneﬁt organizations, rather than as mutual beneﬁt organizations such as coopera-
tives or trade unions. For development NGOs, the broader community aspirations
they promote include: alleviating poverty; addressing marginalization; achieving
social justice; and promoting respect for human rights. The problem with this
public beneﬁt role is that NGOs lack a deﬁned accountability path to their con-
stituency, or what Salamon and Anheier (1999: 9) identiﬁed as an ‘accountability
gap’. For example, while NGOs might be advancing the cause of the poor and
oppressed, in practice they cannot be held to account by that group on how they
advance that cause, nor can the poor and oppressed as a group have much impact on
NGOs if they disagree with the strategy and approaches, as the aid recipient has
little power in these relationships (Power et al. 2002). This relatively weak account-
ability relationship is a deﬁning feature of NGOs as public beneﬁt organizations,
and has implications for how they work. Couto (1998) has developed a classiﬁcation
for US organizations according to the ‘related concepts of participation, representa-
tion, community change and empowerment …’ (p. 580). Within the Indian context,
his classiﬁcation can be adapted into the following set of groups:
 grassroots groups, which are small community-based, self-help groups which
can act for themselves as direct ‘socio-political representatives’.
 community agencies, which have local decision-making structures, but with
little direct representation or full participation of the people served; and
 voluntary organizations, larger organizations which generally have no formal
feedback mechanisms from the people being served.
The overlapping categories of community organizations and voluntary organiza-
tions found in India are typical of the majority of development NGOs in developing
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countries. They are public beneﬁt organizations, and generally serve as intermediaries
between resource providers such as government or other (usually foreign) donors
and small community-based organizations or ‘grassroots’ self-help groups, which
while being notionally representative may not have a formal structure or recogni-
tion from the state. Aid donors prefer public beneﬁt organizations such as NGOs to
undertake broader development work, as they are able to reach a wider and possibly
more diverse set of possible aid recipients than membership organizations could,
while remaining at arm’s length from government:
the lack of organizational responsiveness and legitimacy [of NGOs] is not only
more tolerable than it is in the public sector, but is also a structural prerequisite
for coping with the contradictory societal and political demands which, by
itself, government cannot resolve.
(Seibel 1990: 114)
NGOs are also seen to be inclusive rather than exclusive in their approach to their
aid recipients. They are closer to the communities they are supporting than, say,
government agencies, and there are also cost advantages over other delivery
mechanisms. These all serve to give NGOs some legitimacy with donors whether
these are international or national or state governments (Scurrah 1996). This is on
top of the non-economic resources that NGOs have such as status, reputation and
information. These can also add to NGO legitimacy, which though can be some-
what shaky in many instances (Ebrahim 2003).
The disadvantage of NGOs undertaking work around empowerment and social
change is that they have (at best) limited requirements for formal accountability
mechanisms to the local communities and aid recipients, something that should be
axiomatic for empowerment, and will be returned to in Chapter 6. Many NGOs in
India are aware, however, of the limitations in their accountability structure, and
actively promote membership organizations as part of their interventions with a
view to the membership organizations taking over the programmes and their
ongoing management, but often with limited success. This may be due to NGOs’
lack of appreciation of local contexts. For example, while NGO board members see
themselves taking on a trusteeship role for the NGO constituency, the perspective
they bring is often derived from a values system that has its genesis in a welfare ethic
of service provision. This leads to the question of how well NGO board members
can reﬂect the interests of aid recipients (Couto 1998; Howes 1997). This is the
central conundrum that NGOs face in being both effective, and able to take on the
representational role for their aid recipients, when their motivation and drive comes
from values rather than a representative constituency.
NGOs as organizations
NGOs generally emerge from particular social milieus and respond to needs in a
particular way; therefore how they see the role of mediating between the citizen
and the state is derived from a set of values based on that history and social setting.
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The problem then is how NGOs, driven by their own values and altruistic ends,
derive their support from a community to undertake this mediation? Couto (1998)
argues that it is the representative relationship with the community that determines
the effectiveness of the NGO at empowerment or social change. Non-representative
NGOs are at best ‘technical representatives’ (p. 570): while they have a special
knowledge of a group, they are not part of it. This distance means NGOs speak on
behalf of, rather than as part of the community, which limits their legitimacy
(Jordan 2005). I would argue that this gap is due to NGOs as non-representative
organizations, deriving a set of values from a certain socio-political milieu that
drives their approach to their work. However, it is the very basis of these values
(i.e. to work for a larger group in society) and their non-representative nature that
raises questions as to the effectiveness of their work (Edwards and Sen 2000;
Fowler 1996; Lissner 1977; Power et al. 2002).
The driving force for NGOs as public beneﬁt organizations is that they are
essentially motivated by their values, which could be deﬁned broadly into a desire
for a ‘better world’ (Edwards and Sen 2000; Fowler 1996; Lissner 1977). NGOs
also regard themselves as ‘the heartland of the social economy as they are marked
by distinctive value systems …’ (Paton 1993: 6), and they expand ‘moral space’
(Edwards and Sen 2000: 614). Lissner sums up NGO values thus:
[they]… emanate from religious beliefs, historical traditions, prevailing social
norms, personal experiences, and similar basic sources of human attitudes,…
cannot be directly translated into concrete action because of their degree of
abstraction… [but provide] bearings when deciding on fundamental directions.
(1977: 74)
Regardless of where these values come from, whether they emerge from religious
traditions, paternal leadership, or other sources, it is the values which ‘condition the
rules of the game’ (Fowler 1996: 17). Upholding, or being true to, their values is a
primary concern for those NGOs who wish to promote a certain philosophy or
worldview – a ‘Weltanschauung’ based on these more permanent and deeply held
values (Lissner 1977). TheseWeltanschauung-based values are quite different from
other types of values that are derived from, for example, supporter interests; third
world or recipient interest, which are more temporal; the ‘organizational’ values
that drive the way NGO work is undertaken; or ‘terminal’ values that indicate an
endpoint, such as relief from poverty (Padaki 2000: 424). Table 1 presents a schema
of the various sets of values. As ideology or a political goal is the anchor of a
political party, values, or a world view, are the anchor for NGOs.
The key problem arising from this discussion is that the values of the NGO may
not accord with the values of the aid recipients, in what they aspire to as ‘the good
life’, leading to what can be referred to as a conﬂict of values (Rose 1980). Many
values are normative and not universally held, and so values can be promoted that
are inimical to others in society (Fowler 1996). For example, in the Indian context
promoting the interests of the marginalized, such as women or dalits, can be seen a
threat to an existing social order. To some, NGOs may be involved in ‘expanding
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moral space’ (Edwards and Sen 2000: 614), while to others NGOs may be narrow-
ing a moral space to a particular religious or social ethic, or value system. This leads
to a form of moral hazard by which NGOs can articulate their own values and
priorities as representing the values and priorities of its constituency, and so
consciously or unconsciously gain a beneﬁt in the form either of resources or
legitimacy. These can be from either public donors or from the state (Ebrahim
2001; Joshi and Moore 2000).
NGOs and the state
Another school of thought on NGO theory, while not completely at odds with
the values-based theory of Lissner, argues that NGOs are by nature in the realm of
state inﬂuence and control, to the extent that NGOs often behave as proxies for the
state (Fowler 2000b; Sen, S. 1999). They argue that there is an informal partnership
between the state and NGOs of a mutual interest, and NGOs take on a mediation
role (as a service deliverer, and/or policy adviser), between the communities with
which they are working and the state (Dutt 2004; Nagar and Raju 2003; Tayler
2005). NGOs gain legitimacy through this work and, at the same time, provide the
state with legitimacy. In this way, NGOs start to perform a ‘shadow state’ function,
or become smaller versions of government by providing government services,
therefore acting like mini-states without the accountability of a state to its citizens
(Sen, S. 1999; Williamson 1991; Zaidi 1999). Any accountability will be mainly
towards the state rather than the aid recipients, with the role of values being
somewhat diluted. Arguably, this phenomenon of being part of a ‘shadow’ state
affects the larger NGOs in a country like India, with smaller NGOs often able to avoid
state scrutiny, but as we shall see in Chapter 3, the smaller NGOs face a different set
of inﬂuences as both state and donor relations with NGOs undergo rapid change.
It is the political science theories of NGOs (Lissner 1977), which highlight their
values base and work for a broader public beneﬁt, that this book will focus on; but it
will also note the effects that government and other relations have on NGO
behaviour. These different theories of NGOs have a common element and that is
that they all point to the multiple accountabilities of NGOs, while at the same time
Table 1 A schema of NGO values
Category of NGO
values
Typology
Weltanschauung Represents a worldview or philosophy, e.g. a religious faith, humanism.
Temporal values Represents immediate concerns, e.g. humanitarian relief, human rights,
self-help, individual autonomy.
Terminal values Represents an end point to be reached such as an end to poverty;
universal education etc., e.g. the Millennium Development Goals.
Organizational
values
Represents those of the organization and how it operates, e.g. honesty,
integrity, accountability.
Source: Kilby (2006).
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highlighting the fundamental issues for NGOs – which in some ways are their
strength – of being driven by values and having a relatively broad constituency of aid
recipients. At the same time this can be seen as a weakness, in that the relationship
with the aid recipients and local communities they are working with tends to be
informal and relatively weak. The next section will explore these issues as they
apply to Indian NGOs.
Indian NGOs
Siddhartha Sen (1999) has identiﬁed two key features of Indian NGOs involved in
development work. The ﬁrst, is that NGOs play an intermediation role; that is, they
work for the poor, rather than being grassroots formations of the poor themselves
and; secondly, these NGOs are non-representative organizations. This is in line
with the general discussion of NGOs outlined above: while the number of formal
members of an NGO is very small (usually from the professional elite), they serve a
relatively large number of people in any particular area. They are mainly public
beneﬁt organizations rather than representative or mutual beneﬁt organizations, and
they are driven by altruistic motives for a broader public beneﬁt.
In India, [development] NGOs can be deﬁned as organizations that are gen-
erally formed by professionals or quasi-professionals from the middle or lower
middle classes, either to serve or work with the poor, or to channel ﬁnancial
support to community-based or grassroots organizations of the poor. The NGOs
are generally non-membership organizations and have salaried employees.
(Sen, S. 1999: 332)
Indian NGOs have a deep-seated ethical basis for altruism (Baxi 1997; Viswanath
1993). Because of the altruistic motivation, Indian NGOs:
 tend to be relatively conservative and service-oriented;
 are incrementalist (that is, they seek small improvements in people’s lives);
 promote non-violence; and
 generally avoid party political processes, and discourage party afﬁliations.
In terms of a broad values base, Indian NGOs are about the ‘existential amelioration
of victim groups … [and] the creation of community solidarity [rather than the]
achievement of political emancipation’ (Baxi 1997: 56). These values are not static
and have evolved from a complex history, which will be discussed in the next
section. As Chapters 3 and 4 will demonstrate, Indian NGOs are still evolving in
how they respond to global and national circumstances, at the same time maintaining
their values.
In the late 1980s, however, Indian NGOs were slowly moving away from directly
implementing welfare and income generation programmes, towards more self-help
approaches to development, which had been pioneered in the 1970s by NGOs such
as MYRADA and SEWA (Self Employed Women’s Association) (Viswanath
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1993). Whether this change was partly in recognition of the efﬁcacy of the
participatory approach, or a response to donor pressure is a moot point. But to
some degree this shift did represent an awareness from NGOs of the structural
causes of poverty and powerlessness, and that self-help approaches are an impor-
tant way of addressing the issues of disempowerment (Joseph 1997; Rajasekhar
1998). The self-help group approach very quickly obtained a gender dimension,
and self-help approaches were taken up in women’s programmes in recognition of
the speciﬁc disadvantage that women (particularly rural women) faced.
Women’s NGOs such as SEWA and Annapurna Mahila Mandal have existed
since the 1970s, and the Indian government had established mahila mandals
(women’s groups) in most villages during the 1950s and 1960s. However, it was
after the publication in 1987 of the Report of the National Commission on Women
‘Sharma Shakti’, which focused on the disadvantage that women faced, that the
focus on women in self-help programmes took off. As a result of these changes in
the 1980s both in the approach of NGOs to women’s programmes and the donor
support for gender and development, most development NGOs in India since the
1990s have a much stronger focus on self-help approaches, and the speciﬁc
targeting of women as their primary target group. It is the history and the relation-
ship of NGOs with the Indian state that has shaped Indian development NGOs, and
to a large extent inﬂuences the approaches they take. This history and experience is
unique, not only in South Asia, but arguably in the world. This discussion goes some
way to informing how the modern Indian development NGO of the twenty-ﬁrst
century addresses the high levels of poverty in the current development context.
NGOs in India have their origins in ancient times: written in 1,500 BC, the Rig
Veda, the ancient Aryan Scriptures, promoted the values of dharma (personal
obligations), jeev daya (humanitarian concern and a concern for all living things)
and voluntarism and philanthropy (Iyengar 2000; Mishra et al. 2006; Sen, S. 1997).
During this earlier period the provision of education, health services, cultural
promotion and dealing with natural and other types of emergencies was based on
voluntarism rather than being an obligation of the state (Sen, S. 1999), the excep-
tion being the Muarya empire of around 300 BC when the state took a strong role
(Imandar 1987). This high level of voluntarism was maintained through various
Indian empires right up until British colonization in the late eighteenth century.
It was out of this history, and the impact of the British colonial administration, that
the modern Indian NGO movement was born, but with marked differences after
independence in 1947. The pre-independence period, since around 1800, saw the
development of a strong NGO sector, which in the latter part of the colonial period
took on a strong political dimension, playing an important part in India’s indepen-
dence struggle (Sen, S. 1999; Iyengar 2000). After independence, the development
of the NGO sector was characterized by a changing relationship with the state.
NGOs under British colonial rule
In the early nineteenth century, the long standing traditions of voluntarism received
a boost from the religious, cultural and social milieu that came fromGreat Britain as
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part of its colonial inﬂuence. Paradoxically, this was at the expense of the Hindu
culture and practices from which the traditions of voluntarism emerged (Imandar
1987). The British inﬂuence begun with Christian missionaries from around 1810,
and the charity work of the Indian bourgeois class in the 1820s, who came through
the British education systems. Both groups had as their primary purpose
the provision of welfare; however, some of these groups also had the idea of
promoting political empowerment and individual autonomy, an idea which was
in part a product of the mission school systems (Sen, S. 1992). A nascent social
reform movement emerged with individuals such as Raj RamMohan Roy, Brahma
Samaj and Arya Samaj protesting against those religious ‘evils’ that promoted
women’s subjugation, such as child marriage, dowry and sati (ceremonial widow
burning). By the 1840s this social reform movement, which started in Bengal, had
extended across the sub-continent to western India (Sen, S. 1992; Seth and Sethi
1991). The next change came in the 1860s with the emergence of the ﬁrst rural self-
help groups, and co-operative and credit societies, the precursors of the modern
microﬁnance groups (Sen, S. 1992). Through this early period the colonial govern-
ment had little direct interaction with these nascent NGOs, but the rapid growth and
visibility of NGOs was instrumental in the colonial government introducing the ﬁrst
NGO regulation, in the form of the Public Trust Act and the Societies Registration
Act of 1860, providing a legal base for the emerging NGOs (Iyengar 2000).
The next stage in the development of NGOs was the progression from organiza-
tions concerned with credit and rural self-help groups, to a movement that also
addressed political rights. For example, the Indian National Congress (later to
become the Congress Party) was formed in 1885 as an NGO (Markham and
Bonjean 1995). The movement for political rights, and the work of Mahatma
Gandhi from the turn of the century, resulted in a much stronger political focus
for voluntarism, and effectively planted the notion of the liberal tradition of politics
more broadly in society. It also provided a historical legitimacy for NGO advocacy
(Seth and Sethi 1991), and gave an impetus to the development of the modern
NGOs in India, with their strong focus on both social and political change particu-
larly in rural areas (Iyengar 2000). The Gandhian movement not only had a political
purpose of getting the British out of India (the Quit India Movement of the 1920s),
but it also had a strong village-based social reform agenda based on the notion of
swadeshi or village self-government and self-sufﬁciency (Imandar 1987), which
shifted the focus of voluntarism from issues-based action to a broader political
context (Kudva 2005). The Gandhian movement at the time was funded mainly by
urban-based entrepreneurs, and involved large numbers of urban volunteers going
out to villages, and joining ashrams to work on social activism and reconstruction
programmes: thus becoming the precursors to themodern IndianNGO (Bhattacharya
1987). These groups then built on local grievances to form local organizations that
was the basis of the Gandhi’s nationalist movement (Spodek 1971). It is an over-
statement, however, to suggest nationalism was the main motivation for these local
organizations.
In the early days of Gandhi’s work in India, the central focus was on the
emancipation of peasants at the local level. It was only later that national
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implications emerged (Brown 1974). Gandhi was able to overcome the diverging
social groups that made up Indian society at the time to unite them with a common
focus, and this was largely due to the network of local organizations hewas able to set
up (Kumar 1969). The key shortcoming of Gandhi’s model was that it was reluctant
to network outside its own base to non-Gandhian groups; and it was relatively weak
institutionally, with alliances forged among diverse social groups quickly disinte-
grating when obstacles emerged. The Gandhians seemed to lack the processes
necessary for renewal and providing ongoing institutional support, and ultimately
the ashram model as a development agent was not sustainable. In the 1960s and
1970s it became vulnerable to state intervention and stagnation (Sen, S. 1992).
Another source of activism in the early part of the nineteenth century was from
the manyMarxist groups who built trade unions or kisan-sabhas at grassroots level.
Despite strong political differences between the Gandhian and the Marxist groups,
the colonial state was not able to isolate or divide them, even though they seldom
cooperated. It was the strong support by the Gandhian and the Marxist NGOs
for the independencemovement that became the basis of close collaboration between
the postcolonial Indian government and the NGOs following independence, and
throughout the 1950s. There was, however, a third group of NGOs that did not
challenge the legitimacy of the colonial state, preferring social rather than political
reform and seeing themselves (in the 1920s) primarily as welfare- or service-based.
They received grants-in-aid from the colonial state on condition they did not
support the Quit India Movement, and so became the ﬁrst recipients of government
funding for NGOs in India (Dhanagare 1990).
NGOs after independence
In the post-independence period, we can say the history of NGO and state relations
falls into three broad eras: an era of co-operation from independence until the late
1950s; an era of antagonism from the early 1960s until the late 1970s; and ﬁnally,
an era of relatively strong state control of NGOs from the mid-1980s to the present
day (Jain 1997). In reality, the elements of co-operation, antagonism and state
control have been present to varying degrees throughout the history of development
NGOs in India, but in the ﬁfty years since independence these broad trends can be
discerned.
1947–1960 – ‘the honeymoon’
NGO work in the immediate post-independence period was characterized by close
co-operation with the state, coming from the euphoria brought about by indepen-
dence, and the role NGOs, particularly the Gandhian organizations, had in achieving
it. It was also related to the Gandhian development paradigm built around village
development, which offered a way of reaching the marginalized rural poor who
were in a desperate situation at the time, having suffered decades of neglect by the
colonial state (Jain 1997). What the NGOs brought to the table was a unique
expertise in community mobilization and service delivery at village level, which
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the state did not have, and so the Indian government began funding NGOs from the
ﬁrst ﬁve-year plan. In return, the NGOs became a form of ‘shadow state’ and
offered little opposition to state development policies (Sen, S. 1992: 336). They
provided services to substitute or supplement government efforts, and tended not to
criticize government.
The main actors in this period were the Gandhian organizations, which played an
important role in the independence struggle and, as a consequence, were close to
government. They were involved mainly in training government ofﬁcials and in
promoting village-based industry (Sen, S. 1992), and were involved in the estab-
lishment of the two government authorities, the Khadi and Village Industries
Commission (KVIC) and the Central Social Welfare Board (CSWB). They both
became mechanisms for funding NGOs to develop village associations (Chowdry
1987; Nanavatty 1987); but neither body provided an avenue for sustaining NGOs.
Over 35 years the CSWB set up 10,000 organizations, but only provided funding
for programmes not infrastructure, leading to a permanent dependency on CSWB
programmes for survival (Nanavatty 1987), and as a consequence less than 10 per cent
have survived into the twenty-ﬁrst century (Mishra et al. 2006).
During the 1950s, voluntary ﬁnancial support from the business sector, which
sustained NGOs prior to independence, fell away as it was replaced by an increase
in state funding (Iyengar 2000). This led to a rapid growth in the number of NGOs
through the 1950s and into the 1960s. The range of NGOs also broadened to
include welfare groups; NGOs formed by international counterparts; non-party
political action groups; and those helped by local government and other local
NGOs. The rapid growth in the number and inﬂuence of NGOs in the broader
community sowed the seeds for disillusionment, by both government and the
NGOs, in how each saw the other’s role and effectiveness in their interactions
with society. NGOs began to see the state funding of NGO programmes as a process
of the government fostering co-option and dependency, leading to resentment and
hostility from many NGOs to the strong statist agenda being set. The state on its
part saw the NGOs as being both inefﬁcient and to a certain extent non-compliant or
even unco-operative, in implementing the government’s agenda (Sen, S. 1999) – it
was perceived by the Indian government that NGOs promised much, but delivered
considerably less. This disillusionment by the NGOs and the Indian state led to
increasing resistance to broader state policies, especially those promoting rapid
industrialization and urbanization, and an increase in antagonism between the state
and NGOs.
1960s and 1970s – the estrangement
In the 1960s, a young dissatisﬁed middle class began to set up alternative NGO
formations, which were more radical and movement-based. These young people
were at odds with the model of development being adopted by the state, one which
was seen to be increasing the gap between rich and poor. Many international NGO
donors in the West, in response to the calls for action as part of the United Nations’
First Development Decade, at the same time encouraged their Indian counterparts
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to adopt alternative development models based on village-level formations, also as
a counter to the centralized socialist state model that India was partially adopting.
However, the most radical shift was the growth of the sarvodaya movement led by
Jayaprakash Narayan and Vinova Bhave, calling for a radical revolution, involving
inter alia the voluntary redistribution of land based on principles of Gandhian
socialism (Mishra et al. 2006; Sen, S. 1992).
By the early 1970s some NGOs actively entered the political arena by rallying
around Jayaprakash and the sarvodaya movement and campaigning against the
government of the then Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi. This political campaign
peaked during the government ‘emergency’ of 1975–77, when a state of emergency
was declared, elections cancelled and the Parliament by-passed, with the Prime
Minister ruling by decree. This led to an intense struggle between the NGOs and
the government, with many NGO leaders imprisoned. The defeat of the Indira
Gandhi government in 1977 provided a reprieve for the NGOs as the new Janata
Party government, which included many Gandhians, provided an environment for
the growth of activist NGOs (Baxi 1997; Mishra et al. 2006) and an increase in
government support for NGOs (Sen, S. 1992). The Janata government, however,
was short-lived, being defeated in 1980 by a vengeful Congress Party, which
brought in the era of state control of NGOs.
1980s to 2000s – the new dispensation: more state control
The 30 years since the 1980 elections have seen a re-evaluation of the relationship
between the state and NGOs. The romanticism of the 1950s and 1960s is long gone,
and the perceived threat to the state that NGOs posed in the 1970s casts a long
shadow, and to some extent is still present. As a result of this history, the process of
the tightening of NGO regulations in India has been slow, ongoing and deliberate.
The ﬁrst step in the process started earlier when the ﬁrst Indira Ghandi government
passed the Foreign Contributions Regulation Act (FCRA) in 1976, after three years
of consultation and parliamentary committee work. The purpose of the FCRAwas
to ensure that foreign funds were used for purposes consistent with the sovereignty
of the Indian republic, and in line with Indian law. Its genesis was in 1969 when
there was a suspicion that foreign organizations, including the CIA, were providing
funding for trade unions, student bodies and others for what could be seen as
subversive activities (Ministry of Home Affairs 2008). The Act at the time, how-
ever, was aimed at the more political-based organizations rather than NGOs per se
(Jalali 2008).
The second Indira Gandhi government of 1980 gave formal recognition to NGOs
as development actors, but still saw them as a threat (Jain 1997). As a consequence,
the government put in train a number of laws and procedures to further regulate, and
arguably intimidate NGOs; one effect was that the reformist activism of the 1960s
was branded as ‘revolutionary politics’ and proscribed (Baxi 1997: 60). The ﬁrst
major legal change to the regulation of NGOs by the central government was
the enactment of the Finance Act of 1983 to remove tax deductibility for corporate
donations, and income from any business activities undertaken by NGOs. A little
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later, in 1985, there was also a further tightening of the provisions of the FCRA to
bring NGOs more directly into its purview, inter alia: to bring funds received by
third parties to give to NGOs into the Act; broaden the deﬁnition of political parties
(to include NGOs); ensure that foreign funds were received only after registration
and only through designated bank accounts; and allow Central government to
inspect and audit books of accounts of organizations (Ministry of Home Affairs
2008). This latter provision meant annual inspections and interviews by the Central
Bureau of Intelligence – a federal police function (Chowdry 1987; Puroshothaman
1998). Under the Act the government was given the ability to withdraw FCRA
approval for somewhat vague and ill-deﬁned reasons including:
If the acceptance of foreign contribution by the association is likely to be
prejudicial to (a) the sovereignty and integrity of India; (b) free and fair
elections to any Legislature or House of Parliament; (c) public interest; (d)
friendly relations with a foreign state; or (e) harmony between any religious,
social, linguistic, regional groups, caste or community.
(Ministry of Home Affairs 2007: 6)
At the same time, and somewhat paradoxically, the state continued to recognize the
important role that NGOs could play in service delivery at village level, in part to
ameliorate the perceived failings of the central government. The state beneﬁted
because it quarantined the NGOs’ work to the village level to deal with local level
issues around services, which the centralized state was unable to administer
effectively, while it limited NGOs’ voice on national issues (Kothari 1987). The
government of India’s funding to NGOs for this work was strictly for service
programmes. For example, in 1980, with the Sixth Five Year Plan (1980–1985),
the government identiﬁed new areas in which NGOs as new actors could participate
in development: the optimal utilization and development of renewable sources of
energy, including forestry, through the formation of renewable energy associations
at the block level; family welfare, health and nutrition, education and relevant
community programmes in the ﬁeld; health for all programmes; water management
and soil conservation; social welfare programmes for ‘weaker sections’; implemen-
tation of minimum needs programmes; disaster preparedness and management
(i.e. for ﬂoods, cyclones, etc.); promotion of ecology and tribal development: and
environmental protection and education (Mohanty and Singh 2001). However,
little funding was available for capacity building, institutional development, or
rights and empowerment type activities, as they were seen to be political in nature.
By the late 1990s there were not only considerable delays in obtaining FCRA
approval, but a number of NGOs had their FCRA permission threatened on the
grounds of the ‘political’ nature of their work:
… depending on the character of the issue, states may facilitate and encourage
foreign ties of some domestic actors … while prohibiting the transnational
links of other actors.
(Jalali 2008: 166)
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The other major action of the government towards NGOs in the early 1980s
was a campaign of ofﬁcial harassment. This was mainly in the form of the Kudal
Commission, a Presidential Commission to investigate the activities of the Gandhi
Peace Foundation, an umbrella organization for 945 Gandhian NGOs. The constant
scrutiny, public hearings, hostile media campaigns and accusations throughout the
period of the Commission resulted in what Chaturvedi (1987: 542) describes as the
NGOs becoming ‘distracted and confused’ and much less inclined to be involved in
national-level advocacy work. At the end of ﬁve years of investigation the Kudal
Commission found nothing untoward in the work of the Gandhi Peace Foundation
and other NGOs, and no charges were laid; but it only came to an end when a new
generation of younger NGO leaders pressured the government to have it closed
down (Sen, S. 1999).
While the Kudal Commission was the ‘stick’ against NGOs, the ‘carrot’ was
substantially increased funding toNGOs for speciﬁc programmes. The catch was that
NGOs were deﬁned very narrowly as ‘ politically neutral development organizations
which would help the government and its rural development programmes’ (from
the GOI Seventh Five Year Plan [1985–90], quoted in (Sen 1999: 342). This new
dispensation provided little space for social movements or advocacy; but on the
other hand government funding to NGOs was increased to $US172m. This increase
in government largesse to NGOs, combined with the controls on foreign funding,
effectively meant the government had got its way and had ‘co-opted, controlled,
and curbed voluntary organizations’ (Chaturvedi 1987: 543). They had used coercion
to achieve compliance through the threat of alienation; while at the same time using
remuneration to achieve a more ‘calculative compliance’ (Bhattacharya 1987: 383).
This process throughout the 1980s resembled a state version of the ‘good cop – bad
cop’ routine.
The curbing of NGOs at the national level resulted in a relatively disunited and
disempowered NGO movement by the end of the 1980s. NGO advocacy work was
directed at the state and local government level, rather than the national government
(Jenkins 1998). This was of immense advantage to the economic reformers in the
Central government, as it diverted the targets of dissent to state and local level
political processes, unlike the 1960s and 1970s when the Centre was the target for
NGO advocacy. As well as the controls and the pressure by the government, this
more conservative shift was helped by the disintegration of the more radical groups
and the left agenda, and the entry of young more technocratic professionals into the
NGO sector (Sen, S. 1992). The Gandhian and radical politics-based values of
the 1950s and 1960s were fading quickly and the new emergent NGOs had their
philosophical basis more in the ﬁeld of social work, where social change and social
mobilization were becoming more widely accepted as part of social work teaching
(Siddiqui 1997).
State scrutiny and increased funding saw two groups of NGOs emerge: those that
were more action-oriented; and those that were welfare-oriented (Kaushik 1997).
The latter group saw themselves as intermediaries between donors and the poor as
‘aid managers’, or as Sen sardonically calls them, the ‘technical branch of the poor’
(Sen, S. 1992: 184): they provided services such as health and education to the poor
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and avoided political processes of any sort. The action-oriented groups were
involved in empowerment and networking at a local level (Joshi 2003; Murthy
and Rao 1997). While there was a political dimension in dealing with issues around
empowerment, people’s rights and related issues, there was also a clear move away
from national-level activism to a more local and community-based level of political
activity. At a practical level these NGOs trod the ﬁne line of not antagonizing
local-level political ﬁgures enough that they would take their concerns to the
Ministry of Home Affairs (national government) and have the NGOs’ accreditation
threatened.
The 1990s were seen to herald a new era of state-NGO cooperation, in which the
centrepiece was a two-day Planning Commission meeting with 100 NGOs held in
1994 and chaired by Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao. The agreement from the
meeting was an Action Plan to strengthen relations between government and
NGOs, and set up consultative machinery; but there was no agreement to simplify
the contentious FCRA procedures (Joshi 2003). The Plan saw NGOs having two
main roles – the delivery of services (rather than supplementing existing services)
and the empowerment of marginalized groups. This new rapprochement was put
under some strain when the NGOs had their credibility dented by a number of
ﬁnancial scandals. In 1996 the Council for Advancement of People’s Action and
Rural Technology (CAPART) audited 2,000 of the 7,500 NGOs which it supported
and found fraud to the value of Rs50 crore ($US10m), 300 non-existent or phantom
NGOs (Murthy and Rao 1997: 66) and 26 other NGOs engaging in criminal
conspiracy to defraud (Bava 1997: 271). These scandals led to further distrust of
NGOs, not only on political grounds but also on ethical grounds, bringing into
question their role as advocates. The chequered history of NGOs in the 1980s and
1990s sets the scene for the contemporary NGO movement, and how it responds in
its work to multiple pressures of accountability while at the same time having a role
in the empowerment of the poor and marginalized.
NGOs in India today
The vibrant history of Indian NGOs in the 60 years since independence has resulted
in a more broad-based sector, but one that still has to contend with problems of
autonomy and independence. While the Indian state does not exert absolute control
over the NGO sector, it is able to keep it in check and away from the national-level
political processes, and in effect set limits on NGOs’ role as empowerment agents.
There are two major trends in Indian civil society that have had an effect on
development NGOs in the 2000s: ﬁrst, the activist groups of the 1960s and 1970s
have abandoned the NGO as an institutional form, preferring informal networks
that are completely separate from the state regulatory frameworks and scrutiny,
seeing the state as inherently oppressive and not to be trusted (Chandhoke
and Ghosh 1995; Murthy and Rao 1997; Seth and Sethi 1991). However, the
price they pay is that they remain small-scale due to the very restricted access to
resources (Murthy and Rao 1997). The second trend is the emergence of funda-
mentalist movements such as the Hindutva (Hindu nationalist movement) that are
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fundamentally undemocratic, opposing rational discourse based on freedom and
equality (Chandhoke 1995). Neither of these two changes help in having NGOs
engage in civil society processes: the total disengagement from the state weakens
the process for holding the state accountable, and the move to an intolerance of
diversity of discourse narrows the parameters in which the state can be engaged.
NGOs are affected either way, as they feel any engagement with the state on policy
issues will draw hostile attention from both social action groups on the one hand
and the fundamentalists on the other. Now that social activists and fundamentalists
both occupy the political stage, NGOs feel their role is now in helping marginalized
groups advance their own interests and assert their rights themselves.
There is also a growing vulnerability of NGOs – particularly larger ones that
are dependent on foreign funding – to state scrutiny and the state’s capacity to
cut off NGO resources. An example of this is that the dependent relationship
between NGOs and the state has limited the level of networking among NGOs,
due to competition among them for resources from the state and foreign sources,
and a fall in foreign funding sources in the 2000s. The less supportive environment
for NGOs has brought some of their less favourable characteristics more to the
fore: inﬂexibility, a feudal management style – being dominated by powerful
individuals with little devolution of power, and recruitment very much caste- or
personally based (Reddy 1987). Whether these characteristics are unique to
NGOs or are more or less an inherent style of institutional management in India
is another matter. The other side of this coin is that the decline in foreign funding
relative to local funding, together with deregulated international ﬁnancial ﬂows,
may make it more difﬁcult for NGOs to gain greater autonomy from the state,
especially if they are social change agents with broader empowerment objectives.
The regulatory pressures on NGOs through amendments to the FCRA have been
tightening; for example, in 2001 the Law Commission of India was commissioned
by government to prepare a series of amendments to the FCRA): these were ﬁnally
tabled in the Lok Sabha (Parliament) in 2006. Earlier amendments had already
resulted in substantial tightening; for example, all applicants for FCRA approval
must obtain an afﬁdavit from the district administrator explaining the nature of their
past and current activities. The 2006 draft amendment proposed a further a tighten-
ing of FCRA including: the renewing of FCRA registration every ﬁve years;
stronger restrictions on engaging in religious conversion activities but with vague
deﬁnitions of the key terms ‘inducement’, or ‘indirectly inducing a conversion’; a
forward looking clause in which the certifying ofﬁcer had to make a judgment on
the likelihood of non-compliance and whether a ‘meaningful’ project had been
prepared; a cap on administration expenses but with no supporting deﬁnitions; and
ﬁnally the provision for the state to dispose of assets purchased through foreign
donations, something that could put schools and hospitals at risk if they had
changed hands in any way (Jalali 2008; Parker 2007). On ﬁnancial matters, an
amendment in 2008 sought to remove the overall tax exemption, if there are any
business activities at all, and these could include any cost recovery activities such as
fees for running trainings and the like (AccountAble 2008). These changes mirror
a broader questioning globally of the purpose (and legitimacy) of NGOs, and
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a tightening of NGOs’ administration, marking the relationship of the state to
NGOs in the opening years of the twenty-ﬁrst century as one of mutual suspicion
and a strongly instrumentalist view of what NGOs are or should do (Jalali 2008;
Kilby 2004).
NGOs and community development
These features of the Indian NGO sector in the early 2000s present both challenges
and opportunities for more effective community development programming
and empowerment, the key role that NGOs have taken for themselves. The policy
for greater decentralization to local-level government, under the Panchayat
Raj Act of 1992, has resulted in growing numbers of local-level NGOs. The
population for each village Panchayat is now 5,000 people (down from 10,000)
while at the same time village government is now responsible for a larger budget
and a broader range of activities including water supply, village roads, community
amenities and broader development activities. This has provided NGOs with the
opportunity to be not only service providers, but also monitors and mediators
of the process; and in themselves facilitators of local-level activism and local-
level power politics through their empowerment programmes. Because local
NGOs are less visible than their national-level counterparts, they are able to take
on some of the more sensitive advocacy roles, albeit at a local level. What has
emerged is a large area of overlap, in which NGOs are able to meet social change
objectives such as empowerment through service delivery (Sen, S. 1999). This,
however, leads to a relatively simplistic interpretation of the term ‘empowerment’,
avoiding the analysis of power relations inherent in the term. To be fair, a
blended approach is also driven by the pragmatics of working with poor people
who require tangible beneﬁts, without which any interaction is seen as a waste of
their time.
Against this suspicion by the state of NGO empowerment programmes, there is
an increasing ofﬁcial donor awareness that effective poverty alleviation requires, at
the bare minimum, the participation of beneﬁciaries in development activities
rather than their being passive recipients. While the Indian state has effectively
kept NGOs out of many broader political debates, at the local level there are greater
opportunities for NGOs to use modes of intervention that enable both service
delivery and empowerment, largely free of state scrutiny. The hostile state can
also have the effect of forcing NGOs to be less spokespeople for the poor, and more
mediators or facilitators to enable the poor and marginalized to speak for them-
selves. This is something that if left alone NGOs are generally not good at, as they
can exacerbate rather than mitigate the exclusion of the poor from the political
processes by fostering a level of dependency on them to carry out this role; raising
the obvious question of the extent to which these small local groups can be
empowered if they cannot pose a threat to the larger NGO (Kaushik 1997). This
is an important outcome for the empowerment of the poor, as NGOs can deﬂect
state scrutiny away from themselves to the small, informal and locally based
representative organizations they may be working with (Rajasekhar 1998). The
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move to more local-level NGOs can still lead to co-option when they engage with
the state, raising the question of whether their role is to go further and mediate
conﬂicts between those with vested interests and the poor, and so be forced to take
positions. Localization of NGOs also weakens opportunities for networking when
they live in a competitive environment for resources, making the overall NGO reach
small and fragmented (Murthy and Rao 1997). Likewise, the assumed comparative
advantage of smaller NGOs being closer to the poor is compromised by more
scrutiny and funding from more local-level political processes. The notions of
equality, mutuality and trust may be difﬁcult to maintain, and contribute to an
alienation of the NGOs from their constituency, thus limiting their capacity for
empowerment.
The discussion of the pressures that Indian NGOs have been under over the past
20 years highlights the point that for many the values base of social change
for many NGOs has been threatened by the imperative for survival and income.
Arguably, the move to smaller local-level NGOs provides an opportunity for
the ﬂexibility for effective empowerment programme and stronger accountability
links to their constituents. However, the pressures from local-level governments
and donors place limits on this process for a fragmented set of NGO players.
Effectiveness of Indian NGOs
The key issue for NGO effectiveness that this volume examines is empowerment –
the expansion of choice and autonomous action for women, the major constituent
group for NGO work in India. A key issue is the institutional capacity of the very
poor to manage certain (mainly administrative) processes, and thus a level of
dependency is developed in which the very poor will tend to use the NGO for
institutional support and thus make the NGO seem indispensable in the community,
possibly leading to a disempowering relationship (Murthy and Rao 1997). The
other issue is one of targeting, and whether NGOs are reaching the very poor. In one
study only one-third of NGO programmes were found to reach the very poor and
most marginalized groups, and the level of targeting of landless, dalits, poor
women and poor Muslims was less than their proportion in the total population.
In other words, the programmes were inequitable and discriminating (unintention-
ally) against the very poor they were meant to help. Murthy and Rao (1997)
went on, however, to note that at least NGOs are better at targeting the poor than
the government: NGOs reached 80–100 per cent of the poor, and government
programmes reached 60–80 per cent.
Gender and NGO effectiveness
One of the paradoxes facing ‘empowerment’ NGOs in India is that the one
area where government scrutiny and threat is less, but where NGOs are still
slow to react, is gender. In particular, there is a poor response by NGOs to the
difﬁculties faced by women in rural India in disempowerment, and the concomitant
lack of access to both resources and decision-making. While government
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programmes have been targeting disadvantaged women since the 1970s, which
produced The Status of Women Committee Report, a benchmark document in the
1970s, and again in 1992 The Respective Plan for Women led to a Statutory
Commission for women, at that time there were very few NGO targeting pro-
grammes for women in general, or rural women in particular. The exceptions were a
few notable women’s NGOs such as the Self-employed Women’s Association
(SEWA) and Annapurna Mahila Mandal (both urban based). It was not until the
late 1980s that rural NGOs with a majority constituency of women emerged
(Viswanath 1993).
In the 1980s there are two general types of NGOs that work with women:
institutions in the form of service/welfare oriented hostels for working women; and
those NGO programmes that were ‘struggle-oriented’ – helping women assert their
rights (Viswanath 1993), but in the early 2000s this shifted, with most NGOs in
India targeting women at a practical level such asmicroﬁnance or income generation.
Fewer NGOs directly address gender-based violence, alcoholism, access to work
and other strategic gender needs. While there are movements around these issues,
these are led by powerful individuals or political groups, rather than NGOs per se;
and even fewer NGOs address opportunities for broader political participation or
women. When the factors of both a poor poverty focus and inadequate gender
approaches are taken together, it is the most marginalized women, dalits and tribals
who are worse off (Murthy and Rao 1997). While it may go without saying that
empowerment programmes have to deal with disempowerment and power rela-
tions, both at a personal level and more broadly in terms of the level of social
marginalization that women face, it is difﬁcult to ﬁnd a concerted movement among
NGOs to do so. If empowerment is being able to have extended choices, and being
able to act on those choices in a number of domains, then how the NGOs work with
the most disadvantaged groups, and support them to deal with their own issues, is a
key element of any intervention – which brings us to the vexed question of NGO
accountability.
Accountability and Indian NGOs
The issue of the accountability of Indian NGOs is usually discussed in terms of their
accountability to donors or the state, and it is this compliance of NGOs to state and
donor pressure that has left them out of touch with their aid recipients:
… when the activist [NGO] is not regarded as worthy of state repression, but
when the people alongside her are repressed and brutally so the problems of
accountability [to the aid recipient] assume terrifying dimensions.
(Baxi 1997: 63)
The question then is what works for NGOs in terms of their accountability to their
aid recipients. Devolved management structures can give greater opportunity for
participation of membership and responsiveness of the organizations, that is: if the
NGO listens to its members; whether it shares power; and whether it provides
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timely support. Smith-Sreen (1995) found that high levels of accountability were
correlated with higher economic beneﬁts and medium social beneﬁts, while low
levels of member accountability were associated with both low economic and
social beneﬁts. Five factors seem to have an effect on the accountability of NGOs
to their members:
 socio-cultural environment, that is the history and goals of the organization
concerned;
 NGO’s resources in terms of staff, membership, and funds;
 organizational structure of the NGO including the board, its activities and
external inﬂuences such as donors;
 organizational strategy, that is the norms and values, and leadership style, and
 organizational processes such as the group formation and co-ordinating
mechanisms.
(Smith-Sreen 1995: 92)
In the case of PREM in Orissa, Edwards (1999b) found that when the NGO reduced
its role as intermediary and handed over control to smaller representative organiza-
tions, this was an empowering process. On the other hand the ‘oligarchic tendencies’
(Sheth 1996: 133) of NGOs to take on a representative role themselves can weaken
the collective empowerment of communities (Pantoja 1999). Without constant
pressure from below NGOs can assume a paternalistic role and a shift in priorities
(Rajasekhar 2000). The complex relationship NGOs have with their constituencies
is important as the notion of accountability of NGOs to constituencies (a ‘downward
accountability’), and howNGOs foster autonomy of the constituencies in a range of
areas, is central to the idea of empowerment.
Conclusion
This chapter has drawn together a number of strands to provide a context for the
detailed look at the local NGOs in India that this book focuses on. The theory of
NGOs as values-based organizations with a number of competing accountability
pressures is a real one, but this is tempered in the Indian context by the long history
of NGOs in India which, together with the on-going tension between the state and
NGOs over the past 50 years, has created a complex and moving mosaic of NGOs
formations and NGO state relations, the main one being a strong local focus. The
tensions between the state and the NGOs provide a number of important challenges
for NGOs if they are to have an impact on the levels of poverty that exist in India
and particularly among marginalized women in rural India. The Indian experience,
particularly the dilemmas outlined above, is important for the study as it highlights
the organizational issues that NGOs face if they are to be effective. The key
questions that have emerged of Indian NGOs are those of identity and focus.
Should the focus of NGO work should be around service delivery, which is the
model favoured by the state as it hands over services to NGOs in response to
economic pressures? Or should NGOs be involved in empowerment programmes
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that focus on the poor and marginalized claiming their rights from the state? If the
focus is on empowerment then NGOs face issues around scale and internal manage-
ment structures, particularly their accountability mechanisms. These questions,
then, are on the role of accountability in empowerment; and secondly, the effect
of the range of accountability relationships that NGOs have, and how these
relationships affect their accountability to the aid recipients.
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2 The work of NGOs in India – SHGs
and women’s empowerment
Introduction
Chapter 1 outlined the broad history of Indian NGOs over the past 100 years and the
factors that have brought them to where they are in India’s national development.
The particular focus has been on the past 50 years and the role NGOs have assumed
in modern Indian society, especially the relationships they have developed with
government, which served both as regulator and supporter. The focus will now shift
to India in the early 2000s and how NGOs are situated in the broader development
scene in India, and in particular, look at their modes of operation and the approaches
they have adopted in order to be effective. The main development approach for
NGOs working with local communities that has emerged over the past 30 years is
through self-help groups (SHG). This approach originated in Karnataka in the mid-
1970s, has since been widely adopted by NGOs across the country and is now
strongly supported by government through its national ﬁve-year development plans
(Fernandez 2001). The SHG movement distinguishes itself from other models of
social organization for development programmes in that it, in theory at least, is less
about the delivery of services and more about the empowerment of group members
to be able to make and act on expanded choices, and so advance their interests.
Given that empowerment is seen as a central feature of NGO activity, even if only
aspirationally, it is important then to examine what empowerment is about. As a
starting point I will argue that empowerment can only be analysed through the lens of
disempowerment, which directly links to approaches to poverty and marginalization.
These contested terms are often treated in development discourse as a ‘given’, but
they need to be deconstructed to understand exactly what they mean, and then
examine how NGOs and SHGs deal with them. This chapter will set the context by
looking at the drivers of poverty in India, the nature of empowerment, and ﬁnally the
self-help group approach that NGOs use for empowerment and poverty alleviation.
Poverty in India
India is a country of just over 1 billion people, of whom 26 per cent live in poverty,
when the national measure of a minimum calorie intake of 2,400 calories per person
in rural areas and 2,100 calories in urban areas is applied (CIA 2008; Deaton and
Dreze 2002). While aggregate poverty ﬁgures based on household food consump-
tion hide many dimensions of poverty, they do provide a broad sketch of where
poverty in India is, particularly compared to the past (Loughhead et al. 2001). The
important institutional features of the poverty data for India are: very large regional
differences in the incidence of poverty, mainly between the north and the south of
India, with higher concentrations of poverty in the north (Murthi et al. 1996); and
worsening income inequality, rising by 10 per cent in the 1990s (Deaton and Dreze
2002). Finally, if the deﬁnition of poverty is broadened to include other indicators
such as education and health, as the UNDP Human Development Index does, then
the ﬁgure for India would be somewhat higher, with 32 per cent of households
living in poverty in 2003 (UNDP 2008).
But these ﬁgures tell us little about vulnerability, of who is falling in and out of
poverty (and why) at any point in time: for example, in a study of 36 villages in
Andhra Pradesh, the level of poverty fell two per cent over a 25-year period, but it
was not the steady (if not glacial) fall that a ﬁgure of a two per cent fall suggests. In
that 25-year period, 14 per cent of households came out of poverty and 12 per cent
of households fell into poverty – in all 26 per cent of households experienced
changes in their poverty levels (Krishna 2006). What the ﬁgures mask is the high
level of vulnerability these communities were facing, which is harder to measure:
The identiﬁcation of vulnerable households [is] more difﬁcult than that of poor
households since a household’s vulnerability depends in large measure on the
severity of the shock to which it is exposed.
(Gaiha and Imai 2004: 261)
The sources of vulnerability include shock-induced poverty, which is a result of
household-level problems like income loss and asset destruction, and recovery
problems, often called idiosyncratic vulnerability: these problems can come from
disease epidemics, cost of health care, death and funeral expenses, theft and
violence, and the shocks from globalization such as super-inﬂation, job loss, not
getting paid, etc. There is also the vulnerability that whole communities face, often
called covariate vulnerability, which includes ﬂoods, drought and the like
(Maxwell et al. 2008). Entitlement vulnerability has to do with a lack of access to
other and more rewarding options especially during a crisis; for example, the lack
of strong labour laws and the lack of recognition of workers’ rights in the context of
increased short-term migration. (Wonink et al. 2005). This is also related to
endogenous factors such as caste, education levels and gender, as they determine
‘who has assets, who can access public facilities, who has political connections and
who has supportive social networks’ (Bosher et al. 2007: 615).
Despite the rapid and impressive growth in India over the past 20 years, the issue
of chronic poverty is still a serious problem, historically in rural areas where growth
has not been able to match the rates in urban areas, due to a stagnation of investment
in the rural sector by successive governments (Jha 2002). In the early 2000s,
however, chronic poverty was increasing in urban areas due to poor job security
and higher costs of living (Loughhead et al. 2001). Despite the relatively weak rural
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sector in India there is still, however, a relatively low and slow level of urbanization,
with only 28 per cent of the population urbanized and 60 per cent still living in
villages of fewer than 5,000 people. The rate of urbanization was 12 per cent in
India in 1900 and has only doubled over the century (Datta 2006). This slow rate of
urbanization may be due both to the strong and largely conservative social structures
which underpin Indian villages, and the greater vulnerability and lack of support
structures in urban areas. Whatever the causes for these slow social changes, for the
poor there are fundamental structural issues that have to be overcome, if there are to
be signiﬁcant improvements in overall poverty levels. Some of these structural
issues have a lot to do with how village societies are organized, to which addressing
the marginalized role of women in these societies is key.
In large areas of India women live with many burdens and fears. They carry the
burden of neglect and discrimination, household work, looking after siblings and
of work outside the home. As girls they live with the fear of not getting adequate
attention, care, nourishment, medical attention and education.With adolescence
comes the fear of being sold, sometimes sold in the name of marriage, sometimes
sold into child labour and prostitution. After marriage a girl’s status descends
to an even lower level and her subservience becomes institutionalized. There
is also fear of loneliness,maladjustments, not being allowed a personhood,mental
torture and harassment, and occasionally even death –murder by her own people.
(Janardhan 1995: 39)
The improvements in the level of poverty in India over the past two decades mask
some of the ingrained institutional barriers that prevent marginalized groups such as
dalits, scheduled tribes and women from converting any increased income they
should be receiving, either from the state as welfare, or from their families, to access
basic needs (Mehta and Shah 2003). If we look at gender disparities, a focus of this
book, the poverty levels for female-headed households in India are a full 20 per cent
higher than the national average, and the story is similar for inequality levels
(Meenakshi and Ray 2003; Sen and Mukherjee 2006). One way of measuring the
extent of gender disadvantage is the sex ratio of females to males, which points to a
systemic societal bias towards men and boys in all aspects of the life cycle. Because
of women’s greater longevity the norm should be a little more than 1000 women
per 1000 men, but for India in 2001 it was a low 933 females per 1000 males (the
lowest for all major countries). The lower ratio for India is due to higher mortality
rates for females than males in all age cohorts as a result of the discrimination and
violence Indian women experience throughout their lifecycle; and this ratio is getting
worse over time (the ﬁgure for in India in 1901 was 972 females per 1000 males
(Census of India 2001: 3).
Women live with many of Janardhan’s burdens and fears, and these play out to
create what Amartya Sen call the ‘missing women’; the women who otherwise
should be alive. Selective abortion (increasingly common in India as the price of an
amniocentesis falls) is but one reason for the ‘missing women’. The social dis-
advantage suffered by women is by far a greater contributing factor. Some of the
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statistics that point to the extent of disadvantage are: the earned income for women
is 34 per cent of that for men; the adult literacy ratio for women is 70 per cent of that
for men; primary school enrolment for girls is 85 per cent of that for boys; high
school enrolment ratio is 80 per cent; tertiary enrolment ratio is 70 per cent, and so
on (UNDP 2008). These statistics point to an ‘unequal allocation of food, lower
wage rates and a lack of inheritance rights’ (Mehta and Shah 2003: 503). In short, it
means poorer life outcomes for women relative to men. These gender biases go well
beyond the household, as women have a lower level of both legal and normative
entitlements to ownership and exchange of both land and produce. This leads to
exchange failures for women in terms of the prices they receive for their produce
and their labour; their social relations within the household and the village; and
ﬁnally, in terms of the claims that women can make on the state for welfare and
other beneﬁts. As if this were not enough, there are also large differences in
endowments between men and women to access assets and control their labour;
as well as differences in their status, access to training to upgrade their skills, and
access to inputs for agriculture and other income generation activities. While there
have been improvements over the past decade, there is still some way to go to
overcome the institutionalized disadvantage for Indian women.
These persisting social barriers have been exacerbated since the 1990s by a trend
to greater fragmentation in Indian society exempliﬁed by the rise of the Hindu
nationalist movement, hindutva, which has produced more caste, ethnic and reli-
gious conﬂict, and led to an increased disenfranchisement of minorities such as
Muslims, tribals and dalits; and with it a reasserting of more traditional gender roles
(Das 2008). This more conservative shift tends to weaken the capacity for women
to be heard at the political level, leading to greater levels of intolerance and
increased denial of rights at the local level. On the other hand, religious funda-
mentalism is attractive to those women who regard modernization as a chaotic and
unsettling process, as fundamentalism provides some compensation and a refuge.
The hindutva has afforded new ‘safer’ roles and status for women, such as performing
Hindu rituals and meeting with other women on religious issues. This has the effect
of elevating their self-worth at an individual level, and at the same time changing the
woman’s role in public spaces from a social or even political one, to a religious one.
In this context, work outside the home is seen as a poverty-driven coping strategy or a
desperation measure, rather than as a springboard to escape poverty (Parker et al.
2003). This new dispensation ensures that the traditional roles, duties and responsi-
bilities of women remain ﬁrmly in place, and it sets out boundaries as to how far
‘empowerment’ and other social progress for women can go. Dress codes, for
example, become important, along with marriage alliances and feminine ‘modesty’,
which to somemight be seen as code for submissiveness, and to ‘uphold the patriarchal
family and to be the ideal wife/daughter/sister/mother…’ (Srinivasan 2007: 126).
Poverty and the political reforms of the 1990s
One of the sources of the modernizing change that has reduced poverty levels in
India, these reforms were effectively forced on the government by the mounting
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debt of the 1980s when the foreign debt for India rose from 17.7 per cent of GNP to
an unsustainable 24.8 per cent in 1990. Not only was there a dramatic increase in
the levels of debt but the type of debt also changed from long-term concessional
government debt, to short-term and higher risk private debt. This level of debt,
together with government current expenditure at unacceptable levels, was leading
the country to an economic crash, and the associated loss of conﬁdence in
the economy (Panagariya 2004). As a result emergency provisions were put in place
and a number of government controls were removed: changes included relaxing the
terms of investment, easing the regulations on the ownership of assets and land,
partially ﬂoating the exchange rates, and privatizing some public assets and func-
tions. The immediate effect was a sharp rise in rural poverty from 35 per cent to
44 per cent in the ﬁrst two years following the reforms, with the landless, casual
labour and women-headed households being hardest hit (Jha 2002). The proportion
of women in paid employment fell from 28 per cent to 23 per cent (Murthy and Rao
1997). The beneﬁt, however, was that over the next decade goods and services trade
nearly doubled from 17 to 31 per cent of GDP, thus boosting the economy and
leading to an overall fall in poverty levels, but for poor rural women the beneﬁt, if
any at all, was minimal.
This account of poverty in India and the complex array of changes that have
occurred politically, socially and economically has left NGOs, and their work in
the early twenty-ﬁrst century, set in a context of uncertainty and challenge. The
nature of poverty in India, and the changes in its structure that the economic reforms
have brought, together with the related social changes, have ampliﬁed the difﬁculties
that NGOs face. The opportunity for NGOs, therefore, lies in addressing the
structural inhibitors that keep poverty levels high for the marginalized, including
women. The focus then should be on those structures that deal with gender and
powerlessness, but the dilemma is: how can this best be carried out?
Models of NGO intervention
As indicated earlier, the main model of intervention for the majority of Indian
NGOs working in rural areas on issues of gender and poverty is the self-help group.
It is a form of savings based microﬁnance, which is essentially a mutual-based
model aimed primarily at women, and is now the preferred model for government,
NGOs and multilateral agencies for community intervention in India. In 2006 there
were over two million SHGs across India, with 33 million members and delivering
services to well over 100 million people (Isern et al. 2007). The basis of the SHG is
that 10 to 20 women come together to form a thrift and credit group: each member
puts a small amount of money each week into a common fund, and after a period of
six to twelve months, small loans from the fund are then made to selected members,
based on their savings level and a needs assessment. This fund is often supplemen-
ted on a matching basis from additional resources from an NGO, either as a loan or
grant, or by loans from commercial or state ﬁnancial institutions facilitated by the
NGO. These loans are then applied to a range of uses, which are ideally for
productive purposes in that they will be able to generate additional income to
The work of NGOs in India 29
enable repayments. They can also be made for necessary consumption purposes
such as health costs and school fees, as well as daily expenses during an emergency
or unemployment.
The model meets the demand of poor women for access to affordable credit, and
it enables a broader social intermediation function by the NGO, fostering the
notions of self-help and self-reliance that should lead to sustainability (Banerjee
2004). However, there is an argument that when credit is promoted, the ﬁnancial
accountability requirements and the resources required lead to the social change
objectives being given a lower priority:
[SHG programmes] … tend to instrumentalize women either to improve their
income or assets without necessarily having the effect of improving their status
or access to resources/income. Women take up economic programmes such as
micro-enterprise and increase their economic contribution to the household,
without actually experiencing a corresponding increase in their social status or
decision-making power at home.
(Abbi 1999: 30)
The participation of women in SHGs is very much about the gender relationships
within their households (for instance, whether the women’s husband and/or
extended families support or hinder participation in SHGs) and the social relation-
ships and structures within the group, both of which, if not well managed, can add
to the women’s burdens (Ahmed et al. 2001; Kantor 2003; Murthy 2004). But not
only is the potential burden on women an issue, these programmes tend to be
discriminatory against the landless as they tend to favour people with some assets,
usually land. NGOs tend to avoid these difﬁcult issues, and promote the SHG
model of microﬁnance as being relatively unproblematic.
Despite this ‘downside’ of the microﬁnance based SHG programmes, the evidence
does suggest these programmes do reach the poor, and even though there is strong
ﬁnance emphasis, empowerment outcomes are often achieved (Kilby 2006;
Tesoriero 2005) – these outcomes will be examined in more detail in Chapter 5.
At a practical level, microﬁnance-based programmes are a very important entry
point for any form of social transformation, as very poor women do not usually
have the time to come together at the behest of an NGO unless there is a clear
tangible beneﬁt to them and their families. Without the lever of microﬁnance
through these savings programmes, NGO access to poor and vulnerable women
would be much harder. The question, however, is whether microﬁnance displaces
the social change work NGOs seek to achieve.
NGOs, self-help groups and empowerment
The features of the Indian NGO sector in the early 2000s presented in Chapter 1
present both challenges and opportunities for more effective community develop-
ment programming and empowerment. For example, tighter regulation, promotion
of SHGs, greater decentralization to local-level government, all led by the national
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government, have resulted in a sharp growth in the numbers of local or district-based
NGOs. These NGOs are not only service providers, but are also facilitators of local-
level activism and local-level power politics, and have a role as empowerment
agents (Sen, S. 1999; Anand 2002). It is because these local NGOs are less visible
than their national-level counterparts that they are able to take on some of the more
sensitive advocacy roles, albeit at a local level. The dilemmas that the new local
NGOs are facing, however, with the shift in their funding to more national and state
government sources, is how to manage the balance between being efﬁcient and
effective service providers of government programmes supporting the local-level
state, and supporting issues of empowerment, which requires ﬂexibility and time,
and some distance from the state.
These local-level NGOs would argue that they are able to meet their social change
objectives such as empowerment through service delivery (Karlekar 2004).
However, it can be also be argued that a service delivery approach leads to a
relatively simplistic interpretation of the term ‘empowerment’, avoiding any analysis
of the power relations inherent in the term (Lingam 1998). The SHG approach is
also driven by a suspicious state, one which prefers to see NGOs conﬁned to service
delivery roles rather than empowerment, to which the controlling state is generally
averse. Against state suspicion of empowerment programmes, both NGO and
ofﬁcial international donors are aware that effective poverty alleviation requires,
at the bare minimum, the participation of beneﬁciaries in development activities,
rather than their being passive recipients. How far local NGOs can go in this ﬂuid
context is difﬁcult to determine. For example, if we examine health care, an area
which SHGs with group savings and local advocacy should be able to support, the
evidence is that they have not been able to do much due to the hierarchical nature
of health care provision in India, and the lack of health care facilities and service to
start with (Nayar et al. 2004; Thorp et al. 2005). While there is little evidence to
date, it would seem the use of SHGs in service delivery is not a viable solution, as
they require an effective state around them to which they can advocate change. There
are exceptions of course, as we will see with the case of Jagruti in Chapter 3. The
other issue is that the groups themselves are not necessarily equitable and fair social
structures, and most will have some barriers to entry, thus often excluding the very
poor. This is not to say SHGs are not important and effective, but it is easy to
overstate the real and potential beneﬁts that they can deliver (Moyle et al. 2006;
Thorp et al. 2005). Despite these limitations, however, international donors take the
view that effective poverty alleviation requires that empowerment itself is a key
component, and one that must go beyond mere service provision. However, the
expanding role of the state as donor, through its government instrumentalities, does
not see empowerment in quite the same light.
While the Indian state has effectively kept NGOs out of many of the broader
political debates, at the local level there are greater opportunities for NGOs to use
modes of intervention that enable both service delivery and empowerment, largely
free of state scrutiny. As a consequence of the pressures placed on NGOs by the
State through the 1980s, NGOs are now reluctant to act as spokespeople for the
poor, but act more as mediators or facilitators to enable the poor andmarginalized to
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speak for themselves. This has its advantages, as NGOs are generally not good in
the role of spokesperson: they can exacerbate, rather than help overcome, the
exclusion of the poor from the political processes. They can foster a level of
dependency of the poor on NGOs to carry out the role of speaking for the commu-
nity, rather than the more empowering role of facilitating the community to speak
for itself (Kothari 1987; Robinson 1995). Despite the move to local NGOs and their
role in encouraging communities to speak for themselves, there is still a danger of
co-option, especially when local level NGOs engage with the state at any level. The
other problem is that the reach of local NGOs is very small and fragmented, and
local NGOs can also be compromised by more local-level state scrutiny, funding and
political interference. On the other hand, smaller local NGOs may be able to more
directly address issues of rights and political empowerment (Handy andKasam2006).
The discussion of the pressures that Indian NGOs have been under for the past
20 years highlights the point that for many the values base of social change for
NGOs has been threatened by the imperative for survival and income. On the one
hand, the move to smaller local-level NGOs provides an opportunity for the
ﬂexibility for effective empowerment programmes with stronger accountability
links to the aid recipients, but on the other hand the pressures from local- and
national-level governments and donors can place limits on this process. Given these
complex forces that local NGOs face if they are to use SHGs for empowerment,
how does this work in practice?
Empowerment
The growing popularity of the term ‘empowerment’ has led to a broadening of
the deﬁnition to the extent that the concept is becoming less clear and is shifting
away from the central notion of power, from which it derives. Some authors argue
that the use of the term has become ubiquitous to the point that it seems to have
become another buzzword in development practice, merely to repackage old aid
programmes for the purpose of obtaining funding (Batliwala 2007; Cornwall and
Brock 2005;Moore 2001). Development agencies often use the term ‘empowerment’
to refer to a range of activities, many of which have little to do with addressing the
power relations among the various actors or groups in society, with the term often
being used to:
screen off power relations from the public discourse and obscure hegemonic
relations.… This conception of power as post-modern warm fuzzy expansible,
not only conceals its hard edge; this cloak of opacity also discourages nasty
questions of who beneﬁts and how, and runs the danger of collapsing objectives,
processes and outcomes alike into undifferentiated rhetorical empowerment.
(Cheater 1999: 7)
In order to avoid generalized usage of the term empowerment, let us go back to the
fundamental notion of empowerment and its relationship with power relations. As a
starting point, I will propose a relatively narrow deﬁnition of empowerment: as
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being related to ‘agency’, or the expansion of individuals’ choices and actions,
primarily in relation to others. This deﬁnition of empowerment is important, as it
can provide a basis for the measurement of empowerment; while at the same time
being the foundation for broader social change, which entails access to power by
those who are disempowered. It can be both a ‘means’ and an ‘end’ in the devel-
opment process and is the key reason for its popularity as a development concept
(Ackerson and Harrison 2000). As a ‘means’, the empowerment of beneﬁciaries in
a development programme can lead to particular outcomes such as the improved
management of community resources like schools and irrigation facilities to ensure
their sustainability. Empowerment can also be an ‘end’ in a development interven-
tion, in that the purpose of a programme may be the empowerment of a particular
group of people who would otherwise remain disempowered – empowerment of
women being probably the most common in this category. Such activities are seen
as important in that empowered people are able to participate in development
programmes, assert their rights and be in a better position to demand services
from government and other service providers.
It is important to note at this point that empowerment is related to but distinct
from ‘participation’ (another buzzword in development), when talking about changes
in the relations of groups and individuals with each other and external agents.
‘Empowerment’ looks at participation in terms of expanded choices and action in
community life, while the notion of participation is very broad and encompasses
actions ranging from the mere provision of information, consultation, through
to local control and partnerships (see Arnstein’s [1969] ladder of participation).
By focusing on empowerment we can move to greater local control and the
processes required to achieve it. In this way the social relations between the
beneﬁciaries of a development programme and the authorities should change.
An essential aspect to empowerment is that an accountability relationship is also
established between the patron (in development a government or a donor) and the
client, so that a particular activity is sustainable and an ongoing ﬂow of beneﬁts is
assured. So how do development interventions lead to empowerment outcomes,
and what is the role of accountability in these interventions?
Theories of empowerment
The debate around the notion of empowerment in social relations can be divided
into two broad views: one is that empowerment is primarily about the individual
and changes in their cognitive processes; or the other, that empowerment is about
changes in social relations. The supporters of individually-based notions of
empowerment argue that it is only indirectly related to the direct exercise of
power, but rather it is more about personal cognition and awareness from which
other changes follow, and so this view eschews notions of domination, consent and
resistance, in terms of personal changes: ‘[Empowerment] … is a construct that
links individual strengths and competencies, natural helping systems, and proactive
behaviours to matters of social policy and social change’ (Zimmerman and
Rappaport 1988: 726).
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Critics argue that those views of individual empowerment which avoid notions of
control in favour of non-adversarial and relatively benign changes merely promote
a ‘sense of empowerment’ [emphasis added], that is cognitively based, a sense
of personal control rather than actual control (Riger 1993). This distinction
reﬂects psychology’s two views of human nature: cognition, in which ‘the person
creates reality’; and behaviourism, which posits that ‘reality creates the person’,
i.e. people are inﬂuenced by their environment. Riger’s argument goes that it does
not reﬂect an increase in actual power but rather is a ‘false consciousness’ (p. 281).
The other more radical view of empowerment is that it is inextricably linked to
political issues and rights, whether they are in the realm of patriarchy and the
family, or community power structures (Kabeer 2005). Here empowerment entails
a process of change for the powerless or disempowered, whereby these disempow-
ering institutional structures are challenged. In this framework empowerment is
not a passive process.
These two views of empowerment, while being placed at different ends of
a spectrum, are not mutually exclusive. For example, there is the notion of both a
‘performative aspect and a substantive aspect of voice’ [original emphasis] in
empowerment (Goetz 2001: 35). That is, empowerment has both cognitive and
political components: it is not only a sense of having expanded choice but also of
being able to act on those choices; and considers new forms of social identity,
consciousness and cognition in human action (Mayoux 2000; Puroshothaman
1998). Empowerment has both cognitive and political dimensions: one cannot
act without awareness, and similarly, awareness without corresponding action is
meaningless. According to Jandhyala empowerment is:
… a process whose outcomes would lead to renegotiations of gender
relations, enhance women’s access and control over human, material, ﬁnancial
and intellectual resources, legitimize women’s entry into non-traditional
spaces, create new spaces, and support systems to sustain the process of
empowerment.
(1998: 205)
To tease out the debate on empowerment, a useful starting point is to examine the
notion of empowerment at an individual level and then look at the implications and
tensions that arise for the broader collective and political dimensions.
Individual dimensions of empowerment
The community psychology literature emerging from studies of alienation views
empowerment as part of the building of an individual’s self-knowledge and self-
esteem to reduce feelings of alienation and enhance feelings of solidarity and
legitimacy (Robinson-Pant 2004). Individual empowerment is ‘the reciprocal
inﬂuences and conﬂuence of macro and micro level forces that impact the
emotional cognitive and behavioural aspects of individuals’ (Speer 2000: 52),
and these changes are in:
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 meaning which revolves around beliefs, values and behaviours;
 competence or self-efﬁcacy, or the belief of being able to conduct particular
tasks or roles;
 self-determination or the choices individuals have in initiating or regulating
their actions;
 impact or the degree to which one inﬂuences the outcomes of others; and
 how people understand and relate to their social environment and the role of
collectives in community life.
This approach, which is based on individual changes, does not acknowledge the
structural issues which lead to empowerment programmes in the ﬁrst place; for
example, women’s experience of disempowerment by virtue of the patriarchal
structures in the family, and society more broadly. Therefore, another way of
looking at empowerment is through the lens of disempowerment: a ‘lack of control
over destiny’ (Campbell and Jovchelovitch 2000: 261); ‘polluting’ events which
are ‘not fair’; an ‘affront to dignity’ (Kane and Montgomery 1998: 266); and
‘isolation in decision-making’ (Puroshothaman 1998: 50). What these views of
empowerment and disempowerment have in common is a strong individual dimen-
sion, but it is these same disempowering factors, largely driven by social structures,
that affect group dynamics and disempower whole groups. However, making a
judgement on what is disempowering, and the structural drivers, can raise its own
set of problems: for example, a perceived lack of control over destiny may simply
be due to laziness, incompetence, individual preference, or different priorities; rather
than the action of others, or structural inequality.
There are also differences between the various capacities of decision-making,
that is different levels of disempowerment, and the different choices people make –
people may simply choose not to choose. For example, a woman might be living
in purdah (seclusion) because she is pressured by patriarchal or other forms of
social power, or because she perceives there are beneﬁts for doing so, such as
gaining prestige, or maintaining her privacy. Purdah per se is not an indicator, but
rather it is the socio-political context in which it is placed that determines the
freedom a woman has to exercise her choice (Kabeer 1999). Demonstrating a
causal relationship in these complex social systems is almost impossible. Kabeer
argues that if disempowerment is to be meaningful there must be a ‘deep-seated
constraint on the ability to choose’ (p. 438). This point brings us back to the
structural issues I touched on earlier, which are related to power.
The complex relationships between empowerment and disempowerment, and
the role of the individual and the group can really only be persuasively examined
through the lens of power, and the related theories around power. A key theory by
Lukes (1974) and others (Bachrach and Barantz 1970) is that the exercise of power
is, in part, a constraint on decision-making: power is asserted by conﬁning
another’s decision-making spaces. It is, more often than not, done subtly through
manipulation rather than domination, and decision-making is restricted to relatively
‘safe’ issues, involving ‘non decision-making’ as much as decision-making. The
exercise of power is less about conﬂict and more about inﬂuencing, shaping and
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even determining the wants of another. These nuanced approaches to the notions of
power give some insight as to both why disempowerment is experienced, and the
key characteristics of individual empowerment outlined above. In other words,
people’s lack of control over their destiny or inability to choose can be explained by
the constraints on their decision-making space, and it is the overcoming of these
constraints that is empowering. In this schema, individual empowerment then takes
on different forms with different people: ‘Depending on the context, empowering
behaviours might range from individuals adjusting to adverse conditions that are
not malleable to change, to working with others in a voluntary organization to alter
the distribution of community resources’ (Speer 2000: 52).
In summary, these views of empowerment are related to an individual’s relations
with others. Empowerment is expressed in terms of cognitive changes that in turn
may lead to further actions in their relationships. This nuanced individualistic view
of power, however, understates the broader political dimensions of power and the
notion of domination (Riger 1993). An individual approach to empowerment is
somewhat reductionist, and focuses too much on a sense of empowerment rather
than on actual empowerment. The focus on the personal (in terms of how indivi-
duals feel or perceive the world) disconnects human behaviour from the larger
socio-political context, and therefore serves to maintain a status quo rather than lead
to substantial change. There are larger systemic issues that create powerlessness
and negative life outcomes for individuals. The emphasis on personal empower-
ment also gives insufﬁcient weight to the importance of co-operation among
individuals and community processes: individual empowerment is more concerned
with control than co-operation, while community empowerment is to some extent
about subverting the notion of individual control to the community good (Riger
1993). It is possible to have an empowering collectivity that disempowers indivi-
duals and vice versa (Kane and Montgomery 1998). Empowerment, though, is not
about simple trade-offs between the individual and the group: it is more about how
the group can reinforce individual agency and vice versa. Individual empowerment
can only occur in a social context and so must involve co-operation.
To bring the two competing streams together, a third analysis is to see power as
enhancing the capacity to act rather than being about domination of others. Power
through this lens is, by its nature, transformative and can be seen as an ‘agent’s
capabilities to reaching outcomes’ (Giddens 1979: 88). In other words, while power
is usually directed at others, that is not the primary reason: power is asserted to give
a particular beneﬁt to those who exercise it, therefore power relations are two-way:
‘however subordinate an actor may be in social relationships the very fact of their
involvement in that relationship gives him or her a certain amount of power over the
other’ (p. 6). According to Giddens (1979) the subordinates in any power relation-
ship are adept at converting the resources they have in terms of knowledge or social
relations (or even physical assets) into a source of control, and therefore they gain
some power. This can only be done if power has a collective character; it is a
‘network of decision-making and an institutional phenomena’ requiring a collec-
tivity of support and an institutional framework in which to act (p. 89). The exercise
of power is then a social phenomenon: ‘Power within social systems, which enjoy
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some continuity over time and space, presumes regularized relations of autonomy
and dependence between actors and collectivities in contexts of social interaction’
(Giddens 1984: 16).
Power is the capacity of one or more agents to make a difference and inﬂuence
change in others, and at the same time it is a structural resource of a community.
Individuals can draw on power ‘in the course of their interaction with others’ as it is
inherent in all social systems (Hindess 1996: 9). The implication then is that power
is the property and resource of a social community, and thus involves reproducing
relations of both autonomy and dependency in social interactions. This notion of
power as a social resource with collective aspects, and being dynamic and multi-
directional, brings us to the notion of agency.
Agency has two features: ﬁrst, it is the range of choices that an individual might
have (Kabeer 1999); and second, it is the capacity to exercise those choices, or to
act on them. For Giddens, agency is a deﬁning feature of being human: ‘to be a
human being is to be a purposive agent which both has reason for actions and can
elaborate on them’ (1984: 3); but agency is more than simple choice and action:
Agency is about more than observable action; it also encompasses the meaning,
motivation and purpose which individuals bring to their activity… it can take
the form of bargaining and negotiation, deception and manipulation, subver-
sion and resistance as well as more intangible, cognitive processes of reﬂection
and analysis. It can be exercised by individuals as well as by collectives.
(Kabeer 1999: 438)
Agency can also be seen as a ‘continuous ﬂow of conduct’ and so by its nature is an
intervention (Giddens 1979: 55) and a ‘continuous process by which action trans-
forms both structures and individuals’ (Giddens 1984: 14). In this theory, it has a
feedback loop: the more one exercises their choices the greater the expansion of
opportunities. The concept of agency and action is therefore tied to that of trans-
formative power – it enables a capability to reach outcomes, and is a process of
change. One way of looking at it, is as a continuum of conduct that can be divided
into categories or typologies of power. For example: power over, which is about
control and domination; power to, which is about the opportunity to act more freely
within some realms; and power from, which is about the ability to resist the power
of others (Hollander and Offermann 1990). In practice there is often a blurring of
the understanding of the notion power over and power to in what is being sought in
empowerment. Many interventions can increase people’s power to act (their
agency), by enhancing self-esteem, but do little to affect their power over resources,
policies or, in the case of women, the patriarchy (Riger 1993).
The exercise of power is also related to the arenas or contexts in which it is used.
Power is not only related to a capability to reach certain outcomes, but more
importantly, it is related to access to certain domains and the ability to mobilize
resources in those domains – ‘domains of power’ (Vijayalakshmi 2001: 4), or even
access new spaces (Jandhyala 1998). These might be, inter alia: the household; the
local institutional structures; the political community; the broader economy; and
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civil society. Power being seen as access to decision-making spaces, in the forms of
various socio-political domains, is important for how NGO empowerment pro-
grammes may be conducted. It this understanding of the nature of empowerment,
and the inherent tensions touched on above, that drives effective empowerment
programmes. It affects the approach taken and the indicators used to determine
positive empowerment outcomes either at the level of the individual or the group.
However, it is also the collective dimensions of empowerment that are an integral
part of the equation and cannot be ignored.
Collective dimensions of empowerment
Collective empowerment is in part how individual empowerment can affect col-
lective processes (Pilsuk et al. 1996). At a superﬁcial level collective empowerment
is a summation of individual empowerment, which leads to the self-efﬁcacy of a
group: it is a collective phenomenon derived from the psychological empowerment
of individuals. However, it is much more than this, as there is also strength derived
from the ‘web of continuing relationship … [and] mutual support’ (Pilsuk et al.
1996: 17), resulting in enhanced access by individuals to resources in the arenas of
economic, political and social decision-making. The group gives voice, value,
identity and support to the individual, and a sense of power develops in the
course of collective action, which ‘validates the primacy of… agency and renders
it more visible’ (Puroshothaman 1998: 155. There is thus a feedback loop or
virtuous circle: of personal power producing a collective sense of legitimacy and
an awareness of a collective sense of rights (leading to collective action), which in
turn leads to enhanced personal power. The outcomes of community empower-
ment, therefore, are a raised level of psychological empowerment, political action
and a redistribution of resources and/or decision-making (Calman 1992). Riger
(1993) argues that this process may not be so benign when a vicious circle emerges
of individual or psychological empowerment undermining or weakening commu-
nity empowerment as people begin to act more autonomously: ‘The image of the
empowered person… reﬂects the belief in separation, individuation, and individual
mastery … [contrasts] with an alternate vision that emphasizes relatedness and
interdependence as central values of human experience’ (Riger: 285). The situa-
tions that foster communal or collective values are in tension with those that foster
agency or control, that is ‘control rather than communion’ (p. 285). An individual’s
understanding of power and social change in a group, may differ from their
own sense of control and efﬁcacy. They may experience personal dimensions of
empowerment, quite differently and in a disconnected way to how they see com-
munal notions of empowerment. This tension lies between a person’s instrumental
values,which are attempts to control, and their expressive values, which are about
interpersonal relationships.
Riger goes on to argue that expressive values, being about interrelationships and
dependency, may be valued less in society than instrumental values, which are
about control and achievements. However, the powerless, who are not in a position
to exercise autonomy and choice, depend on communal goals to survive:
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Does empowerment of disenfranchised people and groups simultaneously
bring about a greater sense of community and strengthen the ties that hold
our society together, or does it promote certain individuals or groups at the
expense of others, increasing competitiveness and lack of cohesion?.
(p. 291)
Related to this question is whether the group is the means by which the individual
is empowered, or is an empowered individual a way for a group to more ably assert
its rights and needs? At a practical level these two questions raise the important issue
of what is an appropriate balance between the personal and the collective in empow-
ering processes, and how NGOs and others that seek to facilitate the empowerment
of the poor can ﬁnd this balance in the approaches they take.
Empowerment and development
The preceding section has argued that empowerment is about both groups and
individuals, being group processes that lead to change in the lives of individuals:
In order to be truly empowered, poor people must be able to go beyond their
consciousness of themselves as eternal victims, to transcend their self-
perception towards greater control over their lives and environment. This internal
change in awareness, while catalysed by group processes, is profoundly and
intensely personal and individual.
(Sen, G. 1997: 5)
Not only do the group or collective processes provide a support or catalyst role for
individual empowerment, these processes also provide a context through which
individuals can become aware of the local realities, and in India the SHG can
provide this role. This awareness occurs through the social cohesion the group
brings, and the local networks to which the group exposes its members. For this
process to occur, both individual and collective notions of empowerment must
co-exist and prioritize the importance of control over resources. Control over
external resources can give capacity for self-expression, while a change in personal
agency can overcome barriers to accessing resources. Empowerment may be the
balance between individuals accessing resources and their inner transformation. In
India, it is a lack of understanding of this complex process that results in problems
in bothNGO and government empowerment programmes. Government programmes
can falter because they focus on control over external resources, while NGO
programmes can falter because they focus predominantly on inner transformations.
Empowerment also involves changes in power relations, which in turn can lead
to some degree of social upheaval. At times, for example in gender programmes
challenging patriarchy, empowerment is a zero-sum game with some (men) sur-
rendering power while others (women) gain power. Empowerment is also related to
the idea of development as ‘a process of change in social dynamics [which] alters
the social economic and political power base [and is] a process of confrontation’
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(Gorain 1993: 381). While changes in power relations between societal actors may
not always be a consequence of empowerment, a central tenet of empowerment is
the potential and opportunity for these changes to occur. Empowerment, therefore,
goes beyond the individual and the group, and enters the realm of political change
and social justice. Empowerment then becomes more than merely choices, but a
sense of personal control or inﬂuence, and a concern with actual social inﬂuence,
political power and legal rights. This normative analysis should be treated with
some caution, as it tends to gloss over the tensions between personal and collective
empowerment outlined above. It risks romanticizing empowerment by ignoring
the realities of power relations within groups and communities as a result of the
intersectionalities of ethnicity, class, gender and other social divisions.
If we look at the rationale of development interventions for empowerment,
particularly women’s empowerment in a developing country context, there are
three paradigms:
i An economic paradigm that promotes development interventions to improve
women’s capacity for increasing their income either through employment or
micro-enterprises. This paradigm assumes ‘reinforcing spirals’ that occur as a
result of increased income and economic independence, which in turn lead to
social and political change and greater personal empowerment;
ii A poverty alleviation paradigm which focuses on decreased vulnerability and
looks at ‘mutually synergistic interests’ at the household level. It takes the view
that addressing practical needs, such as health or education, is the best way of
addressing gender inequality and as a consequence women are empowered; and
iii A feminist paradigm, which addresses gender subordination at the individual,
organizational, and macro levels. Economic programmes are seen only as an
entry point for wider social, political and legal empowerment.
(Mayoux 1999)
These three paradigms are not mutually exclusive, but uneasily co-exist to varying
degrees in development programmes, with women’s empowerment as an assumed
outcome in all three. The ﬁrst two, the economic and poverty alleviation paradigms
of empowerment rest on two assumptions: ﬁrst, that there is an economic priority
in people’s lives; and secondly, that economic and physical well-being results in
socio-political beneﬁts through the increased choices that these beneﬁts can bring.
The problem is that these two assumptions are ﬂawed: ‘bringing women together
for savings and credit does not necessarily develop a sense of solidarity or joint
exploration of ways in which women’s problems can be overcome (Mayoux 1999:
976). Likewise other microﬁnance studies that focused on poverty as being related
to a lack of entitlements found that microﬁnance did not expand women’s choices
but in fact increased women’s burdens (Goetz and Gupta 1996; Kabeer 2001;
Mayoux 2001; Rahman 1999). In these cases women generally are held responsible
by the facilitating NGO for the loans, but it is their male relatives who have the
control. The women’s workload is increased due to pressure placed on them from
both within the families and from the NGO staff. These programmes have a
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paradoxical effect of reducing the choices available to women by adding to their
burdens, creating dependency relationships with the NGO microﬁnance provider,
as well as reinforcing gender inequality.
Economic programmes may not accord directly with women’s immediate prio-
rities. When women were asked to rank their own indicators of empowerment
according to their importance in their lives, economic change was rated lower than
education for children (Kilby 2006). The weakness of the economic and poverty
paradigms is that they rest on general assumptions about the most appropriate path
to women’s empowerment and that physical or economic resource constraints are
the reason for disempowerment. They do not recognize that for women, gendered
power relations have to change in order to bring about changes in economic
relations. The economic paradigm is dependent on a rather narrow social construct
that describes women as economic beings, rather than social and political beings:
The view that poor women only organize around economic issues in a passive
and defensive way denies them agency and consciousness and misunderstands
that the struggle itself can be a politically transformative process.
(Hirschman 1998: 231)
Empowerment for women is more than them gaining the ability to undertake
activities; it is also the capacity to set their own agendas and change events.
Empowerment involves women in an active role, not only in decision-making,
but also an understanding of the factors that shape a situation and the nature of
oppression itself. Empowerment entails a transformation of social relations, parti-
cularly gender relations and processes; and goes beyond choices to obtaining
access to new spaces, and social transformation. These views also point to a
notion of empowerment that is ‘iterative, non-linear and perhaps never complete’
(Murthy 2001: 351).
It can be argued that one of the new spaces that empowered people should gain
access to is the relationship with the patron NGO that may be facilitating empow-
erment. It is, in part, the accountability structure (to the people it is working with)
of an organization that directly affects the people’s capacity for empowerment.
The further away the institutional structure is from a direct representation by its
constituency, the poorer the outcome is in terms of empowerment. This then has
implications for the models of development adopted by Indian NGOs and the
approaches they take.
Conclusion
The issue that emerges, which is central to NGO effectiveness and the role of
self-help groups, is how these disparate elements touched on in this chapter come
together. The key element that needs to be examined is how the empowering
potential of SHGs pans out at the ground level for women. The empowerment
theory that has been examined points to a delicate balance that is required between
the individual and the group, in how group dynamics inﬂuence effectiveness.
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Hence the role of the NGO, and how it works with self-help groups, becomes
important. At this level the role of government and its relations with NGOs is far
less important, but nevertheless dominates NGO discourse.
The self-help group model certainly offers a potential for achieving strong
empowerment outcomes in which the group provides both the catalyst and support
for strong individual empowerment outcomes; but also, as we have seen, this is a
delicate balance of managing power relations and enabling equitable and fair
outcomes for the group. This is where the purpose of the NGOs comes into play,
and as we have found the SHG model may be good for some things but not for
others. The major focus recently has been on microﬁnance with a range of papers
and reports focusing on the efﬁciency of SHGs as ﬁnancial intermediaries rather
then as empowering structures. The competing ideology is that greater ﬁnancial
security will lead to women’s empowerment, against the competing view that
expanding a woman’s range of choices through self-help group activity can
enable her and her group to not only expand economic activities but also demand
better services from government and NGOs. The more challenging question is
whether the level of empowerment possible through the SHG can advance gender
relations.
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3 Rural NGOs
Introduction
This chapter explores the changes that have happened to Indian NGOs in the
early 2000s in more detail, using the examples from a group of mostly small
local NGOs from Karnataka in southern India. Karnataka was chosen as it has
a relatively benign social and political environment for NGOs to undertake
their work. In the 1980s and 1990s when these NGOs were established, the
benign environment provided them with more choices in the approaches they
could take in their work and constrained them less than if they were working
in other parts of India. Karnataka has also experienced rapid economic and
social change over the 1990s and 2000s, which has provided both opportunities
and challenges for NGOs. In what seems to be a paradox, since the mid 2000s
the economic and social changes are now having a more negative effect on
NGO capacity, in that they have given the government the resources to provide
both more funding to NGOs. This funding, however, has conditions attached to it
that both narrow and restrict the choices NGOs previously enjoyed when they were
largely funded from abroad. This change will be examined in some detail in this
chapter.
A total of 15 NGOs were surveyed, having being chosen for their focus
being broadly deﬁned as women’s empowerment, with their aid recipients
being largely made up of women. These 15 NGOs were from Karnataka and
Maharashtra (See Map 1). Eight of these NGOs from Karnataka were chosen as
case studies and will be looked at in more detail in this chapter. NGOs from two
rural districts were chosen: the relatively poor district of Dharwad in the North, and
Kolar in the south of the state close to the capital city and major technology hub of
Bangalore. An NGO from Pune inMaharashtra the adjoining state, is also looked at
in Chapter 4, by way of providing an urban contrast, as well as an interesting model
against which to make comparisons. Karnataka also provides an interesting case
study of NGOs in the twenty-ﬁrst century, which are probably undertaking the most
radical changes since Indian independence, with the rapid withdrawal of foreign
donor funding for NGOs being replaced by government, both federal and state,
funded programmes to assist rural communities.
Resourcing NGOs
In the early 2000s the government support of NGOs had stabilized at a strong level
by the consolidation of NGO regulation with fewer legislative or regulatory
changes for NGOs to deal with than earlier expected, and in 2007 with the ﬁrst
national NGO policy in India (Planning-Commission 2007). There was, however,
an attempt to introduce a new FCRA Bill in 2006 into the Indian Parliaments as
detailed in Chapter 1, aimed at restricting NGOs’ activities further by limiting their
capacity to cost recover any of their work such as training programmes, having assets
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revert to the state in certain circumstances, and tightening reporting arrangements
(Jalali 2008). While this Bill ultimately lapsed, the debate around the Bill, the NGO
policy, and rapid growth in NGOs schemes supported by government, all signalled
a greater engagement in NGOs and NGO work by government at all levels.
The real changes for NGOs, however, have been at the local NGO level, especially
in southern India. There are two main interrelated drivers of this change. First is the
sharp drop in international funding of secular NGOs in the mid-2000s; and second,
the marked increase in state funding of NGOs from all levels of government.
Another, but less important change had been a rapid increase in microcredit being
sponsored by the state and provided through self-help groups (these have been
traditionally more savings- rather than credit-based) and the role that some NGOs
have played in this. The driver for these changes had been the rapid economic
growth experienced by the Indian economy, especially in the southern states
including Karnataka from the late 1990s into the 2000s, which provided government
with thewherewithal to increase social spending, andNGOswere an obvious channel.
As a result of this shift in funding sources, from international sources to Indian
government sources for many NGOs, their strategies had also changed. This
change involved a winding back of many NGO activities and by 2009, many of
the medium-sized district or sub-district based NGOs were unable to fully replace
their international donor funding with government resources due to more restrictive
requirements. As a result, in 2009 many NGOs were much smaller, many with half
the staff numbers they had at the beginning of the decade. The reason for this sharp
drop in funding was two-fold: ﬁrst, smaller district-based NGOs had weaker
capacity to manage government funding, which had a set of reporting requirements
and institutional dynamics quite different to most INGO donors; and second, the
Indian government bureaucracy, at both state and national level, was seen to be a
more hostile environment than other donors, something that many NGOs had
trouble dealing with. Other NGOs felt that to be true to their values and avoid
going down the government funding path, they had to adopt some innovative
practices, and formed new partnership arrangements, in order to remain effective.
Examples of these will be looked at later in this chapter.
International development funding of secular NGOs in India had a steady
increase until 2000, after which two events had an important impact. The ﬁrst
was the decision of the Indian government to sever relationships with most of their
bilateral and multilateral donors in 2003; and the second was the Indian Ocean
tsunami at the end of 2004. Both events were in the context of a booming Indian
economy, with poverty rates generally falling and an improved government service
delivery at local level, compared to twenty years earlier. For example, access to
education had improved markedly, with female literacy rates increasing in the
1990s at twice the rate they did in the 1980s, and the gap between girls’ and
boys’ literacy levels was slowly closing, with the strongest and most rapid improve-
ment occurring in the southern states (Premi 2002). The response of many donors,
both the ofﬁcial donors still in India and INGOs, in the ﬁrst instance was to move
out of southern India to those states where poverty was more intractable, such as
Orissa and Bihar, and other pockets of serious poverty in northern and eastern India.
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The enforced withdrawal of many bilateral donors, together with a very strong
economy, sent a message to INGOs that India, and in particular southern India, was
no longer a priority, and that the government itself now had the capacity to seriously
address the country’s social problems. On top of this came the Indian Ocean
tsunami, which badly affected the south-east coastal states of India; and while the
government took the lead in the recovery effort many INGOs effectively diverted
resources from one part of India to work with local NGOs and others in the tsunami
affected areas. An analysis of the foreign contributions to local NGOs reported to
the Ministry of Home Affairs show that in 2003 the increase in INGO ﬂows was
only 1 per cent, representing a decline in INGO funding in real terms; while in the
tsunami recovery period 2005–2007 ﬂows to NGOs rose by 23 per cent, 26 per cent
and 56 per cent respectively with Tamil Nadu being the largest recipient (Das 2005).
Foreign donors also moved to a much sharper sectoral approach to funding, and in
southern India this has been away from livelihoods and supporting SHGs as such,
and more to funding HIV/AIDS, natural resource management, anti-trafﬁcking and
the like. There have also beenmuch larger contributions to larger religious NGOs as
the fears around Hindu fundamentalism have lead to concerns of the safety of
Christians and the followers of other minority religions in India (Jalali 2008). The
result was that long-standing smaller secular NGOs either had to change their focus to
meet donor (in this case mainly government) needs or seek other sources of funding.
While international funding of secular NGOs had fallen, Indian government
funding for NGO work in rural areas went up (Kudva 2005). There were a large
number of schemes run from different government departments, dealing with
welfare and development issues. Notwithstanding the difﬁculty in accurately
measuring the level of this funding, Tandon ( 2002) had estimated that funding
sources for NGO work in India in the early 2000s were roughly split equally
between foreign donors and Indian government. On top of this the estimated
value of private donations and volunteering (often overlooked) was equal to the
sum of government and foreign contributions combined, giving a total outlay for
development work at the time of Rs 16,000 crore or $US3.5b. Since those ﬁgures
were compiled there had been further expansion in government programmes. For
example, one government agency, the Council for Advancement of People’s Action
and Rural Technology (CAPART) expanded its funding of NGOs from Rs 54crore
($US12m) going to 4000 NGOs in the ten years from inception up to 1994, to
Rs 300crore ($US67m) going to 10,000 NGOs in the following ten years, with an
annual spend of around Rs 50crore (US$8m) in 2008 (Kudva 2008: 132).
The reasons for the increase in government funding can be explained by the fact
that Indian governments rise and fall on the rural vote, which has both the largest
proportion of the voting population and the greatest turn-out at elections. In this
context, welfare and development programmes targeting rural areas have had
strong electoral appeal. The problem, however, is that the government does not
have the stafﬁng and other logistical infrastructure to reach people effectively in
rural areas, which existing NGOs have; thus NGOs are seen by the government to
be a viable alternative for delivering services. From the NGOs’ experience, though,
these government programmes can have very high transaction costs, very low
46 Rural NGOs
ﬂexibility and high expected expenditure or ‘throughput’ rates. These funding
requirements affect targeting the very poor as it takes longer to run programmes
with this group due to the natural capacity constraints the poor have, in terms both
of less time to participate in these programmes due to their existing long working
hours and family commitments, and their generally poor education levels. These
factors lead to a reluctance of many district-based NGOs to be involved in these
government programmes.
Indian governments have also been involved in the other main NGO preserve, of
promoting microﬁnance: resulting in a rapid rise in the number of self-help groups
(up to one million SHGs in 2005); but more importantly, a shift in focus away from
being a vehicle for family savings, to becoming a means of distributing credit to
rural areas. That is, the SHGs have shifted from having a strong social or empow-
erment role, to having a more instrumental role of increasing credit availability.
This is something that could have had an effect on empowerment outcomes, a point
that will be returned to in later chapters. As a consequence of this and the downturn
in traditional sources of funding, some NGOs had taken on the role of microﬁnance
agents of one sort or another, as a means for them to survive. The implication of
the increase in government programmes, and speciﬁcally in microﬁnance, is that
there was a drift away from the very poor as the target group, towards the wider
community more broadly. As with other programmes, the transaction cost for micro-
ﬁnance programmes to reach the very poor was high, outcomes were slower to be
realized, the absorptive capacity was low leading to smaller loan sizes, and there
was a greater risk of default. Given the political need to put more funds to rural
areas and show some effect, it was natural for both government and their associated
NGO programmes to shift away from the very poor as their target group. This was
quite different to INGO funded programmes, which had a mandate to work more or
less directly with the very poor.
A number of issues arise in this new relationship. The ﬁrst is a deﬁnitional one,
and that is who NGOs are and what their relationship is with other key community
groups such as the Panchati Raj Institutions (PRI), the constitutionally mandated
village representative groups as part of the governance structures of the village and
sub-district (Fernandez 2004). On the one hand NGOs have a role in promoting
these groups, and on the other they compete with them for resources. Likewise, the
central government views have shifted in this regard; where earlier the Ofﬁcial Five
Year Plans of the 1990s emphasized the role of NGOs, the later plans of the 2000s
brought both the PRIs and NGOs into the picture, competing with each other for
funding. At the same time some government agencies were also setting up their
own statutory bodies with a quasi-NGO status (Fernandez 2004), or supporting the
larger urban-based NGOs, thus:
… creating additional cleavages in the [NGO] sector, deepening the divisions
between nationally and globally linked NGOs… and the smaller NGOs of the
districts … [driven by] the ‘competence culture’ of the newer more directed
and managerial focused NGOs.
(Kudva 2008: 140)
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NGOs and multilateral programmes
Multilateral donors such as the World Bank have programmes that are funded to,
and administered by, governments but use NGOs as the conduit for implementation
at local level. While these types of programme were not as common as other forms
of government funding, they could be quite large and had their own unique
characteristics, and NGOs’ experience with many of them was particularly proble-
matic. The main multilateral programmes that involved NGOs in Karnataka were
World Bank programmes in rural areas, the World Bank Drinking Water Project,
and the World Bank and DANIDA supported Karnataka Watershed Development
Project (KWDP). The KWDP experience in Karnataka is a useful case of the issue
of using NGOs as a conduit for government programmes as it affected most of the
case study NGOs examined later in this chapter.
There were 53 NGOs used as implementing partners, responsible for the local
community mobilizing of SHGs and also ensuring that some of the local infra-
structure work was completed on schedule. This work typically involved arranging
community meetings to agree on work plans and most importantly the payment of
labour costs to communities on the completion of work. Given that the project,
though ostensibly participatory, was planned with very tight output schedules
and plans, for which NGOs were paid against (World Bank 2009), these NGOs
were under much pressure to meet targets and provide detailed reports on output.
The project also had an accelerated implementation schedule between each of the
three phases over the life of the project. As the volume of work expected to be
undertaken increased with the second phase of the project, tensions emerged with
the Karnataka government, who felt that they should have closer control of the
process. The result was a dispute in which many of the NGOs were not reimbursed
for the work undertaken. For some this was up to a year while they covered the staff
costs pending reimbursement. In 2009 many of the 53 NGOs were still owed
money for the staff and other costs they had incurred. While the World Bank saw
The Karnataka Watershed Development Project (KWDP)
The Karnataka Watershed Development Project (KWDP), known locally as Sujala,
ran from 2001–2009, and was implemented in seven districts of Karnataka at cost of
$US79m of which $US4.1mwas funded through NGOs to develop SHGs. The project
covered 516,000 hectares of land spread over 77 sub-watersheds, 1270 villages
beneﬁting nearly 400,000 households. The project objective was to improve the
productive potential of selected watersheds and their associated natural resource base.
It is also to strengthen community and institutional arrangements, promote participa-
tory involvement of primary stakeholders/beneﬁciaries and offer assistance to
women, landless and other vulnerable groups by supporting investments in income
generation activities to accelerate their entry and expand their participation (Milne
2007; World Bank 2009).
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the performance-based contracting system as a success (World Bank 2009), the
local NGOs were the main losers.
The reason for the dispute, which had adversely affected many NGOs, can be
explained in terms of the institutional politics of these loan projects whereby funds
are lent to the central government, which are then lent on to the state government.
As these projects are loan projects for a social or environmental purpose, and will
not generate direct revenue that can be used to repay the loans themselves, the
government has to ﬁnd the funds for repayment from other sources. As there is no
ﬁnancial beneﬁt, the incentive then is for the government to gain political capital
from these projects in the form of control and prestige. This, however, may not accord
with sustainability and equity goals underpinning the projects, or most importantly,
having NGO involvement in them (Fernandez 2004). NGOs, many of whom had a
tradition of community consultation and longer-term approaches, could therefore
be put under pressure from either the World Bank or the government to meet
unrealistic expenditure and output targets that have limited outcomes, certainly in
the short term, with poorer communities. For example, in the KWDP, while the
original objective was for 70 per cent of the beneﬁciaries to be poor and marginal
farmers, at project completion the ﬁgure was less than half that (World Bank 2009).
These poorly planned donor requirements created conﬂict for the NGOs concerned,
particularly with their values and the aid recipients, and ultimately it soured the
relationships NGOs had, both with the World Bank and the partner governments.
The effect of these fundamental institutional changes being faced by Indian
NGOs was that their role changed from that of being development organizations
supported by INGOs with a more hands-off approach, to being social welfare
agents for the government where the NGOs were expected to be implementers of
government programmes on more or less a fee-for-service basis with high levels of
government control (Baruah 2007). While the demands of INGOs to some extent
involved compromises or small shifts in local NGOs’ values, the domestic govern-
ment programmes presented much greater challenges. While there were still
opportunities for local activities and rights-based work or work aimed at the very
poor, the resourcing of these programmes required a greater level of innovation and
skills that was beyond the capacity of many local NGOs.
NGO responses
This very rapid change in the funding climate and institutional support base for
Indian NGOs had a marked impact upon them, particularly those in the more
prosperous southern states. As international donor funding dried up for secular
NGO development work, local NGOs had to shed large numbers of staff and look to
newways ofmaintaining their impact and effectivenesswith fewer staff and resources.
Alternatively, they could have taken government contracts and maintained their
effectiveness that way. There were essentially three options for Indian NGOs:
 ‘downsize’ and revert to the smaller more voluntary structures they had before
international donor funding, and take on more modest activities at local level;
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 strengthen their capacity, particularly ﬁnancial and management, to be able
to take on larger government contracts and to be discerning with those
they take;
 to have independent sources of income through commercial or semi-
commercial enterprises, such as undertaking consultancies or being microﬁ-
nance brokers.
Of course, many NGOs adopted a mix of all three strategies. This chapter examines
the NGO cases fromKarnataka, looks at these changes and at how a group of NGOs
in Kolar and Dharwad districts adapted.
Karnataka
Karnataka, located in southern India, in 2005 had a population of 53 million
and, along with its neighbouring states, is where most of the dynamic growth of
India is located. There had been substantial changes in the social indicators for
India as a whole, and Karnataka and Southern India in particular, since the 1990s.
The ﬁgure for poverty in 2005 for Karnataka was 25 per cent, which was below the
national average of 27.5 per cent, and the poverty level for rural areas was 21 per
cent (Planning Commission 2007a). This level of poverty represented a sharp fall
from a high of 30 per cent in the mid 1990s (Census Commissioner 2002; Chelliah
and Sudarshan 1999). This shift in the level of poverty also represented a shift in the
poverty demographic from rural areas to urban areas. It should be noted, though,
that the urban poverty line was at the time 65 per cent higher than the rural poverty
line, and there was some debate about the relevant price movements and calculation
of the indices that were used to validate that result (Murgai et al. 2003). Regardless
of these debates, two-thirds of the population were in rural areas and this was where
most of the poor were until the early 2000s.
The sharp fall in the poverty levels can, however, hide higher levels of poverty
among certain groups in rural areas, and a relatively high level of inequality and
depth of poverty across the state. For example, the income level of the average poor
person was a full 8 per cent below the poverty line, a statistic that points to a high
level of marginalization and poor prospects of many of the poor that were coming
out of poverty, without focused interventions (Directorate of Economics and
Statistics 2009). Dalits and agricultural labourers were the largest groups of rural
poor, and represented 25 per cent of the poor in rural areas. The poverty ﬁgure for
dalits in rural Karnataka showed the effect of marginalization and caste, with
poverty levels for dalits being around double those of the general population
when their share of the overall population was taken into account. On top of this
20 per cent of the rural population did not have access to safe water, and 54 per cent
of children were undernourished (Chelliah and Sudarshan 1999; Das 2005; Filmer
et al. 1998; PRIA 2009).
Women in Karnataka, as in the rest of India, were signiﬁcantly disadvantaged
relative to men on any measure of poverty or marginalization. Women had a low
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workforce participation rate of 35 per cent (Das 2005) and were found largely in
unskilled low-end jobs such as agricultural labour, where they constituted 60 per cent
of the agricultural labour force, but only 30 per cent of cultivators (that is, being
able to own the harvest either as a farmer or sharecropper) (Das 2005). In agricul-
ture there had been a feminization of agricultural labour, with casual labour (mainly
undertaken by women) rising from 39 per cent in 1994 to 45 per cent in 2000. The
Indian government had for some time recognized that women were a particularly
disadvantaged group and had been targeting them through government programmes
since the 1970s and 1980s, focusing on the underlying causes of women’s
disadvantage (Viswanath 1993). Taking a lead from government at that time,
NGOs also started to focus more on women’s programmes, and in the 1980s and
1990s women’s empowerment programmes sponsored and supported by NGOs
emerged.
The NGO case studies
This section looks at the experience of eight NGOs from two districts of Karnataka
and how they adapted to the rapid changes in the institutional context that small
local NGOs were ﬁnding themselves in. These NGOs were generally district-based
and tended to respond to the needs in those districts, though, in some cases, they
operated in more than one district. The experience of these local NGOs was typical
of many small NGOs found at district levels in India and how they adapted to rapid
change.
Dharwad District, where four of the NGO case studies were working, lies in the
north-west of the state, with a population of 1.6 million in 2001, of which 69 per
cent were engaged in agriculture. It was drought prone with limited irrigation
opportunities, leading to a precarious livelihood based on the vagaries of the
weather (Census of India 2001). The position of women is this context was even
more vulnerable as they made up 90 per cent of those workers in the District who
were without secure employment, with the only job prospects being in agriculture
in a marginal physical environment. The sex ratio for Dharwad was very low with
only 948 females per 1,000 males (well below the state average of 964 (Tata
Energy Research Institute 2001) and women’s literacy level in the mid 1990s was
only 24 per cent (Sharma 2006). The economic position of women in Dharwad
District was at best marginal, and in response to the clear need NGOs had been
involved in community-based development programmes for the poor and disad-
vantaged since the 1970s, with a rapid growth in the numbers of local NGOs since
the early 1990s.
Kolar District lies immediately to the north-east of Bangalore in Southern
Karnataka, with a population of 2.5 m people in 2005, and also drought prone,
but here there was some tubewell and tank irrigation to compensate the dry
environment. Around three-quarters of the population work in agriculture, and as
in Dharwad, there were few work opportunities outside of agriculture for women;
even though Bangalore was close by, it is more difﬁcult for women to move there
for work due to the prevailing social mores. The sex ratio for Kolar was 970 in
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2001, well above the state and national average, but this was probably explained by
men moving to nearby Bangalore for work and leaving the women back home. For
most villages, clean water supply was inadequate, and only 16 per cent of the
population had access to medical care as less than one-tenth of villages had a health
clinic. Only 25 per cent of villages had public transport access (Directorate of
Economics and Statistics 2009). Kolar district also had a reputation for political
divisions even at village level, which made changes like the Panchayat Raj Act, and
even social services through NGOs, difﬁcult to implement.
The NGOs
In this part of India it is the district-based NGOs that were the primary contact with
local communities, ﬁrst emerging in the 1970s, but with a rapid increase in numbers
in the 1980s and 1990s. These smaller NGOs had generally replaced the Gandhian
organizations of the 1950s and 1960s, which were then the main NGOs at district
level. In Karnataka, most district NGOs usually formed themselves into loose
networks for communications and developing relations with government. In
Dharwad District, for example, there was an NGO Council with some twenty
members, but only half of these NGOs were active at the time of the survey. The
women’s self-help group (SHG) model had been the main mode of operation
among development NGOs in Karnataka, partly because it was widely understood
and seen to be successful; and partly because it was actively promoted by both
central and state government, with many government sponsored community devel-
opment programmes at the time being predicated on NGOs adopting a self-help
group model for community organizing. Since the early 2000s, some government
agencies have begun to take on an NGO form, in that many of their programmes use
the SHG model, and the intersection of NGOs and these government programmes
have led to common models and approaches (CARE 2009). Major multilateral
development initiatives also use local NGOs as a major conduit, with a popular
model being to use a larger nodal NGOwith strong management and administrative
capacity as a channel for supporting a number of smaller local NGOs, which have
strong links to the community.
Chinyard
Chinyard (Chaitanya Institute for Youth and Rural Development ) was established
in 1990 and by 2008 it was working with 2537 active SHGs with 48,000 members
(CARE 2009), with 200–300 new groups being added each year. In the 1990s the
support for Chinyard’s establishment came ﬁrst from another local NGO, Indian
Development Service, and then the Hyderabad ofﬁce of an INGO with ofﬁces in
India provided funding to support Chinyard being reorganized and registered under
the FCRA to receive foreign funds. Despite the success of its earlier work, Chinyard
had to deal with a number of institutional setbacks in the early 2000s, which are to
do with the problem that many small locally based NGOs have, and that is their
dependency on one funding source for their core costs and the high level of
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vulnerability this can bring. In this case the sole INGO funder ceased funding
Chinyard in 2000 as a result of a policy to move its work to concentrate on the
poorer northern states of India. This left Chinyard having to seek other supporters.
The effect on the staff was devastating, with staff numbers falling from a high of 30
permanent staff in 2000 to seven in 2005, as the organization struggled with one-off
support from donors over many years, as well as involvement in the Karnataka
Watershed Development Project and the institutional vulnerability that brought. It
was not until Chinyard met the requirements for microﬁnance accreditation in 2007
that staff numbers were able to increase, to the point when there were 25 staff
in 2009.
As a result of Chinyard’s loss of international donors to support its work, from
2000 it adopted a strategy of increasing its microﬁnance work and diversifying its
funding sources. In 2002 Chinyard became a partner in the KWDP, with its role
project being to expand its SHG programme and engage them in speciﬁc income-
generation and watershed management activities. At the peak of the Project work
there were 40 staff working for Chinyard, but due to the change in policy of
the Karnataka government in working with NGOs and its failure to reimburse the
programme after the change, the programme collapsed as far as NGOs were
concerned, and Chinyard was still owed Rs 800,000 (US$20,000) in 2009. As a
result Chinyard accelerated its application for microﬁnance registration and was
registered as a microﬁnance institution in 2007. This enabled it to lend to self-help
groups as an agent to the State Bank of India, which was different from its previous
work where it facilitated the links with banks rather than act as an agent for them.
The advantage of registration was that it was able to increase the scale of the work
considerably, and receive a commission for managing the loans. The loan disburse-
ment rates for Chinyard managed funds grew quite quickly, going from Rs 395,000
(US$8,000) in 2006 when they had only provisional accreditation, to Rs 3.2m
(US$64,000) in 2008 when they were fully accredited. By 2009 they had agree-
ments to manage more than Rs 20m (US$0.4m) over three years from the State
Bank of India, and were expected to receive over time a further Rs 200m (US$4m)
from the Department of Women and Children to lend for micro-enterprise projects
for women.
For the SHG programme, the criteria Chinyard had for recipients of the
microﬁnance programme was for a strong poverty focus, with a requirement that
SHG members be categorized as below the poverty line (BPL) in order to
qualify for assistance. In 2009 Chinyard had lent to Rs 15m to 257 SHGs, with
Rs 500,000 being repaid and a repayment rate of 95 per cent. While Chinyard
had an established set of procedures for loan recovery, and up to 2009 this had
worked quite well with none of its loan portfolio classed as ‘at risk’ in 2008 (CARE
2009), this type of operation still had considerable risks as any default had to be
covered by the NGO. The margin that Chinyard receives to cover their operational
costs from the Bank is 3 per cent on the loan with another 1 percent allowed as an
administration fee. This represented a very tight margin for which even a 5 percent
default rate would not be sustainable over time. In order to cover the institutional
costs to transform itself into a microﬁnance institution, Chinyard received
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institutional support from a US Foundation focused on India that supported
entrepreneurship.
Chinyard had also set up a number of village forest committees as a part
of community-based management of natural resources and several vermi
(worm based) compost units – as a part of its sustainable agriculture programme
(Wiserearth 2005). They had also applied for support for a small-scale (irrigation)
tank rehabilitation project where they hoped to be able to tap into the village
SHG resources, to provide labour as a complement to their microﬁnance pro-
gramme. Funding outside of the microﬁnance programme in 2009 came mainly
from state and central government development funds. Despite the changes
in funding sources, Chinyard tries to ensure that all its work conforms to its
mission to:
… bring about sustainable development through self-help, with special empha-
sis on participatory conservation and management of natural resources, equity
and gender sensitivity, [all with the central objective to] eradicate poverty and
empower the masses, especially women.
(Chinyard 1999: 1)
Up until the 2000s the work of Chinyard dealt primarily with microﬁnance and
resource management, total health, violence against women and micro-enterprise
development, with the largest programme by far being microﬁnance through
the SHGs. The challenge it had for the future was that as external funding had
dried up it had to secure a stable programme and avoid the institutional disruptions
that occurred in the early 2000s, which saw it both losing its main donors and
being involved in the rather insecure World Bank funded Karnataka Watershed
Development Project. This period saw staff numbers rise and then fall very sharply,
leading to a very insecure institutional environment. The other critical issue was the
role a single donor can play in programme development and programme strategy
for a small NGO. While there is a place for donors in having a strong dialogue and
establishing joint priorities, the power relationship that funding brought at that time
left Chinyard in a weak bargaining position, with the feeling that it had to take up
the programmes of the donor.
India Development Service (IDS)
IDS, also located in Dharwad, was started in 1974 by non-resident Indians living in
Chicago, USA to fundraise to support development work in India. In 1977 two
members of IDS from Chicago, S. R. Hiremath and his wife Shyamala, visited India
to identify suitable programme areas, with the intention of developing their own
operations rather than funding other NGOs, which they had been doing up to that
time. They decided that Dharwad would be suitable and settled there in 1979,
registering IDS in India in the same year. Over the following twenty years they built
up IDS into a strong local NGO, but then started to withdraw from the day-to-day
operations in the late 1990s to take on predominantly a governance role. The goal of
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IDS has remained a commitment to the economic and social development of India
through the ‘development of people’. In 2009 IDS had a highly committed and
experienced staff complement of 43, somewhat down from the peak of 73 staff
in 2004.
Like all of the NGOs in these case studies, IDS’s work had changed quite a
bit from 2000 to 2009, and to a large extent this reﬂected the changes in funding
that had occurred to NGOs more generally in Karnataka. Up until 2002 the focus of
IDS was on SHG development when they worked in 100 villages with around 500
women’s self-help groups, targeting mainly landless labourers, artisans, and small
and marginal farmers. IDS facilitated SHGs usually have 10–15 members, a little
smaller than the 20 member average SHG that is promoted by government
and other NGOs. With a smaller group size IDS found there was more opportunity
for greater participation by all members. The SHGs were usually grouped in
villages into what they call a Village Development Society, and these were in
turn federated at sub-district level into Federations. IDS found, however, that
these Village Development Societies require ongoing support, and IDS had to
return to the original groups some years later to re-invigorate these SHGs and
provide them with further institutional support. One of the reasons for this lack of
sustainability may have been that IDS prefers to promote what it refers to as
collective leadership among SHGs members rather than having the SHGs elect
leaders from the outset. The intention was that over time natural leaders would
emerge to take on an informal role of ensuring the groups were well led.
The problem was that this did not happen to the extent hoped for. The IDS
staff member was seen as having the role of catalyst, and as responsible for
developing a ‘sense of partnership’ between the beneﬁciaries and IDS develop-
ment workers. What happened in practice, which is common among NGOs sup-
porting SHGs, is that a level of dependency emerged, with the NGO staff taking on
a quasi-leadership role.
The work with SHGs was put into a difﬁcult situation from 2002, as foreign
funding dried up. IDS became more involved in government programmes, the most
notable being the World Bank supported KWDP discussed above, where IDS was
both an implementing agency and a nodal agency in two districts for a number of
other NGOs. As seen earlier in this chapter, this programme was complex, and the
demands by the donor and Karnataka government were such that the IDS as an
agency was strained. By phase two of the programme, like many other NGOs
involved in the Programme, IDS was unable to meet what were seen to be unrealistic
demands in the rate of service delivery. There was a lot of infrastructure work
involved in watershed management, as well as facilitating and monitoring the work
to be undertaken. The expectations of the rate of work and the project expenditure
rate were unrealistic, and IDS took the decision to pull out of the programme, with a
substantial number of outstanding bills, leaving IDS with large debt. The other key
issue with this project that drove the decision to withdraw, was that it moved IDS
away from its focus on the poor and landless to those with land, who could
implement and host watershed infrastructure (Hilemath 2004). As a result of this
experience and the debt incurred from the KWDP, IDS had to scale back their work
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and in 2009 they were involved in a small number of relatively small discrete
projects:
IDS projects 2008–2009
 Forest and bio-diversity programme with 173 village forest committees with
each having ﬁve SHGs;
 A health and livelihoods programme supporting village health workers;
 Organic farming supported by the Department of Agriculture;
 Skill training programme for the poor funded by central government;
 Capacity building programme under the National Rural Employment
Guarantee Scheme; and
 A small environment awareness programme to support local communities in
their campaign to clean up a local factory whose expansion will lead to water
contamination.
IDS had found that this new approach of being involved in a range of programmes
which were, to varying degrees, directed by government presented a challenge,
and so it was looking at ways of reconnecting with the SHG groups and associated
federations as way of keeping the links with its values on a ﬁrmer footing. IDS had
found that working with government had had some adverse effects, ranging from
the programme target communities moving away from the poor, to the prosaic issue
of being forced to have different categorizations of staff depending on whether they
were working on government programmes or not (Hilemath 2004). This caused
problems, as those working on government programmes were required to be paid at
a different rate to IDS staff.
Despite these challenges, IDS maintained a strong commitment to its values and
it saw the strengths of the programme as due, in part, to a dedicated staff, a low staff
to group member ratio, smaller average group sizes, and an active policy of
targeting the landless and those with low literacy levels. However, according to
IDS’ own analysis in the early 2000s, in one of its programme areas only around
one-quarter of the groups were sustainable and had reached a strong measure of
empowerment after three years, and nearly 20 per cent of groups were ‘weak’.
Following the loss of many of its external donors and the involvement in govern-
ment programmes in the early 2000s, IDS lost touch with these groups, and in 2008
IDS was in the process of re-engaging with those groups through their federations
to re-invigorate them.
Accountability to the aid recipients was a priority for IDS, reﬂected by the
responsiveness of staff to community needs, the ambivalence to government
funding and the policy of having some direct consultation of the Board with the
groups. Likewise there was a strong degree of staff autonomy to be directly
responsive to community needs and to react to their priorities in how they pro-
grammed and provided resources. Paradoxically, though, this fostered a high
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level of dependency of groups and the Federation on staff. This raised the issue of
the right balance between providing support and fostering dependency. Despite
these challenges, IDS had a strong institutional base to continue to be effective
in empowering the poor and marginalized to engage with issues as they arose.
The challenge was whether a level of individual empowerment could be translated
into group autonomy at local level, which would strengthen the collective
role of women in local political, social and economic life. The changes in the
sources of support for NGOs in general, and IDS in particular, make this a
difﬁcult challenge.
Jagruti
Jagruti is an important case study as it is an entirely voluntary-based NGO with no
funding at all, and belongs to that group of NGOs that represent, in sheer numbers at
least, the largest category of development NGOs (Tandon 2002). Jagruti is a small
NGO, which in 2001 had been working for around 10 years with a handful of
volunteers organizing self-help groups in six villages with saving schemes and
facilitating the local community to deal with local issues such as access to services.
Being volunteer-based it had the challenge of ﬁnding ways to keep the volunteers
engaged so they continued the work. So where it could Jagruti found funds from
local foundations for its small number of paid staff from time to time for one-off
activities, but by 2008 this funding had ceased. While the original approach of
working with SHGs was moderately successful, it was not being resourced, and was
little different to the work of larger NGOs in the district. As a result the management
and Board of Jagruti decided in 2004 that there would be a change in direction,
approach and focus, with a sharp move to more clearly rights-based programmes.
The focus was on health rights and supporting people’s claims for better health
services and ensuring they were receiving what they were entitled to. Jagruti, with
support from the Child Rights and You (CRY) Foundation, was able to work
with 400 existing SHGs in 35 villages to train the members on their health
rights, with a view to improving the practices at the Primary Health Care centres
at sub-district level.
Jagruti and health rights
In some government run health clinics in Dharwad District, as in many parts of India,
poor people were being charged for treatment when it is meant to be provided free of
charge. In one case of direct action a community that had been supported by Jagruti
held a series of protests at the clinic. The District Health Ofﬁcer was petitioned by the
people and Jagruti on a number of occasions to no avail. The community then took
the decision to lock up the health centre and stop it operating. The threat of the Centre
being unable to function forced the District Health Ofﬁcer to act, and he removed the
corrupt staff and improved the service.
Rural NGOs 57
The CRY supported programme came to an end in 2008, and left Jagruti with
some dilemmas. Jagruti was a small voluntary agency with few resources and
the challenge of where to allocate them. While Jagruti was quite effective in its
work, it did sap the energy of the volunteer workers and the leadership. In 2009
the range of activities Jagruti was undertaking on a voluntary basis included:
work against trafﬁcking of young women – they had set up anti-trafﬁcking com-
mittees in a number of villages; and promoting the Employment Guarantee Scheme
in a number of villages, to ensure people were aware of it and could take up the
work on offer if they needed to – Jagruti had prepared a booklet on this scheme.
While these activities were important, they were time-consuming for the
volunteers, who felt they had to commit a large amount of their time to the
organization. There was no international funding without FCRA and it was
unlikely that FCRA would be approved, or if it was, that funds from INGOs
would be available for such a small operation. On the other hand Jagruti was too
small to take on government contracts, even if that was the direction a small
voluntary organization like Jagruti wanted to go. This is an example of the
dilemma that small voluntary NGOs have; and that is, while they are effective,
unless they can scale up they are destined to fade away through the burnout of
volunteers. It can be argued that it is these small volunteer groups that are central to
the broader NGO fabric, and they are the source of many of the values that
drive NGOs.
KIDS
KIDS (Karnataka Integrated Development Society) was a small NGO that was
started in 1994 by a small group of concerned social work graduates with a
particular concern for women and children, and it received full registration in
1997 (KIDS 2000a). In 2009, KIDS had 16 staff and its values were based on a
commitment to women and children through promoting their social and economic
‘upliftment’ and empowerment in both urban and rural areas. KIDS does not have a
speciﬁc poverty focus, but rather works with the socio-economically marginalized
women who are vulnerable, such as sex workers, and trafﬁcked women and
children. Trafﬁcking was and continues to be a problem in Karnataka, particularly
from the poorer districts to major transport corridors and larger centres. The women
were trafﬁcked for prostitution, and the children for labour in hotels and restaurants.
The target population for the self-help groups KIDS facilitated were women from
backgrounds including migrant workers, scheduled castes, scheduled tribes, as well
as widows and married girls, all of whom are vulnerable to trafﬁcking. The focus
was on the decision-making power of women and on reproductive rights, as well as
socio-economic development.
KIDS provided services in family and HIV counselling, especially to sex workers
and truck drivers; a child labour programme which involved advocacy on chil-
dren’s rights, as well as running special schools for child labourers; self-help groups
for women; HIV/AIDS awareness raising; and awareness-raising among women on
property, dowry and human rights. Also, KIDS had initiated a separate programme
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called Manavi which included a domestic violence hotline and legal support for
women who were victims of violence (KIDS 2000b). Manavi had supported cases
related to dowry, sexual harassment, property, domestic violence and rape. The
child labour programme was among children in Dharwad who were engaged in
waste-picking, and focused on their education, providing them access to schooling
and a small stipend to partly reimburse their time away from work. KIDS had
received support from the state Education Department to assist their work with
school drop-outs. It was also involved in child labour advocacy such as bringing the
attention of the authorities to the prevalence of child labour in local hotels. They
facilitated a children’s forum across 30 villages, where the children met every two
weeks and discussed issues relevant to them; and from there issues went to a
federation of children forums, which lobbied government on issues of child labour
and child marriage.
KIDS also worked with around 300 SHGs to facilitate human rights awareness.
In addition to this core work they had also received support from the Clinton
Foundation to support children affected by HIV/AIDS with ARV treatment and
counselling. They operated a women’s counselling centre funded by the central
government; and had a major campaign to raise public awareness against child
marriage, and lobbied the state government to regulate the practice of mass
marriages in Karnataka, where up to 15 per cent of brides may have been under
age. For mass marriages KIDS lobbied the organizers of the weddings, and the state
administrators, to ensure all brides had a state-sanctioned proof of age for marriage.
They had also done work with devidasi (the traditional Hindu temple prostitutes)
for the Anti-Slavery Foundation, with the aim of freeing them.
KIDS, like the other case study NGOs, had issues with the drop-off in donor
funding but not to the same extent as the others. While KIDS programmes had
continued without major cuts, their institutional support had always been precar-
ious, based on a high turnover of both projects and donors. Like many agencies
KIDS did not have regular donors, but depended on a number of different pro-
grammes to keep them going. KIDS’ only independent funding came from the
commissions they received from being an agent to provide insurance to poor
women. Apart from that KIDS were not engaged in other commercial or income
generation activities, as they felt it would take their time away from their pro-
gramme work. KIDS was able to survive in this almost ‘hand to mouth’ fashion, as
funding for child and gender rights short-term projects was generally forthcoming,
but it was much harder to get longer-term institutional funding. This may be
because funding agencies did not see children and women’s rights as longer-term
strategic issues in quite the same way they saw poverty and livelihoods.
Grama Vikas
Grama Vikas was a medium sized NGO based in Kolar district in Karnataka with a
driving vision of social and economic empowerment focusing particularly on dalit
women and children. Its goal was to empower marginalized rural women with stress
on children and the environment, and network with Rural Women’s Associations to
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accomplish sustainable development through food security (Grama Vikas 2000:1).
It was established in 1980, following concern at the high levels of malnutrition
among children in the area, highlighted by a governmental report released the year
before. Grama Vikas’ initial emphasis was a child development programme, how-
ever, this expanded into a women’s empowerment programme relatively early on in
the organization’s life. As Grama Vikas took the view that development was
possible only when women had an active role in development activities, however,
a child development programme remained an important focus in the organization’s
work. The strategy of Grama Vikas in working with dalit communities in villages
was initially through child development programmes by establishing balwadis or
pre-schools. The approach of having an entry point through children overcame
local tension between the higher caste community and dalits. After a level of village
acceptance was reached with the balwadi programme, SHGs were developed with
the most marginalized women in that community, most of whom sent their children
to the balwadi. This slow and indirect approach through a children’s programme
was necessary as other NGOs encountered problems of access if they attempted to
work directly with dalit or other marginalized families. The vast majority of Grama
Vikas groups were made up of the dalit and tribal groups in the community.
The other key feature of Grama Vikas’ approach was that the programme
expanded at the rate of the capacity of the SHG to self-manage the programme,
that is, they did not work to a timetable. There was a strong emphasis on self-
managementwithGramaVikas staff moving out of direct groupmanagement as soon
as possible, but being in a position to provide support at all times. The management
of the SHG programmewas in the hands of two representative bodies: one that dealt
with the children’s programme and was made up of a parents’ committee; and the
other was the main representative body dealing with the women’s empowerment
programme – the Grameena Mahila Okutta, registered in 1997. These two bodies
were responsible for the day-to-day running of the programmes, income generation
(including dealing with donors), local-level advocacy, basic social sector work and
SHG management. Gram Vikas was also involved in higher-level advocacy and
managing some local environmental programmes. It also provided some secretariat
support to the two representative bodies, broader strategic work as it related to
community needs, and also in the strategic direction and support to the federations.
Grama Vikas has an all-women staff team apart from the General Secretary.
This was seen as important for the effective organizing of groups. Of the 40 staff in
2005, around 15 were involved in working with the SHGs, with another three
having an SHG audit role. The reason Grama Vikas had such a successful pro-
gramme in employing women is that it provided secure live-in facilities with rooms
attached to the balwadis, all within walking distance of the groups the women were
working with. At these facilities a couple of women lived together and so provided
support to each other. This strong reputation for catering for the safety and security
of women staff, and an all-women team, made Grama Vikas an attractive place
for young women to apply to work.
The vast majority of the women who worked for Grama Vikas were young and
single so staff turnover was high. This was not seen as a problem and was even an
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advantage as the staff could not dominate the groups over time. This fostered self-
reliance in the groups, with the staff having a supporting role. Gram Vikas was very
clear in its empowerment policy and ensured the staff had values in common with
the organization. There was a one year orientation programme, which involved
regular training programmes and new staff being placed with more experienced
staff for mentoring: this way the new staff member had to complete a form of
apprenticeship.
In 2007 there were over 300 women’s SHGs in over 167 villages, with more
than half having reached a level of self-management that they can be linked directly
with commercial banks. Grama Vikas’ programme was committed not only to
economic and social empowerment among marginalized women in Kolar
District, but also to self-run institutions for the SHGs. The majority of the groups
were sustainable and could largely manage their own revolving funds. One problem
for Grama Vikas was that its programme was resource intense in that the women’s
groups were not only responsible for the SHGmanagement, but had a role to play in
other resource distribution to the village, e.g. having a role in managing the
children’s programmes. It was in part the threat of losing some of these resources
(such as the children’s programme) that focused the SHG leadership energy on
resolving issues within the group, to avoid the group failing.
The success of this programme meant that it attracted further funding from
donors and government to provide as credit to SHGs. An injection of large sums
into groups through government or donor subsidized schemes, however, meant
that the members’ equity in the group could possibly drop from a high of, say 90 or
100 per cent, to as low as 10 per cent. There was the risk of problems with
repayment rates, and given that even in the older groups not all members had
accessed loans for capital, the groups themselves could have easily divided among
themselves into a situation of ‘haves’ and ‘have nots’. The risk here was that it could
create conﬂict and fragmentation, and disempower some members within the
SHGs. Grama Vikas managed these risks well and did not have the same drop in
INGO support that the other NGOs this chapter covers had. It managed the changes
in funding by maintaining long-term relationships with child sponsorship agencies,
and had even expanded to the neighbouring Raichur district in 2007. The advantage
of child sponsorship funding is that it does not use the projects cycle approach that
other INGOs use with ofﬁcial back donors. This way Grama Vikas can secure its
funding in the medium to longer term.
MYRADA
MYRADA is a large NGO aimed at social and economic empowerment. It operates
in three states of southern India; Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu.
MYRADA’s values were: justice, equity and mutual support for marginalized
communities through ‘fostering alternate systems of the poor through which they
mobilize and manage the resources they need [through] institutions which form the
basis for their sustained empowerment’ (Fernandez 2004: 3). MYRADA began
in 1968 and was the oldest and largest organization of the case studies. In its
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ﬁrst decade it worked with Tibetan refugees in Karnataka but in 1979 moved into
broader development work. In 2009 MYRADAworked in 12 districts across three
states, with over 10,000SHGs (which MYRADA refers to as self-help afﬁnity
groups – SAGs). This ﬁgure included 500 sex worker groups and 400 watershed
area groups. These were all women’s groups with the exception of the small number
of watershed groups, which had both men and women members (MYRADA
2009: 6). There was a staff complement of around 500. By 2009 MYRADA’s
donor proﬁle had changed markedly, with around 70 per cent of their funding
coming from Indian federal and state governments. While there was strong growth
until the early 2000s, the two major INGO donors ﬂagged that they would be
withdrawing their programme from southern India in around 2010, and so from
2005 MYRADA began a planned change in its approach to its work.
Over a four-year period (2007–2010) the various programmes withinMYRADA
were set to become autonomous organizations within MYRADA, with a greater
setting of direction by the local staff and aid recipients, with a view to them
becoming independent NGOs in their own right. The mechanism for the devolution
was through the Community Managed Resource Centres (CMRCs), of which there
were 96 established in 2009. These CMRCs would continue to provide support to
the SHGs as well as watershed associations and sex-worker groups, with
each CMRC being responsible for around 100–120 SHGs (MYRADA 2009: 6).
This more decentralized structure provided an opportunity for upward growth
from the community organizations directly, but with the centres taking a greater
role in accessing resources themselves. As the major source of resources was
increasingly government funded programmes, MYRADA felt that it would be
more successful and sustainable if the CMRCs directly accessed these programmes,
as they were closer to the target communities, which some government pro-
grammes preferred. In 2009 around one-third of the 96 CMRCs were in a position
to cover their own costs with over half being able to cover 75 per cent (MYRADA
2009: 40). The CMRCs each had their own Board on which MYRADA had
two nominees. The plan was for all of the CMRCs to become fully independent
in the years following 2010, when the ﬁrst eighteen CMRCs became
independent NGOs. MYRADA saw itself as being no longer at the centre, but
providing a mentoring role and the ‘institution’ of last resort for the CMRCs
(Fernandez 2004).
Following these changes MYRADA began to focus its work on more strategic
issues, and on engaging with government. In 2009 it was working with village
governments to improve their administrative capacity for the programmes they
implemented. It undertook training and capacity building for NGOs and SHGs and
gram panchayats (Village Government), and it was working with the central
government to improve the management of government-run SHG programmes.
It also assisted the Indian Planning Commission in developing district development
plans in those districts where MYRADA had experience, but district administration
lacked the capacity themselves. This shift of focus for MYRADAmeant that it was
still able to have inﬂuence and development impact, but from a much lower
resource base that was derived from their independent sources of income, such as
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consultancies, and a corpus of funds that covered their head ofﬁce expenses, rather
than INGO donors.
Prakruthi
Prakruthi is a small organization aimed at social and economic empowerment
working in Mulbagal Taluk in Kolar District in Karnataka. It had its origins as a
small village group within Grama Vikas 1982, but as it grew in size and inﬂuence it
slowly developed its own identity until it reached a stage where it could be
independent . Prakruthi was also an intermediate service organization supporting
35 other NGOs in Karnataka Tamil Nadu and Kerala on behalf of a local network of
former partners funded by a major INGO in the early 2000s. Prakruthi worked in
70 villages with 150 women’s SHGs covering some 2,200 families. As well as the
SHG programme, Prakruthi was involved in a natural resource management pro-
gramme, child development, health, and strengthening village assemblies. It saw
itself as a non-political body in the civil society. The values of the organization were
based on the premise that ‘sustainable development can only take place in the
context of an organized committed groups or society’, with a mission
… to develop and support the process of an ongoing struggle of the disadvan-
taged section of society and help them ﬁnd their own ways and means of
alternative sustainable development strategies which can be applicable afford-
able and can bring measurable collective improvement in their life condition.
(Prakruthi n.d.)
Like the other NGOs mentioned in this study, from 2005 Prakruthi had the
challenge of a sharp drop-off in donor funding, when the last international donor
ended its support in 2009. Prakruthi was also involved in the KWDP programme
and as with the NGOs in Dharwad, the changes in policy within the programme saw
Prakruthi not being reimbursed for one year’s expenditure that it incurred as part of
that programme. As a result of the issues with KWDP and the move of INGO
donors away from Karnataka there has been no expansion, and Prakruthi had to cut
back their staff from a peak of 73 people in 2004, to 33 by 2010.
Overall Prakruthi had a programme committed to economic and social empow-
erment among marginalized women in Kolar District; however, one of the schemes
that was being considered by Prakruthi was a government-supported microﬁnance
scheme that would see an injection of Rs 150,000 into each SHG and also provide
a fee to be able to cover some of Prakruthi’s costs. As for IDS, the challenge for
Prakruthi was that the members’ equity in the group would drop from 90 or
100 per cent to a mere 10 per cent, leading to the problem of insufﬁcient attention
being given to addressing social issues in the group and fostering an atmosphere for
empowerment. The danger was that this could cause problems with repayment rates
and a feeling of reduced ownership, which could in a worse case disempower the
groups. As with the similar microﬁnance programme taken up by Chinyard there
are quite a lot of risks for the organization as it goes forward, both in terms of
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maintaining values and being viable. Of the organizations in this set of case studies
Prakruthi has been the most affected by both the loss of INGO donors and the issues
of the debt from KWDP. In 2009 there was no clear plan to manage the funding
issues.
RORES
RORES (Reorganisation of Rural Economy and Society) was a small NGO aimed
at social and economic empowerment, that worked in Kolar District, but also had a
small programme across the border in Chittoor district in Andhra Pradesh. It started
in 1989–90 but spent the ﬁrst three years establishing itself andmaking contact with
local communities. Initially it worked in 15 villages, but through the 1990s RORES
expanded its programme reach to 60 villages. From this work in the 1990s a
federation of SHGs facilitated by RORES supported the SHGs, and by 2009 it
was largely independent. In the early 2000s RORES had a number of separate
programmes, such as a watershed programme supported by the Andhra Pradesh
government in Chittoor district in AP; a government of Karnataka State Women’s
Development Corporation supported programme, with 40 villages; and the Integrated
Sustainable Development programme working in 60 villages in Srinavasapura
taluk (sub-district of 500 villages) supported by a number of INGOs. RORES
was also involved in the KWDP but did not incur losses as many of the other
NGOs did.
Since 2005 most of these programmes had been wound back as INGOs with-
drew, and the fall in INGO donor funding had seen the RORES programme reduce
so that in 2009 it was involved with only 146 SHGs, and this number was unlikely
to change. Their staff numbers had fallen from a high of 30 people in 2005, to 12 in
2009. In 2009 RORES was involved in a school lunch programme, a horticulture
programme funded by the state Department of Forestry, and organic farming
projects supported by the state Department of Agriculture. Most importantly,
however, was that RORES had become more strategic in its approach, with
their most important programme being an information campaign in one taluk on
the Right to Information Act. Under the Right to Information Act all levels of
government – federal, state and local – had to provide information on government
programmes if requested. RORES published a bi-monthly broadsheet newsletter
with details of government programmes available and their details. The newsletter
included information on: infrastructure projects, such as the winning of tenders and
their details; the school lunch programme, to which schools, and what was
included; and the welfare programmes including the ration shops, the food that
was available and details of which ration shops had their scales certiﬁed by the
Weights and Measures Board. Making this information more widely available
ensured that people knew their entitlements, and at the same time made it harder
for providers to skim off beneﬁts for themselves, or engage in corruption. RORES
managed and implemented this programme with only one staff member, and the
information provided had a direct and ongoing beneﬁt to these communities,
especially the marginalized.
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The other issue was the sustainability of RORES as an organization. In 2009
it was reducing its presence in the core programme area, and at the same time it
was also engaging in income generation activities through the production of
spirolum, a dietary supplement made of processed blue-green algae, which it
marketed through its NGO network. It was also supported by funding generated
from the executive director’s commercial microﬁnance programme for the middle
class that operated in local urban areas. The proﬁts these commercial activities
generated were sufﬁcient to support the Right to Information newsletter and
covered the core costs of the organization. The strategy of RORES, to overcome
the drop in funding, was to develop independent commercial sources of income and
take on only a few government programmes. This has enabled it to continue
some of its core programmes, and ensured that it was able to have a major focus
on the marginalized in the district. The cost was a narrower focus of their
programme.
Conclusion
This chapter has looked at the rapidly changing circumstances in two districts
in Karnataka, and how NGOs have responded to the changes brought about by
rapid economic development, and as a result the withdrawal of many INGO
donors from the Karnataka. The focus has mainly been on the smaller NGOs and
the strategies they have adopted to survive. Three points have emerged: the ﬁrst is
that level of poverty and marginalization in Karnataka was still serious in the
poorer districts, despite the rapid economic gains made at the state level; the
second is that the NGOs in the case study had all continued their work, but with
serious disruption and restructuring required; and third, they adopted a range
of different strategies for survival. These strategies ranged from expanding
commercial operations to provide core support, in the case of RORES; splitting
off local operations so that they can better access state resources, as was the case
with MYRADA; operating a microﬁnance operation as was the case with
Chinyard; to establishing new long-term donor linkages, which Grama Vikas
undertook.
While there was no uniform solution to the challenges, it was the resilience and
ingenuity of these local NGOs that saw them through periods of rapid change and
uncertainties. The other key feature of the experience of these local NGOs was the
role of INGOs, and also multilateral donors such as the World Bank. While it was
expected that INGOs and their funders would pull out of economically successful
states such as Karnataka to put their limited resources in areas of greatest need in
the north of India, it was the process of withdrawal that is worth examining. With
the exception of the MYRADA donors, there did not seem to be a process of
withdrawal and adjustment from the donor over a longer time frame. Given the
extent of the work for many of these NGOs and the communities they reach, a
three to ﬁve year process of withdrawal would seem reasonable. Related to this
were the management processes of the World Bank KWDP, where the Bank saw
the move to results-based contract management as a strength. In effect it resulted in
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the failure to reimburse the NGOs for work completed and effectively shut down
some of the NGOs’ ongoing programmes that were outside the scope of the
KWDP. More work was required by the Bank and government agencies in their
results-based management approaches as the search for quick results often left
ineffective projects and reduced NGO infrastructure in their wake.
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4 Pune waste-pickers programme
Introduction
This chapter looks at a programme which did not follow the traditional NGO
model, but rather took a radical step in terms of the development approaches of
an NGO working with marginalized communities. In this case it was an urban
programme in the city of Pune in Maharashtra, the state immediately to the west of
Karnataka, working with waste-pickers to support them to realize their rights. The
radical difference was that from the very start, the model of intervention was that it
was led by the aid recipients – the waste-pickers. Here the role of the local NGO, in
this case the Centre for Continuing Education of the Women’s University (SNDT),
was akin to a service provider to the waste-pickers’ own organization, the Kagad
Kach Patra Kashtakari Panchayat (KKPKP) – from Marathi this translates as ‘the
association of waste-pickers in the city’.
Waste-pickers
So who are waste-pickers? In the streets of any large city in India you will see small
groups of women (and sometimes children) around and inside garbage skips, sifting
through and collecting scraps of paper, tin, plastic and cloth. These are the rag
pickers, as traditionally they collected rags and bones, but this has broadened to
include recyclable waste more generally, and so the more accurate name is waste-
pickers. In India’s pervasive caste system, waste-pickers sit fairly close to the
bottom rung, being a sub-group of dalits, a name that in Marathi literally means
‘suppressed’ or ‘crushed’ – the most marginalized in society. The dalitswere kept to
the most menial and unpleasant tasks, such as cleaning up other people’s rubbish,
and other such jobs that higher caste Hindus would not do due to their degrading
nature, being seen as ‘unclean’ in the Hindu religious tradition. This particular
group of dalits came to Pune in 1972 from the rural areas of Maharashtra where
they were agricultural labourers, following a devastating drought; and in Pune they
found that waste-picking was about the only work that dalit women could do,
outside of more poorly paid domestic service.
The programme that SNDT developed had its genesis in 1990 when it started an
informal education programme for working children in the urban slums of Pune. It
was here that SNDT staff met child waste-pickers and accompanied them on ‘their
forays into garbage bins’ and saw the lives they led (Chikaramane and Narayan
2005: 1). The informal education programme brought to SNDT the broader social
justice and socio/political issues of slum life: key among these is the realization that
income generation programmes did not reach the very poor, who have little time for
additional income generation activities as they are mostly involved in very low
paid, full-time and often labour-intensive work. The main issue waste-pickers had
was less about their income levels, but more about changing the terms and condi-
tions of the work they were doing as waste-pickers: a problem that waste-pickers
have worldwide (Samson 2009). SNDT realized at the time that for a programme to
reach the very poor it had to target working people as workers, and see waste-
pickers in that light. ‘it was clear to us … that there could be other claimants to the
‘wealth in waste’ and small group endeavours were not likely to counter the threat
and this became the basis for organizing the waste-pickers on a mass scale’
(Chikaramane and Narayan 2005: 2). The solution that SNDT and the waste-
pickers came up with was to work with the waste-pickers as an organized group
in mass actions around their rights, rather than adopt the more common NGO
approach of treating the issue of marginalization as an individual livelihood issue.
Over the next twenty years the waste-pickers of Pune, as an organized group,
moved from being a marginalized and openly oppressed group in the city life of the
early 1990s, to having a central role in the revamped waste collection system of the
city ten years later.
Waste-pickers and SNDT
While as an occupation waste-picking is lucrative in comparison to the alternative
opportunities dalitwomen have in cities, it is regarded as ‘dirty’ and the preserve of
Waste recycling in India
Informal waste recycling in India with minor regional variations has been structured
in a pyramid form with scrap collectors or rag-pickers at the base, generally being
women and children who access garbage dumps (landﬁll sites) and the large and small
bins in the streets. Women do the more menial waste-picking work as men will not do
it but work in the ‘upper’ end of the waste recycling pyramid. The male scrap
collectors have push carts and buy scrap from small shops and businesses, and are
also scrap collectors.
Thirty per cent of the women are widowed or deserted and over half are the major
contributors to the household livelihood and less than 10 per cent are literate. They
collect paper, plastic, metal, and glass scrap moving on foot 10–12 km per day with
headloads as great as 40kg, and earn a little over a dollar a day. This scrap is sold to
scrap dealers some of whom are registered, who are almost exclusively men who are
in a position of power and frequently cheat the women through manipulating their
scales or buying waste on credit and not paying on time.
68 Pune waste-pickers programme
a ‘lower’ sub-caste of the dalit community, and mostly women and their children.
While waste recycling is important for a whole host of reasons that are well known,
up until the late 1990s it was not seen in that light in urban India. Waste-pickers
were seen as ‘scavengers’, actively discriminated against, harassed by the police
and government ofﬁcials, and treated badly by scrap dealers, with the legitimacy of
their work being continually brought into question. In 1990 SNDT was supported
by an international organization to undertake an adult literacy programme with the
children from the informal sector, including those of waste-pickers. After some
initial work with the waste-pickers it became clear that there was little demand from
the waste-pickers or their children for literacy, but rather the level of discrimination
and ofﬁcial harassment made their work situation difﬁcult, and at times quite
tenuous. After the initial contact with SNDT the waste-pickers approached them
as to what they could do to deal with their difﬁcult working environment. The main
issues they faced, as mentioned above, were not only dealing with putrefying and
dangerous garbage, but also issues of discrimination including facing police round-
ups when there was a theft in the neighbourhood, being cheated by the scrap traders
they had to sell the scrap to, and the stigma associated with the occupation. The
critical issue became one of establishing an alternative identity of waste-pickers as
‘workers’ rather than as ‘scavengers’.
This led to a programme shift by SNDT, away from non-formal education
towards what could be described as a rights-based approach that focused on the
right of waste-pickers as waste-pickers, and the legitimacy and respect that should
be associated with that role and identity. The second major shift was the realization
that a traditional approach of a development agency in setting up a ‘project’ with a
predetermined time frame, and a set of outputs and outcomes to address these
complex issues would not work. As a result SNDTapproached an INGO that had an
ofﬁce in Pune for an ongoing institutional support grant to work with waste-pickers
with a relatively open-ended scope for the types of activity that would be under-
taken. In practice the development approach adopted by SNDT became an iterative
one where the implicit objectives and outcomes expected were continually chan-
ging as the waste-pickers progressed in having their rights realized and issues
addressed.
The philosophical approach of SNDT in the programme was from the outset, to
ﬁrst and foremost acknowledge waste-picking as a legitimate and worthwhile
occupation, and that it should be supported as such, rather than having SNDT
(or any other agency for that matter) seeking to provide programmes aimed at
alternative income generation: ‘to establish an alternate identity for waste-pickers
as “workers” premised on the belief that scrap collection was socially relevant,
economically productive and environmentally beneﬁcial “work”, and that working
conditions could be changed’ (Chikaramane and Narayan 2005: 3). The strategy
then was to identify a process for formalizing waste-picking as a legitimate
occupation, and the only viable way that SNDT and the women could see to do
this was through a representative institutional structure. A trade union was the best
model given the inherent political nature of the struggle that waste-pickers were
engaged in. Such a trade union, however, would be different from an industrial
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union as the waste-pickers were self-employed, and did not have a formal associa-
tion as employees with the municipal corporation, which governed Pune City and
as such had responsibility for all waste management, including solid waste manage-
ment (as garbage collection had come to be called). The union model was preferred
over a co-operative structure, as the struggle of the women waste-pickers was
primarily about their lack of recognition and dignity, in often de-humanizing
conditions, rather than securing a share of an industry per se. But as we shall see
in this chapter, a separate co-operative structure did emerge. A trade union structure
also inherently recognized waste-pickers as ‘workers’ and enabled them to adopt
the methods of trade unions in negotiation, and their assertion of rights. This
included the strategic use of agitation methods such as rallies, demonstrations and
sit-ins to demand change, as being important and legitimate means. This was not
only to achieve their immediate ends, but also to assert their dignity and solidarity
as women waste-pickers. While waste-picking as we have seen is highly gendered
with little opportunity for women to enter the higher end of the waste recycling
pyramid, having their rights respected is a major step, and was empowering in
itself.
The leadership in the early years came from Dr Baba Adhav who at the time was
President of the trade union of ‘coolies’ and ‘head loaders’. He argued that a critical
mass was required, and so a convention of waste-pickers was organized in 1993.
Eight hundred waste-pickers attended from across the city, who one after the other
recounted their stories of the indignity of their existence under a state of continual
harassment. This convention led to the formation of the KKPKP) as a trade union
which established the waste-pickers as ‘workers’ and so provided a framework to
form a communications link between them and the municipal corporation. The
KKPKP was formally registered later in 1993 with the 800 original members who
attended the convention earlier that year. By the late 2009 KKPKP had a member-
ship of 8000 waste-pickers, 90 per cent of whom were women, and around half
were active in the union to varying degrees. It had a representative structure with an
elected council of 95 women and 5 men who meet every month to determine
priorities. It had as a central tenet the use of non-violent satyagraha resistance, to
challenge systemic injustice to waste-pickers and their communities.
KKPKP: the early years
The key issue that the waste-pickers faced in the mid-1990s, as we have seen, was a
lack of legitimacy, which in turn fed into a number of other hardships they faced in
their day to day work. The lack of respect from their peers, and the community more
generally, resulted in them seeing little future for themselves or their families
outside of rag-picking, and so children were not sent to school but were often
made to follow their mothers in their work of waste-picking, as well as other forms
of child labour. This lack of self-respect and legitimacy led to low prices from scrap
dealers, and ofﬁcial discrimination from the municipal corporation with their role
being seen to be on the edge of the law, and subject to persecution as vagrants and
‘scavengers’. SNDT took an approach to breaking the cycle of low self esteem and
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lack of legitimacy, that involved talking to the waste-pickers and sometimes work-
ing with them at their workplaces. The SNDT staff came to understand the issues
waste-pickers faced and identiﬁed with them. From these cautious initial steps
membership of KKPKP was slowly built in the city wards, and from there repre-
sentatives were selected. By 1996, as the numbers and conﬁdence in the union
grew, the union representatives were being elected from within each slum area. It
was important for both SNDT and the union from the outset, that the representative
nature of the union be accepted, and so formal meetings were held every month to
discuss issues between the 100-strong council of waste-pickers and SNDT staff.
KKPKP had a governing board of 11 members (eight women and three men) of
whom eight were scrap collectors, the President was the son of a waste-picker and
there were two non waste-picker activists associated with SNDT, also on the board.
The other important principle adopted by SNDT was that the organizers who
worked with the waste-pickers have a close understanding of these women and
their work, and so as part of the ‘induction’ for staff, they spent some time with the
waste-pickers at their workplace and worked with them in picking out recyclable
waste. There were four organizers originally employed for this role, with
three activists in the role of broader management and strategic oversight. This
meant that the organizational structure was small and able to avoid becoming too
bureaucratic; and it also meant that a lot of the organizational work had to be done
by the waste-pickers women themselves, thus instilling autonomy from an early
stage of the organization development. From SNDT’s point of view they offered
and promised nothing in a way of tangible beneﬁts or services, but rather a belief that
collective action could end individual isolation and injustice (Mander 2002). There
has also been a certain amount of goodwill for the waste-pickers’ plight from the
broader community who see their struggle as justiﬁed, and so the pejorative views
of trade unions were avoided.
Identity cards
One step towards obtaining legitimacy and avoiding harassment was to establish
legitimacy through a recognized identity for waste-pickers, and one that clearly
classiﬁed scrap collection as legitimate work. While rag-pickers were recognized,
and more often than not disparaged, as a caste identity, waste-picking as an
occupation was not recognized in the same way. The solution that the union
came up with was the idea of an identity card – the existing ration cards and the
like established the women’s identity as dalits, residents and welfare recipients, but
they did not establish their identity as waste-pickers. The union, through a series of
demonstrations and public rallies from 1993, lobbied the municipal corporation to
provide, or at least recognize, an identity card for waste-pickers. In 1995 the Pune
Municipal Corporation became the ﬁrst municipality in India to recognize and
endorse the identity cards issued through KKPKP to authorize the waste-pickers to
collect scrap, thus recognizing their contribution to the ‘work’ of the municipality’s
waste management processes. This wording of ‘authorize’was important as it was a
much stronger terminology than ‘allow’. It implied a right to the waste, rather than
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merely access to it under the grace and favour of the municipal corporation, and a
result of the introduction of the identity card was that the level of harassment of
KKPKP members fell markedly.
Cooperative scrap store
Scrap was big business and the waste-pickers salvaged 144 tonnes of scrap worth
$3.7m annually in Pune in 2005; of this, the waste-picker earned a little over a
dollar a day (Chikaramane and Narayan 2005), and so it was important that the
waste-pickers received a fair price for their scrap. The price being offered by traders
on any particular day was due to a number of factors, not least the globalization of
the solid waste trade, where recycled paper and plastics from the west ended up in
India for reprocessing, leading to a crash in local prices when a ship of recycled
paper, plastic or metal arrived. Another factor, which was more easily controlled,
was the monopoly that local scrap dealers had. The women waste-pickers had little
bargaining power as they belonged to a marginalized group who were actively
discriminated against when dealing with male scrap dealers and often received
prices well below the going rate. The solution that the union came up with was to
have their own co-operative scrap store as competition to the established scrap
dealers. The union negotiated with the municipal corporation to get some space
under one of the many ‘ﬂyovers’ that were being built across the city where they
could have a some space for a store. The co-operative scrap store was set up in 1998
as a wholesale buyer, which while only moving a very small proportion of the total
waste collected, had the effect of providing some competition to the commercial
wholesalers, and so placed the women in a stronger bargaining position. The
co-operative scrap store provided an outlet if a reasonable price for scrap could
not be reached. The 40 or so women who sold their scrap there every day were
given a cup of tea and shared in the proﬁts at the end of the year, half of which went
into a provident fund and the other half was a cash dividend. The accumulated
reserves from the store of Rs175,000 (US$3,500) enabled them to expand, and in
the ten years since that ﬁrst co-operative scrap store another three stores were
opened across the city.
Savings and credit co-operative
As the poor generally describe their most important needs as jobs and credit, the
next obvious step after securing waste-picking as an ‘occupation’was to sort out the
issue of credit. The waste-picker women were not only being discriminated against
by the waste buyers, but also by credit providers to the point that they were not seen
as credit-worthy. This forced them to depend on expensive money-lenders who
charged around 5 per cent per month ﬂat rate of interest to cover their credit needs.
The women asked KKPKP if they could help. The approach the union took, rather
than using existing microﬁnance approaches, which were less suited to urban
environments, was to adopt a credit union model with a weekly collection of
both saving and repayments from each slum area. The credit was originally for
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basic consumption items, but by 2009 there had been some move towards loans
being provided for children’s school fees and housing costs. In 2009 the credit
union served 3,000 women and the union had an established relationship with a
bank to provide an ongoing line of credit. The maximum loan was Rs50,000
($US1,000) and the interest rate was 12 per cent per annum. A further six per
cent went into a social security charge, to build a provident fund for the women.
From 1999 interest free deposits from benefactors enabled KKPKP to build a
corpus of Rs300,000 in funds to capitalize the credit union. Since then the credit
union has declared a dividend of 10 per cent every year paid to the members after
covering costs.
In 2002, as the credit union matured, they found there were still a signiﬁcant
number of waste-pickers who were not taking advantage of their service, simply
because they were too poor to meet the savings requirement, and their income was
too low and insecure for unsecured loans. The KKPKP undertook some research
with this group and found that they were using the pawnbroking services offered by
moneylenders, where they would be sold a small amount of gold to be used
as collateral in a pawnbroking arrangement. The poor women would receive an
ongoing line of credit secured up to 60 per cent by the value of the gold, but at the
existing high interest rates. As a result of the study KKPK undertook a campaign
against the moneylenders, and at the same time secured a fund of Rs200,000
through local well-wishers with which they redeemed the gold from the money
lenders and took over any outstanding debts. KKPKP then set up their own
pawnbroking service as part of the credit union, but offered a 2 per cent per
month rate rather than the 5 per cent per month offered by money lenders. As a
result of the credit union rates and the campaign, the moneylenders dropped their
rates to match the credit union rates.
Later years: KKPKP autonomy
In the early 2000s, after the union had been operating for around 10 years, KKPKP
began to look for ways to secure its independence from outside support by INGO
donors and others. While it was appropriate to receive support for small one-off
pilots or research activities, it was important that as a union KKPKP be self-funding
for its institutional support. While union fees from such a marginalized group
would never be enough to run the costs of a union, they were hoping they could
build a corpus of funds so that the income from it would be able to cover the costs.
The breakthrough came when after years of sustained lobbying the union had
waste-picking in Pune classed as an ‘unclean’ occupation by the government
(Chikaramane and Narayan 2005) and therefore eligible for an education subsidy.
The Maharashtra Government approved the waste-pickers through their Municipal
endorsed identity card to be classed as being engaged in an unclean occupation and
so be eligible for the Pre-matric Scholarship for Children, which was subsidized on
a one-for-one basis by the central government to give a total grant of Rs5000
(~US$100) per annum, per family (Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment
2004). Until that time only the children of night soil carriers and similar workers
Pune waste-pickers programme 73
were eligible. The campaign to broaden the classiﬁcation to include waste-pickers
was helped by a supportive media with headlines such as ‘Government ﬁnds
rag-picking too clean to merit help’ (Chikaramane and Narayan 2005: 15).
This subsidy, which was only available to KKPKP members, resulted in a rapid
increase in union membership. As the union played an important part in negotiating
the classiﬁcation and subsequent subsidy payments, there was a strong argument
from the union leadership that newmembers should pay ‘arrears’membership from
the time the union was formed in the mid-1990s.
They are beneﬁting because we struggled. For years without complaint we
attended programmes, protests, marches, meeting and conferences. We did not
calculate in terms of immediate beneﬁts. All those years [other] women
laughed at us.… Today they beneﬁt because of our efforts. Let them pay for it.
(Waste picker women quoted in Chikaramane and Narayan 2005: 29)
There were no complaints at having to pay the Rs350 ($US7 in instalments) for the
fees in ‘arrears’. This set of fees then made up a corpus fund so that from 2002,
KKPKP no longer needed institutional support from external donors, being self-
funded from fees and interest income. This education subsidy continued for four
years, but by 2009 payments had been suspended on the grounds of high costs
if implemented across the state, and so the campaign for waste-picker justice
continued.
Health
Another important breakthrough as a result of ongoing campaigns by the KKPKP
and its members was that Pune Municipal Corporation recognized the health risks
inherent in working with solid waste and agreed to cover health insurance pre-
miums from 2002. This was the ﬁrst municipality in India to do so, and it was
important as it conﬁrmed the status of waste-pickers as a formal part of the waste
management under the purview of the municipal corporation. Like every step of the
way in ﬁghting for waste-picker rights, it was not without its problems. For
example, the insurance company objected to the large number of claims from
waste-pickers and stopped paying out on many of the claims, even after the
municipal corporation paid increased premiums. This dispute was only resolved
following direct action through sit-ins by waste-pickers outside the insurance
company ofﬁces, leading to the administration of the account being moved
to another ofﬁce of the company. KKPKP also looked at alternative health strate-
gies including occupation health and safety by improving the tools-of-trade the
waste-pickers use, including providing rubber boots, gloves and the like.
Education
The issue of accessing education for waste-pickers’ children had been an issue for
KKPKP since its inception, as the role of children in waste-picking was
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institutionalized to a large extent. In the early years 1989–1996, SNDT provided
non-formal education classes for out of school children, which were supplemented
by and then replaced with annual school enrolment drives. At the same time there
was a focus on schools not to discriminate against waste-pickers’ children (such as
being sent home for having dirty/torn clothes and the like). ‘They [waste-picker
children] were the ﬁrst to be shouted at and the last to receive text books and
uniforms due to them from the Municipal school system’ (Chikaramane and
Narayan 2005: 19). Incentives were also provided for waste-picker children
to go to school, with notebooks and prizes from KKPKP, and the Maharashtra
state education system provided additional food rations to the families of those
children with 80 per cent or higher attendance rates. This was in addition to
the education subsidy for those classiﬁed as being in ‘unclean’ occupations outlined
above. KKPKP also approached corporate sponsors to provide bursaries for
higher education. While there was a requirement that members of the union do
not use children for labour or engage in child marriage, ensuring access to
education for waste-picker children was an ongoing issue for KKPKP since its
inception. While there was a drop of 75 per cent in the incidence of child labour in
waste-picking in 2005 due to the union’s work, there are still children working as
waste-pickers.
Solid waste collection and handling (SWaCH) co-operative
Since the late 1990s there has been a national move in India following a ruling from
the Supreme Court to develop a national standard for Municipal Solid Waste
Handling, with regulations coming into effect in 2000. Among other things, they
directed municipalities to undertake measures for doorstep collection of waste, and
its segregation in the household into various categories of recyclables – common in
the West. The implication of this regulation was that the waste-pickers would be
displaced if doorstep collection was privatized, something that occurred in
the small city of Nasik in Maharashtra, where waste collection was done by private
contractors, putting the local waste-pickers out of work. KKPKP also had a similar
experience when residents in some wealthy areas hired private contractors to collect
waste at the household doorstep, thus displacing 20 waste-pickers in one area. In
another area, 300 waste-pickers negotiated for doorstep collection for 25,000
households, charging a nominal amount for the service, as well as the return from
the waste collected (Mander 2002: 3640).
Given their earlier experience, this regulation posed an opportunity as much as a
threat for the members of the KKPKP, provided that the waste-pickers could be
integrated into doorstep collection. If this occurred they believed they would
improve their working conditions, improve their earnings and ‘transfer their
status from scavenging to service provision’ (Chikaramane and Narayan 2000: 16).
While the Pune Municipal Corporation was slow in implementing doorstep collec-
tion on a large-scale, due to resistance from both the municipal workers unions and
the waste-pickers union (albeit for different reasons) KKPKP saw the inevitability
of the move and became proactive. They put to the municipal corporation that
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KKPKP would conduct a trial across seven wards of the city to see if doorstep
collection by waste-pickers was feasible on a large scale. This trial commenced in
2005 and after eighteen months 1500 waste-pickers were reaching 150,000 house-
holds, being 30 per cent of the city. Given this success the waste-pickers argued that
they should be given the contract to cover the city (Express Newservice Nov 2,
2007). The trial did raise a number of issues: for example, the waste-picker women
did not like being paid monthly; the households did not like to be paying for a
service they thought they paid their rates paid for; and the Corporation also had
reservations. But none of these problems were insurmountable, and in the end they
were all resolved.
After some intense negotiations, further studies, and some backsliding by the
Municipal Corporation (Times of India [Pune edition] 31Oct, 2007), an agreement
was reached, and in August 2007, the Solid Waste Collection and Handling
(SWaCH) Cooperative was established as the umbrella organization for the
waste-pickers involved in doorstep collection. Membership of the Cooperative
was open to all, but the KKPKP waste-pickers were given ﬁrst priority, and after
them the next priority for membership were those classiﬁed as living in ‘below
poverty line’ (BPL) categories. SWaCH was given responsibility for doorstep
collection for 80 of the city’s 140 wards and a budget of Rs3.5crore (US$0.7m)
to set up and run the programme. The municipal corporation agreed to provide
support for ﬁve years after which SWaCH was expected to be self-sufﬁcient.
The Governing Body of SWaCH comprises 14 waste-pickers/collectors, two repre-
sentatives of the PMC and one representative of KKPKP. Within a year of its
establishment SWaCH was well accepted by the community, and it carefully
positioned itself as a proactive service provider offering a range of services to
complement doorstep collection. They had their own website advertizing these
services (http://swachcoop.com/about-swachpune.html, accessed July 2009): includ-
ing having drop-off points for householders to leave large items; building compost
bins for householders; collecting electronic waste separately; and providing
integrated services for institutions like schools, as well as ofﬁce blocks and
corporations. SWaCH looked at providing recycled products such as bags for
sanitary pads only to improve the safety of waste-pickers, but it also promoted
the recycling message and provided another source of income for the waste-pickers
(Times of India [Pune edition] 7 June, 2009). The waste-pickers were also trained
in ‘soft skills’ in customer service and communications, to improve their inter-
action with their clients: Pune’s householders (Times of India [Pune edition]
12 April, 2009).
The KKPKP was also connected to the global waste-picking issues through its
advocacy and policy work (Samson 2009). In the 2009 UN Climate Change
Convention negotiations, KKPKP spoke out against aspects of the UN’s Clean
Development Mechanism and argued that the proposal to burn waste for methane
production would make thousands of waste-pickers unemployed. The point that
KKPKP made was that recycling saved 25 times more greenhouse gases than
incineration, and seven times more than landﬁll. They particularly objected to a
Clean Development Fund (CDF) supported ‘refuse derived fuel’ plant in the Pune
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landﬁll, which has reduced the local waste-picker earnings by more than half.
‘ “If the waste goes into the incineration plant, what do we eat?” Mr. Gaekwad
said’ (The Hindu 10 June, 2009). As seen from these case studies KKPKP is driven
by the continued struggle for waste-picker rights, as well as raising awareness of
the gendered and caste relations inherent in waste-picking.
Gender and waste-pickers
As indicated earlier in this chapter, waste- was highly gendered. It was regarded as
such an ‘unclean’ activity that men of any caste did not want to be engaged in it, and
the dalits would prefer their womenfolk to be engaged in waste-picking at the
household level, while men operated pushcarts from shop to shop picking up
recyclable items. The big changes brought about by KKPKP, and especially the
SWaCH co-operative, was to essentially change the nature of the work so that it was
less stigmatized, more lucrative and involved fewer hours of work. The question
that continued to face KKPKP was: how to maintain the access of their members to
waste and not be pushed out by male-dominated waste collection processes? The
KKPKPwas very careful to ensure that it was not a ‘women’s’ union or exclusive in
any way, as they felt that while the argument for workers’ rights had very strong
gender dimensions, to make it exclusive would lead to divisions in the community
and enable opponents to adopt divide and rule tactics. The approach that KKPKP
took was to ensure the representation in the KKPKP governance represented the
proportion of men and women engaged in waste-picking; and that these proportions
were maintained as the new systems were implemented to avoid the phenomenon
of men ‘muscling in’ on a sector as technology changes. With technological change
it is often the beneﬁts of the technology changes that is accessed by men at the
expense of women, and so the challenge for the KKPKP and the SWaCH
co-operative was to ensure that did not happen.
The approach taken to protect the women workers here was through strong
membership structure through the union. While it was possible for the gender
balance in the KKPKP to change over time to include more men, there were
two important features that made this unlikely in the short-term: ﬁrstly, the
requirement that all new members had to cover-off membership subscriptions
back to when the union was formed, to limit the level of ‘freeloading’ that later
membership brought; and secondly, the preference given to KKPKP members in
doorstop solid waste collection for the city, through the rules that were put in
place. The Pune Municipal Corporation could provide contracts to different
providers, and as truck collection expanded with more automation this would
inevitably occur, but in the short to medium term this was unlikely due to the
strength and relative militancy of the KKPKP. In the longer term the children of
waste-pickers were not taking up their mothers’ occupation, and so in another
generation there would be fewer dalit women being involved in manual waste-
picking. The key change that occurred through KKPKP and SWACH was that the
waste-picker women themselves had a strong inﬂuence on setting the pace
of change.
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Conclusion
The waste-picker programme as a development programme is an important case
study of success in meeting the broad goals originally envisaged, but also one of
institutional sustainability. The programme was initially supported by a relatively
small annual grant from an INGO donor over ten years, and in that time the KKPKP
was able to build an investment fund from which staff are paid and secretarial costs
covered, and to ensure the programme was independent from donor funding.
KKPKP has set up a separate co-operative to manage the work of waste-picking
itself, so that while the women still operated as individual traders, it was under the
umbrella and protection of both a co-operative and a union. From the outset the
SNDT sub-centre continued to provide support to the association though mobiliza-
tion and training programmes with waste-pickers; and it also provided programme
management and some secretarial and support type services for the union. Staff
from SNDT are effectively seconded to the union and the SWaCH co-operative, to
provide the staff resources to these bodies. Some of these staff are the children of
waste-pickers. The women reported that they had their dignity restored: rag-picking
was, and still is, seen as a dirty and low status occupation, but the KKKP provided
it with legitimacy. The women were living in a cleaner environment and had
escaped the stigma of being perceived as being dirty, to the point that they ‘…
look[ed] like the rest of the community’ when they were not at work (Waste-picker
quote 2002). This meant they faced less overt discrimination from the middle class,
they could stand up for themselves, and had greater ﬁnancial literacy with savings
and banking. They were able to support their children’s education, as they realized
there were other options beyond waste-picking for the future generation, and there
was also marriage support to prevent child marriage. Finally, they had a greater
income with easier and greater access to waste, and they were formally recognized
as part of the city’s waste management processes.
SNDT had a strong commitment to its values and a strong programme around the
pursuit of the rights of the people it served, the waste-pickers. In terms of empow-
erment, the KKPKP had made a clear difference to the lives of the women, it had
given them agency and enabled them to be able to negotiate with police and
ofﬁcials and make decisions around the work of the union. The outcomes of the
work of both KKPKP and SWaCH was an effective increase in waste-picker
incomes through access to waste, lower costs of credit and more security in
their employment. The waste-picker programme adopted a different model to
most other NGO programmes, with an emphasis more sharply focused not only
of the rights of the women but also their role in the process. They were actively
involved in programme priorities identiﬁcation and design in a formal process
through the monthly meetings. There was also a high level of staff accountability to
the waste-picking women themselves. Being associated with the University
(which largely leaves them alone) the staff were less involved in day to day NGO
organizational issues and could focus their energies more directly on the
waste-pickers, etc. It was a very successful model in what it set out to do.
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5 Measuring women’s empowerment
Introduction
The previous chapters looked at the situation of rural NGOs in two districts
of Karnataka, and an urban NGO in Pune; and the rapid changes they had to
manage in the early 2000s. This chapter will now look at how these and other
NGOs are involved in empowerment programmes with self-help groups and the
contributing factors in their effectiveness. It will examine, ﬁrst how empowerment
might be measured when it comes to NGO self-help group work, and then the
factors that inﬂuence empowerment outcomes, especially for the poorer and more
marginalized groups. Quantitative and qualitative analyses are both necessary if
meaningful insights are to be gained: a qualitative analysis can identify the key
factors in, and indicators of empowerment, given its rather nebulous nature and
largely cognitive meanings; while a quantitative analysis can provide some indica-
tion of the extent of any change and enable comparisons to be made. This mixed
method approach is preferable to attempting to identify empirical proxies, which
may or may not be valid in a particular context.
The challenge for meaningful research, then, is to be able to score, rank
and undertake what is essentially a quantitative analysis of qualitative measures.
This way we can ascertain the relative importance of a number of possible factors
in achieving empowerment outcomes from NGO interventions. Once these factors
are identiﬁed, further qualitative analysis is then required to validate these
ﬁndings and establish if there are causal relationships or merely coincidental
associations. The approach taken in this study was to interview around 70 SHGs
as focus groups from the set of NGOs being studied, analyse the data, and then
follow this up with further interviews of the leadership and staff of the participating
NGOs to verify and put some context to the ﬁndings. Finally, two workshops were
held with the NGOs to discuss the issues raised from the self-help group survey
results. The results of the study indicated that ‘agency’ was the key measure
of empowerment, and both the time the group had been functioning and account-
ability of the NGOs to the self-help groups were key causal factors for
empowerment.
Researching empowerment with Indian NGOs
The research involved a survey of 15 NGOs and 77 self-help groups supported by
those NGOs. Nine of these NGOs were used as case studies in Chapters 3 and 4.
The other ﬁve NGOs included: a Christian NGO, Good News, in Dharwad
District; an environmental NGO, the Development Academy, in nearby Pune;
BGGS, a small rural NGO in Dharwad; YUVA, another urban NGO; and Disha
Kendra, an NGOworking with tribal communities inMaharashtra. The NGOs were
chosen from a list of the NGOs working in the relevant district. Five NGOs
were chosen each in Dharwad and Kolar on the basis they represented the range
of characteristics and sizes of NGOs working in each District, with the other ﬁve
NGOs representing NGOs in different settings, namely, urban, environmental
and tribal communities by way of comparison. Of course not each NGO was
conﬁned to their home district; for example, MYRADA worked across a number
of districts in three states, but the NGOwork in that district was the focus of the study.
The SHGs that the NGOs were working with were chosen using a stratiﬁed
random sample so that a range of ages of the groups and the castes of the women
with whom the NGOs were working were represented. The principal method
used in the research was a group survey, involving the collection of qualitative
and quantitative data from the groups. The interaction with the groups also pro-
vided the opportunity to capture some of the women’s own narratives of how
they experienced empowerment. This data was then enumerated and statistically
analysed to establish the extent of any change, relevance of the ﬁndings, and
for comparative purposes. The basis for using the two-stage mixed-method
approach in the data analysis was to enable some level of triangulation by
using different data sources including statistical rankings, personal narratives and
NGO records (Sandelowski 2000). The key concepts being analysed, empower-
ment and accountability, are both normative, and are not easily subject to empirical
testing as they can have different meanings in different cultural settings. It was
important then to capture how they were experienced in this part of India. It goes
without saying that poor women in India are not a homogenous group, and so no
one woman’s voice reﬂects that of all, or even many, marginalized women.
Experiences of marginalization and empowerment vary across the regions of
India, and so it was important that context speciﬁc analyses were undertaken to
capture the richness of these experiences in a particular setting (Murthy 2001).
There were problems with using a predetermined survey approach in which
respondents were ‘led’ through a series of possible or expected outcomes. These
can lead to a range of normative biases where people respond in the way they think
the researcher was looking for or expecting. The other issue was that of relationship
between the researcher and the subject. The very act of asking the question set up a
power relationship between the researcher and the subject that could lead to
problems with the quality of the data being collected (Goetz 2001; Reid and
Vianna 2001).
The survey used open-ended discussion techniques, allowing more time for
free-ﬂowing discussions within the groups as well as with the researcher. The
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researcher tried to improve access to the groups by sitting with them in an
informal manner, and providing background information on the research and
other information the groups wanted to know. By using open-ended questions
and an analysis of the responses, the indicators for empowerment were developed.
As these were described in terms of the broader empowerment literature and
‘agency’, the links could be readily made (see Chapter 2). For the quantitative
analysis of the data the interview responses were categorized into a series of Likert
scales. This process involved a number of steps: ﬁrst, the responses to an open-
ended question on changes people had experienced in their lives over time listed
and the lists grouped into taxonomies, or classiﬁcations. The taxonomies were then
used to determine a coherent domain that positioned items on the list in a way
that was more or less consistent across respondents’ answers so meaningful com-
parisons were possible (Hines 1993). The next step was to number and rank
the items on the lists to produce a series of interval data as an ordinal rank. The
women in the SHGs identiﬁed empowerment for them as expanded choice and
action, which was the domain; within that the taxonomies were the capacity to:
leave the house freely; interact with ofﬁcials; and participate in local government
processes.
These rankings reﬂected the degree of change the respondents indicated they
had experienced. This was further corroborated in the interview, by not only
looking at the information per se, but also by examining the interviewees’ approach
to providing the information, and their level of participation (Poland and
Pederson 1998). This approach is similar to a grounded-theory approach, which
inductively develops measures, which are then grouped and coded (Webler and
Tuler 2000). These ﬁndings and associated explanations were then compared with
Free listing –
(Question: What are the important changes in respondent’s life?)
Coherent domain (empowerment)
(Responses grouped) 
Taxonomy (1)
(leave house)
Taxonomy (2)
(meet officials)
Taxonomy (3)
(participate in govt.)
Ranking (low empowerment) (High empowerment) 
Figure 1 Framework for ranking empowerment.
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other similar research, and further qualitative research that occurredwith the case study
NGOs that looked at how the NGOs themselves deﬁne and assess empowerment.
Measuring the variables that affect empowerment
The survey selected the focus groups SHGs from the list the NGO provided of the
self-help groups that it was working with. The use of focus groups rather than
individual interviews has the advantage of capturing more information in a given
time, and it also provides a collective testimony and ‘emphasizes empathy and
commonality of experience and fosters self-disclosure and self-validation’ (Madriz
1998: 116). Typically, the interviews lasted between one and a half and two hours
and sought in the ﬁrst instance factual data on details of the group and its members,
and the village. These information questions were then followed up with open-
ended questions to elicit information on the changes that had happened to the
women through their SHG membership, and how decisions are made both within
their household and within the group. The semi-standardized structure allowed for
discussion within the groups of the issues as they emerged. There were six broad
areas covered in the survey:
 characteristics of the village itself in terms of population, caste, schools and
other social amenities such as water supply, formal and informal groups and
associations in the village;
 structure of the self-help group in terms of membership, and their endowments
such as education and caste;
 decision-making in the SHG;
 the accountability mechanisms the sponsoring NGO has with the groups;
 changes to SHG members in terms of what they had learnt, what they had
gained in terms of assets and how their lives had changed;
 village social capital such as decision-making processes and the broader
support mechanisms within the village.
Following the survey the ranked numeric data were analysed using non-parametric
Spearman tests to calculate the correlation or ρ value of a sample size of 77
groups. This particular test was chosen to avoid assuming a speciﬁc distribution
for the data. While the sample was relatively small and difﬁcult to randomize
due to access difﬁculties etc., the statistical test gives some indication of the relative
importance of certain factors in NGO work on empowerment. Empowerment was
the dependent variable in the correlation analysis, with the key independent vari-
ables being accountability of the NGOwith the groups, and the number of years the
group had been meeting together. Other variables based on the endowments of the
groups were also tested, but found not to be signiﬁcant.
The data analysis of the focus group survey data results indicate that both time and
accountability were found to be statically correlated with empowerment. A second
phase of interviews involving NGO staff andmanagement was then undertaken as a
follow-up to look more closely at these two statistically signiﬁcant factors.
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Empowerment
Empowerment was examined through ‘agency’ by using a set of proxy questions.
These questions explored the group members’ perceptions of what they had learnt
as a result of being active in the group; the key changes in their lives that had
occurred during the past few years; and whether the women believed these changes
were related to their membership of the SHG. Finally, the questionnaire explored
the group members’ involvement in broader village life including, inter alia, local
government, and how community issues were dealt with. The set of responses to
these questions provided data about the change in personal agency the women
experienced as a consequence of being a member of a group; as well as what might
be called the breadth of empowerment, that is, to the extent that the different
members experienced change within a particular group. Other questions relating
to empowerment looked at the outcomes the women had experienced, such as what
they had learnt and the assets they had gained.
The numeric coding was done by grouping the responses into the ﬁve broad
categories that emerged from the surveys. These became the taxonomies or cap-
abilities that deﬁned empowerment for these women. These were the ability to:
i go out of the house freely;
ii meet with ofﬁcials;
iii travel independently outside the village;
iv attend village meetings etc.; and
v actively participate in local political processes.
A score was then given to the level of empowerment that had been ‘experienced’ by
members of the group with a ranking of 0–5 with 0 being for ‘no change’ in
empowerment and 5 for the highest outcome that could be expected within that
context for these groups. The assessment of the data to make the ranking had two
components: the content of the responses; and the number of the members of the
Table 2 Results of Spearman rank correlation
Independent variables Mean SD ρ p-value
Accountability 2.610 1.1546 0.35 0.0018**
Caste 2.513 1.5894 −0.17 0.1334
Education 1.883 1.3176 0.05 0.6608
Land 2.591 1.3370 −0.13 0.2444
Village social capital 2.948 0.6766 0.06 0.6195
Change in social capital 0.630 0.4700 0.22 0.0589
Size of group 22.234 19.5737 0.04 0.7358
Years of group 3.653 2.4516 0.26 0.0240*
n = 77; Empowerment is the dependent variable
* Signiﬁcant at the ﬁve per cent level
** Signiﬁcant at the one per cent level
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group who responded. For example, if only a small proportion of group members
answered, a lower score was recorded for a particular indicator (such as going out of
the house), than if the whole group responded. This method of ranking can be a
little problematic in that the social and cultural context of the interview itself may
limit the response of some members of the group, given the discussion was held
with a foreign man sometimes at relatively short notice, with the discussion on
topics that the group did not normally talk about. The responsiveness of the group
itself, however, could also be seen as a measure of empowerment in that people
with greater agency would be less constrained in different and new social situations.
However, the ranking scores and range were based on the responses of the women
themselves, and the priority the women gave to a particular factor, and this was then
veriﬁed from other research and literature. Nevertheless, despite these checks, the
ranking could still be argued as normative, based partly on the values and judge-
ments made by the researcher in analysing the testimonies of the respondents.
There was also a weakness in using Likert scales for this type of research. There is
an inherent assumption that the ‘gap’ between each numeric factor is constant. That
is, the nominal or ‘empowerment difference’ between a (i) for going out of the
house and a (ii) for meeting with ofﬁcials is the same as the empowerment
difference between (ii) meeting with ofﬁcials and a (iii) going out of the village
freely; which of course could not be assumed in that way. But despite these two
reservations, this method of data analysis did provide some means to gain an
indication of the extent and direction of the changes in empowerment identiﬁed
by qualitative methods.
The main ﬁndings of the study were that ﬁrst, in terms of empowerment, women
themselves identiﬁed strongly with notions of ‘agency’ in how they described the
key changes that had occurred in their lives. These changes (albeit often subtle) in
power relations with those with whom the women interacted (through their
increased agency), were ranked by the women – in terms of importance – ahead
of more tangible outcomes, such as increased incomes. The second ﬁnding was that
there was a strong correlation between empowerment and those NGOs with strong
‘downward’ accountability mechanisms. These ﬁndings supported the notion that
empowerment within women’s lives, particularly in terms of ‘agency’, was stronger
if the women in the self-help groups had a direct role in some of the institutional
processes of the organization that facilitated that change (in this case the NGOs).
Most of the responses from the SHGs emphasized a few key indicators of the
changes in the lives of their members and provided an insight into how empower-
ment was perceived and experienced by these groups. These indicators related
primarily to improvements in the ‘agency’ of the women and were categorized
broadly as: autonomy of action; changes in family decision-making; participation
in community decision-making; and advocacy on broader social issues. These
related to the domains of change discussed in Chapter 2, in that the women had
greater inﬂuence in the family domain, and access to and inﬂuence in both the
community and political domains.
An interesting and related ﬁnding, was that in response to the open-ended
question on ‘change’, only a few respondents mentioned gaining assets or increased
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incomes as such. This suggested that changes in the economic domain, popular
with microﬁnance proponents, do not feature as highly in these women’s lives as
many would expect. This of course did not mean that increased incomes were not
important, but they were not seen as an important change in and of themselves. For
these women it was the broader process of social inclusion and their inﬂuence in it
that they found empowering. A number of respondents, however, did refer to the
reduced cost of credit, possibly because it increased the stability of incomes, and the
associated increase in certainty in the household economy, was important in their
lives. These changes that were reported went beyond the cognitive of how women
‘felt’; but they also described how these changes led to tangible effects on their
lives. Table 3 summarizes the number of responses to the identiﬁed key changes.
Autonomy of action
The capacity for the women to go out of their homes independently of other family
members was a clear statement from them of an increased autonomy of action.
While purdah (the seclusion of women from public) in the strict sense was not
followed by any of the members of the SHGs surveyed, the socialization of women
in poor Indian households was very strong, and except for agricultural work in
season, women were generally restricted in their public movements. There were
strong family and social expectations that women would generally stay in the house
and undertake household duties. Many of the respondents to the survey referred to
the ‘four walls’ being all they knew. Increased mobility gave women and their
SHGs legitimacy in the eyes of other family members, particularly, the husbands
who ‘allowed’ the women to attend the meetings. These groups were seen by the
family primarily as savings and credit groups, and so were a means to increase the
ﬁnancial resources available to the household.
The women used phrases such as: ‘being able to act independently’ to indicate a
key change in their lives, which for them was transformative. One group referred to
the fact that they ‘now had their freedom’; and another group member said she
could ‘now go to Delhi’ (some 2000km away) to emphasize the degree of personal
change she had experienced. The implications of the relatively simple act of being
able to go out of their home meant that the women could now interact with other
members of the community regularly. This included being able to attend SHG
meetings on a regular basis and doing the banking work associated with the savings
programme. This way they were able to interact with a range of ofﬁcials, whereas
Table 3 Summary of empowerment responses
Key change Go out
of house
Gain
family
respect
See SHG
as
important
Attend
village
meetings
Deal
with
ofﬁcials
Social
advocacy
Engage
in
business
Strong inﬂu-
ence in
community
No. responses
(n = 77)
37 21 31 21 28 17 15 13
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before they joined the SHG, their personal interaction was conﬁned to the family.
In the waste-picker community of Pune, the women responded that as a result of
the changes the NGO programme had brought to their lives they could now wash
twice a day and change their clothes after work, ‘and then I look like everybody
else’. The implication was that they were being treated the same as others in the
community, mainly because they could not be readily identiﬁed as ‘untouchable’
waste-pickers. The increase in self-esteem often resulted in improvements in a
number of tangible areas such as the livelihoods for the women and their families,
leading to a further increase in the women’s personal self-esteem. This supports the
theory of ‘psychological empowerment’ discussed in Chapter 2, where a virtuous
circle of heightened self-esteem occurs, leading to tangible results, which in turn
boosts self-esteem further.
Dealing with ofﬁcials and family
The second area of autonomy of action the respondents identiﬁed was an increased
interaction with local ofﬁcials: the main ones being bank managers, as the SHGs
had to have bank accounts for their savings, and typically, the banking role was
rotated among the group members. What was interesting from the data was that in
those cases where the banking role was not rotated among the group, the members
tended to report fewer [empowering] changes in their lives.While this was not able to
be statistically correlated due to a small sample size, it did point to the importance
that interacting with new people in new situations and domains can have on
people’s lives. In most cases the range of ofﬁcials the women dealt with widened
over time: from dealing with bank staff in the ﬁrst instance, to meeting with
government ofﬁcials about beneﬁts that may be due to group members, and in some
cases, village issues that directly affected the group members, such as water supply.
The increased capacity for independent action in many cases led to an increased
level of respect from the family and some change in the respondent’s power and
authority within the household. In one SHG a member referred to having being
‘introverted’ from harassment, but as a result of the self-help group programme had
become ‘bold’ and gained her ‘voice’. It was mainly the husband and his extended
family, such as brothers and their in-laws, particularly the mother in-law (who
traditionally had some power within Indian families) who had the change in
attitudes: phrases like ‘I gain more respect in the family’; or ‘I am no longer
treated like an idiot’ were not uncommon responses in the focus groups interviews.
A number of women highlighted changes in family decision-making, namely an
increased capacity to deal directly with various domestic problems that emerge; for
example, small disputes, problems with children, and their education; while others
indicated that they could now deal better with household problems that are more
serious, such as alcoholism and associated domestic violence by the menfolk.
The importance of education for the children, especially girls, was a common
response from most groups. This was driven home to the women when they, as
members, had learn to sign their names as part of normal banking transactions, and
that provided them with an identity in the broader community. Most SHGs were
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also required to have an educated person in the group to keep records and undertake
other administrative tasks, and those groups that did not have any literate members
‘employed’ a student, or one of the members’ educated children to carry out this
task. There were, however, a range of other factors that affected the level of
education of girls, of which the intervention of the NGO may be only part of the
story. Groups that were very new also reported they were sending their daughters to
school, whereas before they would not. Some of the reasons that this was happening
were: improved local infrastructure (schools, roads and buses); the spread of
television and the ‘Hindi’ movie and the different portrayals of women these
media presented; and the positive role models from other women in the village
who were sending their daughters to school. These all contributed to breaking down
the traditional practice of keeping the daughters at home. The study found, how-
ever, that the SHGs did provide support for girls’ education, and so the groups had
some role in the increase in the number of girls staying longer at school.
Participation in village political life
The women generally perceived themselves, as a result of their SHG membership,
as having some inﬂuence in village political life, and in some cases the women
nominated their participation and inﬂuence in village political life as an important
change (See Table 2), but this is still in a context where the space for women to
participate in village life was limited, with most village processes still being male-
dominated and patriarchal. The other main factor inﬂuencing the involvement of
women in village life was the changes to the system of local government and the
introduction of gram sabhas (village meetings) as a consultative forum for the
gram panchayat (village council). Also the afﬁrmative action policy of the Indian
government requires that 35 per cent of gram panchayat places go to women, and
that the District Collector appoints gram panchayat chairpersons in such a way as
to ensure an adequate representation of women and scheduled castes and scheduled
tribes’ in these positions. In Dharwad districts where the gram sabhas were
working well, there was greater participation of women SHG members in these
processes. The few women who were elected into the gram panchayat indicated
that participating in the SHGs provided the support and grounding for them to be
able to participate in local government. Thus, membership of SHGs provides an
important preparation ground for these broader community processes.
The women also reported a greater role in advocacy on local issues, mainly at the
local gram panchayat level driven by perceived injustices based on gender and
caste biases by ofﬁcialdom. This advocacy was mainly around improvements to
roads, water and village development, and also access to facilities, such as washing
facilities by dalits. The SHGs were also involved some state government level
advocacy, mainly on the issue of having the Government either not issue, or
withdraw, licences to sell alcohol in villages. The Government licensed the sale
of alcohol for speciﬁc villages for which it received a license fee, and as it was an
individual licence for a village it was possible to pressure the government to have
the licence withdrawn. The main reason that could be argued for a withdrawal of a
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licence was on the grounds of domestic violence and family safety. As result there
was a very active community-based advocacy campaign across the state to have
these licenses withdrawn on a case-by-case basis. For the women of these SHGs,
being engaged in advocacy represented quite a shift beyond their everyday village
life, and more importantly demonstrated the power of them and their SHG in being
able to tackle these sensitive issues.
Stability of income
As discussed above, one of the outcomes of the expanded choices and capacity for
action the women identiﬁed was some improvement in their standard of living.
While only a minority of respondents nominated economic beneﬁts in answer to the
unprompted open-ended questions on change, the women did recognize the eco-
nomic beneﬁts that accrued from the intervention in follow-up discussion. This was
typically described as having increased assets, ready cash, the reduced cost of credit
and general economic stability in the household. These economic outcomes enabled
the women to invest in children’s education, undertake some income generation
and provide household items that they saw as providing a better standard of living.
A greater disposable income that reduced cost of credit and provided ready savings
led to opportunities for the women to make a broader set of choices. Examples
included the upgrading of pottery wheels of a potter caste family, by moving from
wood to steel bearings; and in other cases the women purchased small amounts of
gold to enable them to obtain secured credit at lower interest rates for themselves
(rather than their family) through the commercial banks’ pawnbroking services.
Other groups reported an increased capacity to send their children to school, the
purchase of clothes, and the accumulation of assets such as cattle or goats by many
households. For the waste-pickers of Pune, in an urban setting, the chief resource
gained was easier access to household waste, their source of livelihood. The
economic beneﬁts in both urban and rural areas gave the women a much stronger
sense of security not only in economic terms but also in social terms. In the urban
areas of Pune, for example, the related social improvement was that the waste-pickers
suffered less discrimination following recognition from the municipal authorities,
and also to some extent because they could afford better housing and clothing.
The advantages brought by the co-operation and the norms of reciprocity of
working together as a SHG, was an important resource for large number of groups.
The ability to sit together to discuss issues, solve problems together, ‘listen to each
other more’ and the mutual support for women who were in domestic disputes or
being harassed by the police, were all identiﬁed as speciﬁc beneﬁts. The solidarity
within the SHGs was also seen as a source of status; earlier their lives were seen as
‘drab’ and they were ‘treated as idiots’, but now the women had status, were getting
information and were interacting with people outside their household and the
group. From the survey data it is possible to map a progression in empowerment
indicators over time in the life of a SHG. In the initial stages of a group’s life the
women reported access to very basic resources such as the habit of savings, and
then access to cheaper credit. The next step involved going out of the house,
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participating in basic household decisions such as food purchasing and gaining
access to paid work outside the house. As conﬁdence and self-awareness grew the
group members became involved in SHG management, taking on social issues in
the village, etc. and ﬁnally taking a greater control in household decision-making.
If a personal interest was there, some became involved in the local-level political
processes, which was an opportunity for poor women to be involved in local
government. Whether a person seeks to become a politician or not is a matter of
personal choice rather than an indicator of empowerment. It can be argued, how-
ever, that across a district or a number of communities, an increased number of
women from marginalized groups being represented in politics may give some
indication of broader empowerment processes at play.
Factors that affect empowerment
One of the key ﬁndings of the research was the positive correlation of account-
ability and time (the years SHG had been operating) with empowerment. The
scores for accountability were derived from the type of consultative and reporting
processes the NGO had to the aid recipients through the SHGs. For the NGOs in
this study the range of accountability mechanisms they had in place included: staff
listening and responding to the needs of the SHGs; management meeting regularly
with these groups (depth of accountability); and more formal mechanisms such as
scheduled meetings (level of formality) (Kilby 2006). These latter processes could
give high level of control to the recipients, not only of programmes, but even in
terms of the strategic direction of the NGO. These accountability processes were
given a numeric ranking based on a 0–5 numeric Likert scale. A low ranking
(score of 0–2) was given to the more informal and irregular processes the NGO
adopted, while a high ranking (score of 4–5) for those processes with a high level
of formality and frequency, and an open agenda for the groups to engage with
(see Figure 2).
The results showed a strong correlation (a positive ρ value signiﬁcant at the one
per cent level) between the accountability of the NGO to the SHGs and the level of
Level
of formality
Depth of accountability
High
accountability
Low
accountability
Figure 2 NGO downward accountability.
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empowerment of group members. To analyse the accountability mechanisms that
these NGOs have towards the SHGs they work with, the NGOs studied were
notionally divided into three broad groupings (based on the level of formality of
the accountability processes they had in place: informal processes; semi-formal
processes; and formal mechanisms for accounting for their work with the groups.
These divisions were to some extent arbitrary and were made for the purpose of
better describing the accountability processes.
Informal accountability processes
This group of NGOs did not see it as important to have mechanisms to take on the
views of the SHGs in terms of how the programme is being delivered, the priorities,
and other similar matters. The NGOs saw themselves primarily as service providers
or charitable organizations, and therefore the need for formal and semi-formal
processes was less important to them than if they were social change agents,
where they would be seen to have a more representative role. Women’s empower-
ment, for this group of NGOs, was enabled through the increased opportunities
provided by the services or the work that the NGO was providing to these
groups and communities, and the increase in the range of choices available to the
participants that the programmes provided. The SHGs had the choice of availing
themselves of the services or not, if they did not see these services as relevant
in their lives. Staff and management of these NGOs felt their interactions were
characterized by a sense of solidarity with the groups, and they were mindful of
their needs and priorities. While the relationship was informal it was seen as very
real, and usually involved a wider group of staff or management engaged with the
groups, than only the project staff involved in the project. Overall, this group of
NGOs argued that the formal accountability was elsewhere: either to their boards,
donors, or government; and their accountability was derived from the provision of
specialist services that are widely recognized as being community priorities, and for
which there was some need for commonality of approach. Others felt that if they
had more formal processes, then expectations would be raised in the community
which they would be unable to meet, and so have some difﬁculties in their
programmes and lose the conﬁdence of the community.
For the larger NGOs such as MYRADA, it was important that common
approaches were taken across all programmes, and that programme management
requirements were such that there would be some certainty in programming, for
funding reasons. Informal rather than formal processes were also necessary to avoid
expectations being unrealistically raised. The view ofMYRADAwas that it was the
process of empowerment that led to accountability, not the reverse: their argument
was that if the recipients were empowered as a consequence of an NGO interven-
tion, then that showed the NGO was accountable to the recipients’ needs. The other
main feature of this group of agencies is that they did not see themselves as having a
primary mediation role between the aid recipients and the government authorities.
In all cases there was some brokering between the communities and the govern-
ment; however, it was largely informal, irregular and non-public. Most of the NGOs
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in this group saw their institutional priorities as quite separate to their work on the
ground, and spent considerable energy dealing with donors and governments. They
did not see these institutional processes of expanding into new areas, new commu-
nities and new sectors as relevant to their aid recipients. In these cases they felt that
direct accountability mechanisms to the groups would in some way compromise
them institutionally and limit their capacity for expansion, or dealing with other
stakeholders.
Semi-formal accountability processes
Other NGOs in the study readily acknowledged the importance of some level of
accountability to their aid recipients, and had put in place a number of what could
be described as semi-formal processes for reporting back to the communities with
whom they were working. In addition to the practice of management regularly
meeting with these communities, these NGOs had processes in place for taking on
board the priorities of the aid recipients, and the programming processes of these
NGOs were ﬂexible enough to reﬂect these priorities. However, in these cases the
recipients did not directly participate in the organization’s business. While repre-
sentatives from the SHGs attended annual meetings and made suggestions, they did
not feel part of the organization in any strict sense of the word. Nevertheless, the
management saw some importance in being accountable to the community they
were serving and had set up processes to reﬂect that. In the example of KIDS, the
main linkage they had with the community was having the community group
leaders visit the KIDS ofﬁce every month to discuss the programmes. There was
a review process every four meetings to discuss what was happening in the groups,
and what linkages with government and other organizations the groups wanted. The
KIDS’ staff asked people what issues were relevant and accepted feedback.
The key to the relationship was that according to KIDS staff ‘the community has
a certain minimum standard of service’ and so KIDS were accountable to the
community in meeting their needs. But for KIDS this relationship seemed to go
beyond minimum standards: empowerment was seen by KIDS’ staff in terms of the
women’s credibility to go to the banks on their own and have access to the resources
of the village. From a staff perspective it was: ‘seeing the women free from violence
and ill-treatment at a community level and personal level [that] was the strongest
form of accountability’ (Interview KIDS 2002). To some extent this reﬂected the
same point that MYRADA had made to justify its informal approach, but in the
case of KIDS there were additional processes in place. The NGOs in this group that
had semi-formal processes saw their role in broader terms than service provision
(leading to empowerment) but rather more as a catalyst for local level social action.
In the case of KIDS this catalytic role was in respect of the rights of children and
women, especially the more marginalized groups such as sex-workers and street
kids. In the case of Chinyard the catalytic role was concerned with village-based
social problems such as alcoholism, dowry or other ‘social ills’ brought to them by
the groups they were working with. These NGOs responded by forming a loose
partnership with these groups, and the NGOs took a brokering, rather than a
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representative role, in dealing with social issues. It was the groups themselves who
dealt with the issues, with the help of the NGOs, rather than the NGOs undertaking
this role themselves. It was these semi-formal processes of accountability that the
NGOs used to ensure their work and interventions were relevant.
Formal accountability processes
This group of NGOs relied on strong personal associations and formal feedback
mechanisms to offer the SHGs and communities they were working with the
opportunity to put their views for the management of the NGOs to consider in
their programming. These mechanisms varied considerably among the NGOs
surveyed, but reﬂected the approaches the organizations had taken to overcoming
the dilemma of being an organization with a public beneﬁt purpose (rather than a
mutual beneﬁt organization like a co-operative), while at the same time being able
to be held to account by their aid recipients. For example, the process adopted by
IDS encouraged their board members to make contact with the groups directly so
the board was directly in touch with those it saw as its constituents. Each board
member met with a number of groups in a particular village, or group of villages,
prior to board meetings. In this way board members performed a representative
function by putting the aid recipients’ point of view at the highest level, even
though they were not elected by them. This approach reﬂected the de facto role a
local NGO Board had, and that was to ensure programme effectiveness and that the
interests of the aid recipients were being met.
The urban NGO, SNDT, in its work with waste-pickers on the other hand, had
regular and direct staff dialogue with an open forum of the group it worked with, the
waste-pickers’ union – KKPKP. This took the form of a monthly meeting between
the small number of staff of SNDT and two representatives of the waste-picker
women from each of the 100 slums in which SNDTwas working. In practice not all
attended, but around 50 women usually went to these meetings, and the discussion
was very robust and open, with very controversial issues discussed and difﬁcult
decisions hammered out. For SNDT these processes were adopted by the organiza-
tion because they felt that if empowerment was to occur, the women themselves
should exercise a large degree of control, not only over the programme but also, and
more controversially, over the NGO staff directly. In this way they would be able to
claim some ownership over both the NGO and the programme. In effect SNDTwas
a contractor to the waste-picker women and their union, and to some extent taking
direction from them. In the case of the backdating fees for new members (see
Chapter 4), there was a difference in view between SNDT staff and the union, and
the union prevailed. The issue that SNDT was non-compromizing on was its
opposition to both child labour and communalism (where communities are in
conﬂict with each other on the basis of caste or religion). These issues, in waste-
picker communities could be both serious and divisive, as well as being against the
law and a denial of rights.
Each of these NGOs, to some extent, fostered the development of a self-managed
people’s organization, as a representative body to which the NGO provides speciﬁc
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services and expertise. These self-managed organizations are very common in
southern India; however, not all have a direct representative function to the NGO,
with most solely involved in a co-ordination of microﬁnance activities among the
groups. There they acted as a broker and managed autonomous microﬁnance
practices rather than giving direction to the NGO. In the cases where there was a
direct relationship with the NGOs such as in the case of Gram Vikas and IDS, the
federations were seen as the path to sustainability of the programme with the plan
being that the groups would take over the programme over time. Federation
structures can themselves have accountability problems to their own constituen-
cies, with an ongoing relationship, if not dependency, on the NGO. For those
federations with Grama Vikas and IDS, there was some NGO staff involvement
in their oversight even after some time.
For SNDT and Grama Vikas the relevant representative organizations were not
only instrumental in the management of the programme activities, but also inﬂu-
enced the strategic direction of the programme, and even the NGO itself. Grama
Vikas was instrumental in establishing the Grameena Mahila Okkuta (the local
women’s federation) in 1997, which was responsible for not only microﬁnance
activities, but also for strategic issues such as networking with other like-minded
organizations and inﬂuencing government policy. The role of Grama Vikas in this
case was to support the work of the Okkuta rather than taking on an instrumental
role itself. In the case of SNDT, the union (KKPKP) took all decisions of a strategic
nature that affected it, and the union had a more direct role in setting the work
programme and strategic direction of the SNDT. For Grama Vikas, as an NGO it
was only involved in new programmes, dealing with donors, and macro-level
advocacy. The Grameena Mahila Okkuta was involved in the ongoing programme
management, local level advocacy, shared control of the accounts and (increasingly)
some donor liaison. In addition, Grama Vikas staff were speciﬁcally trained
and encouraged to be supportive and responsive to the women’s groups. The
role of Grama Vikas was becoming more that of a supporting organization and
the provider of a venue and logistical support, rather than of an intermediary
as such.
These three broad categories of accountability of NGOs as non-representative
bodies to the aid recipients were important, as they showed the various mechanisms
of accountability that NGOs could have without themselves being membership
organizations. It is worth noting, though, that while there were clear processes of
accountability, the only real sanction in place for the aid recipients was to pull out of
the relationship; there were no real intermediate options for them beyond moral
suasion. This analysis of the different types of relationship of NGOs with the
groups they are working with can be linked back to the analysis of the empower-
ment data that show a positive correlation with the accountability mechanisms
and empowerment outcomes. The ﬁnding of the follow-up study with the partici-
pating NGOs was that there were possible accountability options, short of formal
membership structures, in which NGOs could account for their work to the aid
recipients, and that these are important for strong empowerment outcomes for those
groups.
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The age of the group
The second factor that showed a positive correlation with empowerment was the age
of the group in terms of the number of years it had been functioning, which of itself
is not unexpected. An implication of this ﬁnding was that a balance should be struck
between efﬁciency, the time spent with a group, and effectiveness, the empowerment
outcomes that more time with a group may bring (Berg et al. 1998; Hishigsuren
2000). The NGOs surveyed indicate that many donors, and particularly Government
ones, seek to limit the period of the NGO engagement with the SHGs. Many
microﬁnance and other group-support program donors seek a relatively early
withdrawal by the NGO from providing support for the groups, usually within
three to ﬁve years. MYRADA’s policy, for example, called for the withdrawal of its
staff animators within three years after group formation, seemingly regardless of
the endowments or capabilities of group members (Fernandez 1998). While this
approach made sense in terms of freeing-up resources for NGO expansion into new
villages and communities, it ran the risk of jeopardizing the sustainability of
the groups and the empowerment outcomes. There is also the danger of prescriptive
policy approaches, so that staff targeted those in the communities who are more
likely to be able to ‘go it alone’ after three years rather than the most needy.
As the ﬁndings suggest, these time limits affected the possible empowerment
outcomes, particularly for the most poor and marginalized groups such as dalits.
Here the level of disempowering socialization was such that three to ﬁve years was
nowhere near enough time, and the case studies indicated that double this period to
10 or more years was necessary in most cases with marginalized groups. While the
waste-picker programme was undoubtedly a phenomenal success, the engagement
with SNDTand the staff with themwas over 15 years. The period of engagement by
NGOs with a particular community group was one in which the managerial, and
often donor-led, search for efﬁciency and relatively quick results can led to poor
outcomes.
Empowerment in practice
These research ﬁndings support the ideas of empowerment that come from sociology
and psychology: that is that increased personal agency and self-esteem are the core
changes in people’s lives that then can lead to social change. Personal changes in
self-esteem and agency led to the greater engagement of women in the broader
social and economic spheres in their communities, which is in line with other
research looking at empowerment from different perspectives and in different
country contexts [for example, see (Kabeer 1999)]. It is from enhanced agency
that access to resources and tangible outcomes in people’s lives follow. While
Kabeer argues that agency alone is not sufﬁcient, the women in this research
described the empowering processes in their day-to-day lives in terms of changes
in their personal agency: the majority of the women surveyed referred quite
speciﬁcally to an increase in their personal capacity to engage with others, as the
most important change they had experienced. In practice, this occurs in a number of
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different domains: within their families; with others in positions of power outside
the household such as bank managers; and also within the self-help group itself.
These changes did not mean that women were not susceptible to subsequent shifts
in their social environment that were disempowering. For example, in Pune, when
the Municipal Corporation’s moved a waste dump, from which waste-pickers
derived their living, they felt disempowered and helpless. But overall the key
change was the increased range of choices and opportunities for action available
to the women. A modiﬁcation to Kabeer’s framework might be that resources and
tangible outcomes were not only a result of agency, but they also served as a
foundation to maintain any changes in personal agency that occurred.
The change in an individual’s agency was important as it facilitated the devel-
opment of relationships outside the immediate household sphere: the women
responded to the question about changes in their lives by speaking of being able
to go out and gain access to, and inﬂuence other relationships that exist in domains
outside the household. These were broadly the economic, social and political
domains that are found within a village community, and power is related to access
to these different domains (Giddens 1979). The change in the respondents’ agency
expanded the choices available to women personally, and increased the number and
range of relationships available to them in different social and political domains.
It was these relationships which were a source of power (Narayan 1999; Sen, A.
1999; Vijayalakshmi 2001); and the converse was also true, that it is the denial of
access to these domains and relationships which was disempowering. Poverty,
when seen as deprivation and marginalization, had a clear political dimension,
and was intrinsically related to power relations and the restricted access to different
domains within a community (Goetz and Gupta 1996; Kabeer 2001; Zaman 1999).
It was the existing conditions of social exclusion and disempowerment that drove
how these responses were articulated.
Women’s perceptions of empowerment
The approach taken to the research was to examine the phenomenon of empower-
ment from the marginalized women respondents’ perspective. Their narratives of
the personal changes they had experienced since the NGO had been working with
them were sought. The results, as outlined above, found that the women saw the
improvement in their agency as the change that most readily came to their mind,
leading to increased self-esteem and self-respect, which they readily contrasted to
their social exclusion and disempowerment. The responses of the members of the
majority of SHGs to the changes that these NGO savings and credit programmes
brought, was a sense that there were greater choices available in their social lives that
an effective increase in their disposable income gave them. This change was not seen
as increased or stable incomes per se, but rather increased self-esteem and the reduced
stress – probably due to the relatively personal nature of the contact with money
lenders, which can be personally threatening, not tomention the higher cost ofmoney.
The ‘empowerment’ that the women have described above had both individual
and collective dimensions. At an individual level the women saw the changes they
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experienced very personally in terms of their agency, and expressed it in terms of an
increase in the range of activities they could engage in. These changes were from
the very basic one of being able ‘to go out of the house now’, through to the Pune
waste-pickers engaging in political negotiationswith respect to their work conditions,
and taking control of aspects of city waste collection. These changes, importantly,
were directly related to the women’s participation within the groups, supporting the
idea that power has a collective dimension (Giddens 1979). It was the women’s
own capacities to make the SHGsmore effective that had a strong personal effect on
the women. There was a feedback loop operating within the groups with the
individual woman’s engagement with the groups making the groups more effective,
which in turn increased the feeling of self-worth of the individual that then fed back
into the group (Drury and Reicher 1999). This collective process had implications
for how the groups were established and the norms under which they operated, in
particular the relationship the NGO facilitating the group had with the members,
and the participation processes in the SHGs that the NGO promoted.
These ﬁndings support the argument that empowerment is primarily a social and
psychological phenomenon, and is related to access to social resources and power,
involving complex interrelationships between the personal and collective domains
of women’s lives.When asked about the important changes they had experienced in
their lives, the women tended to relate the changes they had experienced in personal
agency to the work of the SHG. The ﬁeld of community psychology tends to
looks at empowerment in terms of self-knowledge and self-esteem, reduced feel-
ings of alienation and enhanced feelings of solidarity and legitimacy, all of which are
related to group interactions (Asthana 1996). These ﬁndings also support the
feminist view of empowerment, which goes beyond the psychological, to support
a broader socio-political view of power relations (Goetz 2001; Jandhyala 1998;
Puroshothaman 1998). That is, the increased agency leads to women feeling much
better about themselves – greater self-esteem; and they also experience changes in
their power, so they are able to inﬂuence others and their actions. The most serious
deprivation that marginalized people experience (in the context of rural India) is in
the social and political sphere rather than the economic. This can have implications
for those programmes that focus on ‘economic empowerment’ and argue that it is a
source from which social and political empowerment emerges (Hashemi et al.
1996; Hishigsuren 2000; Schneider 1999). This study supports an alternative view,
that is, ‘economic generation must be accompanied by social regeneration’
(Campbell and Jovchelovitch 2000: 263); and suggests that economic programmes
can at best be a means to an end, and must be accompanied by social programmes,
with a big say in them coming from the aid recipients themselves.
Empowerment in the household
Analysing the nature of empowerment and disempowerment at the household level
is generally more difﬁcult than at the broader community or individual level,
mainly because of the normative nature of both the question and the answer in
any survey. The values of the inquirer are implicit in any questioning of household
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relationships; with an implicit value that equality in decision-making is preferable
to a situation of one party (overwhelmingly the man) in a relationship assuming
the decision-making role. In our own lives we are often happy to delegate a
whole range of decision-making to others. Looking at changes in decision-
making, however, is valid as power relations invariably involve the locus of
decision-making. The second difﬁculty with looking at empowerment at the house-
hold level is more problematic, and that is people often will answer normatively,
that is, in terms of ‘what should be’ rather than ‘what is’. The changes the women
from the SHGs reported during the focus group discussions usually only obliquely
referred to their situation before they joined the self-help groups, such as being
unable to go out of the house, or having to seek permission from the husband for
any action they wished to take. There was little direct discussion in the focus groups
of the power relations in the household, but when there was any such discussion,
I would argue that this in itself is an indicator of empowerment, as a level of
self-knowledge and analysis is implicit in any such discussion.
The main reason given by the women for any change (albeit often slight) in the
power relations in the household, was due to their participation in the SHG, and the
consequent change in their role in the household economy. Because the women
could access the NGO programmes through these groups, it gave them some
legitimacy within the household as these programmes usually brought additional
resources to the household. Often this led to a greater level of inclusion of the
woman in household decision-making processes with many respondents reporting
that they were consulted about household decisions. At a policy level if these often
small changes at the household power relations were important in the women’s
perceptions of the outcomes of the programmes, then a more direct focus by NGOs
on these self-identiﬁed empowerment outcomes at household level would lead to
more effective programmes.
Social exclusion
While the study did not look speciﬁcally at how women saw their situation in terms
of marginalization or exclusion as a result of their caste or other dependent relation-
ships, the data did provide an indirect view of how poor women saw themselves in
their communities and their families. These women not only experienced a heavily
restricted household life, but there was also social exclusion from the political and
economic spheres of their communities. The extent of this exclusion depended on
their caste and class; with ‘caste’ being a function of their birthright, and ‘class’ in
the Indian context being related to wealth and income. For example, there were
cases where tribal women were speciﬁcally excluded from the political and broader
economic sphere, even following involvement in the SHGs; and for dalit women
the exclusion from certain spheres extended to relatively mundane areas, such as
access to water. The nature of this exclusion was heavily socialized so there was no
need for overt enforcement processes. The dalit women believed they were being
excluded, by virtue of the ‘untouchable’ nature of their caste. For example, they did
not have an entitlement or right to the water from the village well as it would be
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‘unclean for higher castes’, so they did not use it. In an example reported in the
survey, when as a result of being in a SHG and the NGOwork with it, some women
eventually did use the well with no repercussions, they described this relatively
simple process as being transformatory: it heightened their self-esteem and con-
ﬁdence. The change in all of these cases was in terms of women’s agency – the
capacity to have expanded choices – and to be able to take decisions that inﬂuence
the lives of others. In this case it effected change in what were deeply socialized
relationships across caste lines.
The causal factors in empowerment
The factors that show a signiﬁcant positive correlation with empowerment are
important to consider in the NGO discourse on empowerment. The ﬁndings on
accountability and time can give direction to howNGO empowerment programmes
may be implemented; and secondly, they give some direction for future research on
empowerment programmes. The accountability of an NGO to the groups with
which it was working was a signiﬁcant factor in achieving strong empowerment
outcomes, and supports the view that the exercise of power is in part the ability to
call people to account, and power is exercised when one party holds another party
accountable for their actions (Day and Klein 1987) – the process of holding another
to account is an empowering one. Other research, while not looking at empower-
ment as such, found that greater levels of participation in decision-making
processes led to improved social outcomes, largely due to shifts in authority and
control (Blair 2000; Lee et al. 1999; Smith-Sreen 1995). These ﬁndings add to this
existing research by showing that greater levels of ‘downward’ accountability were
also associated with the empowerment of the poor and marginalized in developing
countries. That is, the accountability processes an NGO employs in its relations with
its constituents can lead to positive changes in power relations that disempowered
individuals experience in their day-to-day lives.
Generally poor and marginalized women in India had no say in calling to account
other people, either within their family or outside; they were generally excluded
from decision-making at both household and village level, and had few opportu-
nities to engage with other people, let alone be able to hold people to account for
their actions (Janardhan 1995). In this context being able to hold NGOs and their
staff to account for their work with poor women was unique in their lives, and by its
nature was empowering. This empowering change extended beyond the group’s
relationships with the NGO, to other political, social and economic domains in the
women’s lives. Key to this is that it was also the level of formality or certainty in the
accountability processes that was important in empowerment, and it was this level
of formality that established a right to participate in decision-making (Joshi and
Moore 2000). It was more difﬁcult, or rather there was less incentive, for the NGOs
to have formal processes in place for their accountability to the people with whom
they were working, because as public beneﬁt organizations they did not have
statutory or formal mechanisms for accountability to the aid recipients. This
study has found, however, that this structural issue need not be an impediment, as
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some NGOs had established quite clear mechanisms to transfer some control to the
people with whom they were working. The role in the accountability of the NGO
through its staff to the community it is working with, was also important for another
reason: the staff of NGOs were generally outsiders (in terms of class, caste and
origin), in relation to the aid recipients. The ability to hold outsiders (with a
perceived higher status) to account was a powerful symbol for marginalized
women, and exposed them to new domains of power. What these case studies
have shown is that one of the few arenas in which village women can be involved in
decision-making processes or exercising agency in a different domain was with the
NGO; that is, if it had processes in place for this to happen.
These ﬁndings on accountability point to the desirability of NGOs having direct
mechanisms of accountability to the communities they are working with if empow-
erment is to be maximized; but they also showed a fundamental limitation of NGOs
as empowerment agents. If NGOs are not required to be accountable they are less
likely to hand over power to their constituency: ‘[one is] sceptical of the capacity or
willingness of any but the most exceptional organizations to encourage or even
tolerate the autonomous and potentially antagonistic mobilization of their own
client groups’ (Joshi and Moore 2000: 49).
There is a tension between the source of authority and power within an NGO, and
the desire for effective empowerment programmes. All of the NGOs that partici-
pated in the research recognized, to varying degrees, the importance of some level
of accountability to the recipients if they were to be effective. This was not only for
transparency reasons but most also recognized, that this form of accountability was
part of good development practice. However, of the 15 NGOs surveyed only one
handed power over in a direct sense (SNDT), and two others actively promoted a
direct role of their constituency in strategic programming; indicating that any
handing over of control to the aid recipients is both difﬁcult and unusual.
NGOs’ perceptions of empowerment
Few of the NGOs surveyed saw their accountability to their constituency as an
empowering process in itself. SNDT, and Grama Vikas to a lesser extent, were the
exceptions; they both recognized that being involved with dalits, and having the
NGO staff directly accountable to the dalit communities, was seen as a way of
breaking down caste consciousness. As dalits were generally regarded as social
outcastes, the members of the broader community were unlikely to see themselves
as having any accountability obligations to them. How the staff of SNDT related to
the waste-pickers was important in how the waste-pickers would respond. In the
waste-pickers’ day-to-day dealings with others in the community, such as mer-
chants, more feudal norms of behaviour emerged, and so SNDT saw it as central to
their work, and the empowerment of the women, that their approach to the waste-
pickers was as ‘insiders’ together, which should lead over time to some change in
the women’s own self-perception and self conﬁdence. Likewise the dalits, after
working with Grama Vikas, also had a high level of conﬁdence in their dealings
with higher caste people.
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Apart from these two exceptions, the ﬁndings from the research was that the
NGOs’ own perceptions of empowerment as a goal of their intervention, differed in
some key respects from the women’s own perceptions of empowerment. The
NGOs tended to see the results of empowerment work in tangible terms, such as
income or participation in the credit schemes. This view was supported not only in
the testimony of the NGO staff, but also in how their programmes were monitored
and reported by the NGOs themselves. This was also related to the nature of project
interventions and donor expectations which sought tangible outcomes in a rela-
tively conﬁned time period. While the majority of the NGOs in the study saw
empowerment as an outcome of their particular intervention, from their point of
view empowerment was seen as an overarching goal that would follow a particular
intervention – empowerment should be the product of increased incomes, access to
credit etc., rather than a direct outcome of the group processes facilitated by the
NGOs. This position tends to support the economic paradigm of empowerment
outlined by Schneider (1999) and others. Some NGOs in the study focused
exclusively on self-help groups as microﬁnance agents, with their day-to-day
interventions and monitoring mechanisms focused exclusively on ensuring the
ﬁnancial aspects of the programme were being maintained. While Chinyard had
as its primary objective empowerment so that women ‘can participate in local level
political processes’ (Abbi 1999: 8), neither Abbi’s review nor Chinyard’s other
documents systematically recorded this process in terms of its outreach, but rather
saw empowerment as a bi-product of the savings and credit programmes.
MYRADA also has clear empowerment objectives, but again tended to see
empowerment as a result of their interventions, rather than a speciﬁc part of an
intervention (Fernandez 2001). The NGOs which did have speciﬁc support
mechanisms for empowerment such as IDS, BGSS, Grama Vikas and the
Development Academy, all found it difﬁcult to monitor empowerment, and
depended on anecdotal evidence of speciﬁc cases rather than broad-based survey
work. At a practical day-to-day level the term empowerment is not looked at, but
rather these NGOs would see participatory and governance processes within
groups, as well as encouraging groups to deal with their own social priorities, as
their way of directly addressing empowerment issues. The strong move to
Dalit people power
In Kolar during a government sponsored food-for-work programme for the most
drought affected, which involved manually de–silting tanks, some women who
Grama Vikas had been working with had to hire tractors from the higher caste
people (from the reddy caste) in the villages. Initially the tractor owners refused to
deal with the women directly (wishing to maintain untouchability), but rather through
intermediaries. The women themselves insisted on dealing with the tractor owners
directly and ‘held out’ for three weeks before the tractor owners agreed to deal with the
women directly. It was the close interaction with staff at all levels, which gave the
women the conﬁdence to deal with higher caste village people in this way.
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promoting microﬁnance and ﬁnancial sustainability in microﬁnance by NGO
funders, particularly by Indian government agencies, was an issue that could
have negative effect on empowerment outcomes. This funding regime effectively
privileged what can be referred to as instrumental concerns (programme efﬁciency
through ﬁnancial performance) over social effectiveness. These case studies did not
support the view that a well-functioning microﬁnance programme will automati-
cally result in strong empowerment outcomes (Hashemi et al. 1996). The NGOs
that tended to have the highest empowerment ranking were those that had a broader
socio-political approach to their development work; that is, SNDT, Gram Vikas
and IDS.
New approaches to empowerment evaluation
The approach of the research in eliciting the women’s narrative is very important
as it has given a perspective on empowerment outside the NGOs’ (and the
researcher’s) expectations and values, and it also provided a common base for
making comparisons. It may well be that NGOs would be better served if they
looked at the outcomes of their programmes in terms of empowerment, less by way
of anecdotal evidence, which may reﬂect a minority of cases, but more by way of
systematic monitoring of the broad-based changes women see in their lives. This
may require the development of speciﬁc instruments for the NGOs to use. The
current instruments such as PIMS used by MYRADA, and AIMS developed by
Management Systems International for the World Bank in microﬁnance, tended
to focus on pre-existing outcomes, which could skew the results, rather than on
open-ended approaches that enabled the views of the beneﬁciaries of a programme
to be heard more directly. The lesson that emerged from the difference in the
women’s views of what is empowering and the NGOs’ expectations, is that it
pointed to some changes in approaches to group mobilization and management
within NGO programmes. If this learning could be developed into practical
approaches, NGO work would be more responsive to the self-deﬁned aspirations
of the communities with which they were working.
Conclusion
Two key points have emerged from the results of the study: ﬁrst is that members of
the self-help groups identify quite strongly with agency in describing the key
changes in their lives following an NGO intervention, even though this may not
have been the main objective of the intervention. The change in agency was in
terms of the women’s capacity to enter different spheres in a community’s social,
economic and political life. Before the intervention the women were restricted to
the household sphere, and there they had little power. Empowerment for these
women was being able to enter new spheres or domains and exercise some power
over other people’s behaviour. The result of this enhanced access to different
domains of power was articulated principally in terms of personal self-esteem,
expanded choices and the capacity to act. The women in the groups related this
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change to their interaction with self-help groups they were part of. A feedback loop
occurred in that as the self-conﬁdence of the members fed into the group effective-
ness, it then fed back into personal agency. This ﬁnding is in line with theories of
community psychology (Drury and Reicher 1999). It is important because it moved
away from the idea of the group being an instrument in providing ﬁnancial or other
‘practical’ support to the individual, to the group being an integral part of the
process of individual empowerment, and intrinsically tied up with the individual’s
notion of empowerment.
Second is that the key factors that affected empowerment were the age of the
groups and the accountability of the NGO to the groups. While the ﬁndings on the
age of the group were to some extent expected, the ﬁndings on accountability
were important as they provided direction for future programming options.
Accountability to the aid recipients was important, because when the staff and
management of an NGOwere being held to account by the group members, this act
of accountability was an empowering process, and the group members felt they had
some power over the NGO. If poor and marginalized women had power over an
external agent such as an NGO (which represented a completely new sphere of
inﬂuence) then they felt they could expand this inﬂuence or power to other spheres
in their lives. More broadly, if poverty is seen to some extent as social, economic
and political marginalization, which Sen, G. (1999), Narayan (1999) and others
argue, then these empowerment processes are important in development practice.
Neither of these two factors – time and accountability – which were found to be
correlated with empowerment, are dealt with in any detail in the NGO discourse on
community development, group formation, or group management. This omission
in the NGO discourse and learning practice, may go some way to explaining why
strong empowerment results are not common across NGO programmes.
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6 NGO accountability
Introduction
As discussed in the previous chapter, the ‘downward’ accountability of NGOs to the
people they are working with is a factor in contributing towards strong empowerment
outcomes for poor women in India. This has the obvious implication that strengthen-
ing NGO accountability mechanisms to the aid recipients will lead to better empow-
erment outcomes in NGO practice. NGOs, however, generally do not directly address
the issue of ‘downward’ accountability, as they see themselves having other sets of
accountability requirements which have greater priority. This chapter will look at the
reasons behind this. It can be argued that NGOs’ values are their primary point of
accountability, rather than the people they are working with. As we have seen from
Chapter 1, NGOs are primarily values-based public beneﬁt organizations (Kilby 2006;
Lissner 1977; Tandon 1995a); however, this is rarely examined by donors or in the
contemporary NGO discourse. The exceptions to this are the more radical political
NGOs, or thoseNGOs providing sexual and reproductive health and other contentious
social policies, both of which have had their government donor funding cut from time
to time. For many NGOs, their values play a central role in their management choices,
and the development approaches they take. While I argue in this chapter that it is
mainly the NGO’s values which will decide the approach as to how it should be
accountable to its aid recipients, there is also a complex interplay of relations between
NGOs, the communities theyworkwith, the government, and donors. These inﬂuence
how anNGO can realize its values and empower communities, and I would argue that
over time it seems that the accountability pressures from this interplay with govern-
ment and donors can create a shift in the values of the NGO, which has implications
for their work, and how they are accountable to their aid recipients.
Most of the NGOs that are included in this study devoted considerable resources
to being accountable to their donors. How they managed this was very important to
them, as it affected their operations. The shift from being largely reliant on inter-
national donors in the late 1990s to being reliant on domestic donors by 2009
showed how important this relationship was to these NGOs, and how it affected
each of them differently. While many of these NGOs were not dependent on a
single donor, and some of the NGOs such as SNDT had in fact initiated the ending
of their funding relationship with INGOs, the source of funding was important, and
a driving force for most of these NGOs in terms of their accountability relation-
ships. Accountability to government as a regulator, however, was less important for
these NGOs, who saw the reports they have to provide as a requirement or
obligation, rather than as part of an ongoing relationship they feel part of. As one
NGO manager put it ‘we are accountable to the government but we don’t feel
accountable to the government’. While most NGOs were required to have some
level of relationship with the state and federal government, this was not required at
the gram panchayat level. This is where one would expect NGO to have a close
relationship, but few of the NGOs surveyed saw that they needed to have a speciﬁc
relationship with the gram panchayat, and to some extent they were in competition
with them in their work with local communities. These accountability relationships
that NGOs have with donors and governments have policy implications for NGO
programming to meet the empowerment objectives they espouse. There are also
implications for how INGO donors see the work they are supporting, and the key
features of effective programming around empowerment. The next section will
look at these issues in more detail, what the literature and theory says about NGO
accountability, and then the extent to which the case studies accord with it.
Accountability
A useful deﬁnition of accountability for NGOs, as a starting point for this discus-
sion, is that it is about the conduct and performance of an organization (Day and
Klein 1987). However, this is not a simple matter of reports and accounts, rather it is
as much about perception and power (Conger andKanungo 1988; Gray et al. 1997).
Accountability generally:
 identiﬁes shared expectations;
 provides a common currency for justiﬁcation;
 puts agreements into context;
 provides a sense of obligation; or a right to be called to account; and
 has sanctions for failures to meet expectations.
Accountability also deﬁnes the relationship between actors through what Schedler
(1999) calls ‘answerability’; of who can call whom to account, and who owes a duty
of explanation. This then establishes a power relationship, with the roles, forms and
direction of accountability deﬁning the distribution of authority: ‘… the notion of
authority as the right to call people to account needs to be complemented by the
notion of power as the ability to call people to account … effective power whether
legitimate or not in turn requires effective control for accountability’ (Day and
Klein 1987: 9). While being unable to hold others to account is synonymous with a
lack of power, to be unaccountable to others is to be all-powerful, and also be able
to provide an illusion of accountability under the guise of responsibility:
While accountability builds on the modern idea that power and knowledge are
separate goods, the notion of responsibility allows powerful actors to maintain
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the illusion that they know what they are doing and therefore to dismiss
irritating questions that do nothing but disturb their solemn and responsible
exercise of power
(Schedler 1999: 19)
Being accountable, therefore, is more than providing access to information but goes
a step further and enables the receiver of the information to be able to do something
about it, through processes that in the end have sanctions associated with them
(Mulgan 2001). This ability to hold agencies to account is an area in which the very
poor often lack capacity (Jenkins and Goetz 1999). Because this point is supported
by the data presented in Chapter 5, it is easy to argue that the nature of the
accountability of an NGO to its aid recipients is central to the empowerment
process, as it determines the distribution of power between the NGO and the
communities it is working with. However, due to failures in accountability, this
occurs a lot less than expected.
NGOs and accountability
While the previous section highlighted the range of accountabilities NGOs might
face, it is NGOs’ perceived lack of accountability, particularly to those they are
working with, that needs to be teased out. Goetz (2006) argues that the failure of
NGOs to be accountable to their aid recipients falls into four broad areas:
 Substance: here the NGO in self-help group programmes fails to see that the
violations of women’s rights or the neglect of their needs in the programmes
are accountability failures, or even problems – here the NGO fails to
understand or accept that they have an obligation.
 Seekers: the SHGs as seekers lack the leverage to demand answers from
power-holders (in this case the NGO). The women are not seen as individual
rights bearers, and do not see themselves as such. The cultural context they are
embedded in does not give them this privilege.
 Targets: Who is accountable? NGOs? Donors? Governments? Here the multi-
level governance structures of many development programmes confuse the
lines of accountability.
 Methods: Key accountability institutions are inaccessible to poor women. Can
women really take an NGO to court, especially in a collective action or public
interest case?
For the reasons above, the question to ask is: how do NGOs manage accountability,
and how can the aid recipient hold them to account.
Organizational accountability is empowering when organizations are opened up to
their members (Conger and Kanungo 1988; Murthy 2001; Peters and Pierre 2000)
and empowerment is related to ‘inclusiveness, transparency, accountability and …
legitimacy [through] collective decision-making, collective action and popular
participation’ (Titi and Singh 1995: 13). As we have already seen in this chapter,
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the accountabilities that NGOs have to respond to are complex and diffuse, and the
tools of enforcement are limited (Ferejohn 1999). There are three broad account-
abilities that NGOs have to meet: to their values and mission; to their performance
in relation to the mission; and a functional accountability, which is to do with
probity (Tandon 1995a). This set of accountabilities is generally to the recipients,
donors, the state (Edwards and Hulme 1995) and their values (Edwards 1999a;
Edwards 1999b; McDonald 1999). The problem that NGOs have is how to privilege
accountability to the aid recipients in this complex accountability environment.
In Chapter 5, it was found that empowerment is correlated with NGO account-
ability to the recipients of the aid programme, so it can be argued that the
accountability to donors and the state (through the required practice or regulation)
can play a part in either supporting or undermining this accountability. It can also be
argued that strong ‘downward’ accountability pressures can hinder NGO expansion
and other strategic initiatives, as the people with whom they are working like to
keep the NGO programmes to themselves rather than promote an expansion to a
broader constituency (Desai and Howes 1995), but this is rarely found to be an issue
given the power relations at play in NGO programmes. The question this chapter is
concerned with is whether, at a local level, an NGO can be effective in empower-
ment if it does not have internal mechanisms of accountability to its aid recipients.
If empowerment is the objective then evidence from Chapter 5 and elsewhere
would suggest that the accountability structure has to be towards the community
the NGO is working with, and the social change objectives have to remain foremost
(Smith-Sreen 1995). This could even be within the context of humanitarian relief
programmes where such structures are harder to establish (Slim 1997). The ques-
tion then is: how should an NGO prioritize accountability to the constituency, when
there is no simple model and there are competing accountability forces which it faces?
As Fox and Brown (1998: 21) note ‘although they usually lack formal institutional
accountability mechanisms their [NGOs] dependence on maintaining at least the
appearance of consistency between theory and practice creates informal, inconsistent,
but often powerful accountability pressures’. There is not a single rule for account-
ability of NGOs; however, there are some guides in the form of codes of conduct and
donor contracts that usually prescribe the accountability processes in the direction of
either the private or public donor, or the government as regulator. It is rare, however,
that there are requirements for accountability to the aid recipients. This struggle within
NGOs reﬂects the natural tension of: adherence to values; the desire to survive and
expand; avoiding ‘biting the hand that feeds’ (often the state); andmaximizing income
(Edwards 1997; Lissner 1977). What emerges is that the ideal of accountability of
NGOs to their aid recipients is continually under pressure from donors, the state, and
the organization’s own leadership structures and values. There are also internal
accountabilities of staff to each other and management, and from time to time
accountabilities to other organizations in networks or where joint programmes are
underway, but for this discussion I will focus on the principal (mainly external)
accountabilities they face. From the discussion above, a framework of NGO
accountability can be developed (Figure 3) which shows four accountabilities
that an NGO manages: to its values, recipients, donors, and government.
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The top half of the ﬁgure (especially when referring to empowerment NGOs)
concerns the mission of the NGO and its work, while the bottom half is
more instrumental, concerned with their continued existence, and the ﬂow of
resources to the NGO. There is a natural tension between the ‘top half’ – values
and constituency – and the ‘bottom half ’ – resources and regulation. This chapter
argues that how NGOs manage this tension affects the effectiveness of their work
on empowerment.
Accountability to the state and donors
The accountability of NGOs is constantly tested by the state: Firstly, the state
is a source of NGO legitimacy through formal legal sanction and registration
processes. Second, the state is often a donor through its provision of resources
either as direct grants or tax concessions, an increasing issue for Indian NGOs as
we have seen in Chapter 3. The effect of these pressures from the state is to move
the focus of accountability back to itself. From the state’s point of view, social
mobilization is at best a lesser priority, and in the case of India it can be seen
as a threat. Therefore, NGO performance is increasingly measured according to the
managerial and market values of efﬁciency and effectiveness in service delivery
rather than social mobilization. This emphasis has implications for how power
and authority are exercised inside organizations, and with the communities they
serve. This pressure may result in an NGO’s sense of accountability to its
values and these communities becoming less important. In Bangladesh, for
example, this process of shifting accountability has seen the role of NGOs
move from:
… promoting rights through class struggle to class harmony, privileged the
sustainability of the institution over sustainability of the work on the ground or
the local groups, and moved to a more elite leadership of civil society groups to
produce a more assimilationist model, which appeases donors and doesn’t
threaten the state.
(Syed and Hassan 1999: 127)
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The requirements of the donors and the state imply certain types of accountability,
which are not only privileged over accountability to the aid recipients, but in some
cases can militate against it. The other related pressure is that the direction of
accountability for the NGO is often deﬁned by the demands of the ‘project’ itself, a
central requirement of most donors either foreign or local. The project is time
bound, with certain outcomes expected that lead to an impact in an idealistic and
logical way. However, as we have seen in the case studies, empowerment may not
easily lend itself to such logical processes. Even when an NGO is given the freedom
to develop the programme, there is the pressure from donors on speciﬁc time-based
expenditure targets and predicted outcomes, which if not met the NGO is often
penalized. ‘The reality is that they [NGOs] are in the grip of a neo-modernization
algorithm that assumes projects are development. As their budgets rise … so they
demand more and more projects on which to spend their money …’ (Elliot
1987: 60).
There are exceptions, however, and these are instructive. From Chapter 5 the
most successful NGOs programme in empowerment terms was that of the waste-
pickers, whereby the NGO, SNDT avoided the notion of the ‘project’ all together,
and managed to ﬁnd donors that would accept institutional funding rather than
project funding. Generally, however, donors seek certainty in the programmes they
support, while the aid recipients are more uncertain as to their future and so they
seek more ﬂexibility in how they use the resources they receive, leading to tensions.
The effect of the demand for more certainty from donors is that the source of funds
can inﬂuence the direction and focus of NGO accountability to the donor, with
upward shift of accountability and ‘puppetization of NGOs’ (Zaidi 1999: 264), or
NGO sector becoming a ‘shadow state’ (Sen, S. 1999: 329). This trend can be seen
in Bangladesh where a small number of very large NGOs seem to act as an
oligarchy, while in India this occurs much less, and across many more contexts.
The process that evolves is that a dependency-based, patron-client relationship
emerges as a consequence of donor and state pressures. Combined with a lack of a
formal representative framework, this leads to these oligarchic governance struc-
tures within NGOs, particularly in their relationship with their aid recipients.
Michel’s ‘iron law of oligarchy’, which argues that if unchecked, membership
organizations will shift from democratic to oligarchic control (Michel, 1915
quoted in Fisher 1994), seems very apt for NGOs, particularly as they are non-
membership organizations, and so there are fewer checks (Davis 1995). The
weakness inherent in the governance structure of NGOs and their accountability
pressures to donors and the state gives little support for the idea of them being
natural empowerment agents; however, there has to be some linkage with the aid
recipients for the NGO to be credible in its work: ‘but most [NGO] leaders do
depend on their claim of representation to sustain their organizational power over
time so they have to represent some of the members to some degree some of the
time’ (Fox and Brown 1998: 22).
The results from the study, however, show that accountability is important for
NGOs, but not in the ways that much of the literature discussed above perceives it;
the literature tends to look at accountability to government and donors, and the
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broader issue of transparency, rather than the direction of accountability per se.
While the Indian NGOs in the study talked about their accountability to the state
and donors, particularly ofﬁcial donors, they tended to see their accountability in a
complex way, highlighting values, the work, and their constituencies. The NGO
accountability framework (Figure 3) posits that accountability to the ‘values’ and
‘constituency’ are directly related to the nature of the work of the NGO itself, and
the accountability to the donor and the state is related to accessing the resources for,
and legal requirements of, the NGO to undertake their work.
Accountability to values
All of the Indian NGO case studies placed accountability to their values as the most
important form of accountability they had, and contrary to a lot of popular opinion
and some literature, none of the NGOs surveyed saw themselves as being driven
solely by funding contracts. Half of the NGOs in the study had not taken up funding
offers, or had initiated the ending of funding relationships, on the basis that the
conditions set by donors did not accord with their values. The problem these NGOs
saw, though, is that in the ﬁrst decade of the twenty-ﬁrst century, while the amount
of funding available was increasing, the range of sources of funding was narrowing,
with a major shift to domestic sources. This shift presented a challenge to many of
the NGOs of the priority of adherence to their values. The values of the case study
NGOs were expressed in different ways among the group as they had different foci.
Most of the NGOs’ values were expressed in one way or another in their mission
statement and they clearly articulated them in discussions. The origins of the values
for these NGOs they saw as coming from a moral, or a religiously based ethic for
some, and an altruistic notion of ‘what is right’ for others. None of them saw service
provision as an end in itself, but as a way of achieving or meeting the aims of their
values. These were generally expressed in terms of what the NGO aims to do in its
work, or in terms of its relationship with its constituency and what it hopes to
achieve with them. For example, SNDT’s values were described in terms of ‘justice
and equality’ for their constituency, the waste-pickers, which then had implications
for both the organizational and staff behaviour in relation to the waste-pickers. For
IDS in Dharwad, the values were also in terms of both staff and organizational
behaviour of maintaining ‘responsibility and integrity’ in how they work. Other
NGOs in the study saw their values in terms of the outcome for their aid recipients,
which for most was empowerment and self-reliance. For example, in the case of
KIDS it was anti-exploitation and women’s rights for ‘the poorer sections’ of
society. Related to these organizational values were the personal values of staff,
which should reﬂect the organization’s values. Generally these were expressed, not
in instrumental terms, but rather in the relationship with the community they were
working with, with common terms used such as ‘partnership’ or ‘working in
solidarity’, supported by the notions of integrity and sincerity in how the work is
undertaken. They felt then that these personal values should be imparted to the aid
recipients. Many respondents saw the NGO staff as being central to imparting these
values, and indicated that they had particular staff selection, development, and
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support programmes to ensure staff, and their approach to the work, reﬂected these
values. As to whether this was also reﬂected in direct accountability mechanisms to
the aid recipients, the results were mixed.
The issue that most of the participating NGOs had was the difﬁculty of having
speciﬁc mechanisms of being accountable to their values. First, accountability to
values can often be demonstrated in terms of programming decisions. For example,
if a programme evolved in a direction not consistent with the organization’s values
of working with the poor then the staff should have responded and made the
necessary programme changes. Second, accountability to values can be demon-
strated through the aid recipients themselves, and how they responded to the NGO
in terms of their support and involvement in the work. Finally, the most interesting
indicator of accountability to values was the response of those who opposed a
particular programme, and the reasons they gave. For example, if a wealthier group
in the community complained to a government donor that they were being excluded
from the programme on the grounds that it was favouring marginalized groups in
the community, then this was a positive indication that the work was effective.
While it is the Board’s responsibility to ensure that an NGO is adhering to its values,
it is the three mechanisms outlined above that reﬂected more closely the work on
the ground, and provided a more immediate measure of an agency’s accountability
to their values, when these values related to empowerment or rights of the margin-
alized. The challenge is how this can be tracked on a day-to-day basis to avoid a
gradual erosion of values, when there is a conﬂict of values, particularly with the
values of the donor. Here the pressure to accept funding for certain purposes, such as
the watershed programme in Karnataka described in Chapter 3, and the issues that
arose, can have an effect on how an NGO sees its values in the day-to-day work.
The accountability of NGOs to their values in their relationship with the aid
recipients, as well as how they developed the relationship with the donors, can be
illustrated in how some agencies had rejected generous offers from donors for
programmes which, on close analysis, were not in line with their values. In one case
a donor wanted the NGO concerned, whose values were around alternative health
issues and traditional medicine, to carry out a community awareness programme
around health issues solely based on the existing formal health structure, rather than
incorporating traditional practices. In another caseWorld Bank funds were returned
for a social forestry project, when it emerged that the project would promote
policies that were not in the tribal people’s best interests. For one NGO, the
accountability to values was ‘always the driving force, which they cannot allow
to be diluted’. SNDT’s mechanisms for accountability to its values were framed in
terms of the personal link between the staff and the waste-pickers, and how the staff
saw their work. SNDT rejected the notion of the NGO as being an ‘outsider’; and
the organization’s values reﬂected the notion of equality of SNDT and its staff with
the waste-pickers so that ‘[we]… cannot talk of doing the work for the people; they
do it for themselves’ (quote from SNDT worker). This formulation of the staff
motivation moved away from the notion of altruism towards one of solidarity. If
this was the core value of the organization then accountability to its values were tied
up with accountability to the community they were working with, and how that was
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exercised. SNDT had very strong and formal accountability mechanisms to the
waste-pickers through their union, the KKPKP.
However, for most of the NGOs surveyed, the notion of accountability to their
values was less clear. They saw their values being reﬂected in the work and less of a
driving force per se. Nevertheless, while few NGOs had formal mechanisms to hold
themselves to account to their values, or sanctions in place if they did not follow
them, the majority could give clear instances where decisions were directed on the
basis of these values, and choices appraised against them. They saw themselves as
having a set of objectives, out of which a series of complex relationships emerged
with donors, aid recipients and government. Here each has tried to inﬂuence the
other in terms of organizational priorities and values. In all cases these relationships
were negotiated, rather than being based on a strict client-patron relationship. Key
to this was that the accountability to values was framed in terms of the communities
the NGOs were working with. This way a linkage could be drawn with the
accountability to the recipients, and how this panned out on a daily basis with the
other accountability pressures these NGOs faced.
Values, however, can become eroded over time through organization growth,
staff change, or changes in the preferences of donors or aid recipients. For most of
the NGOs studied in this book, there were clear induction processes and staff
selection criteria that attempted to inculcate and reﬂect the values. There was also
a feeling that as an organization grew and the array of accountabilities becamemore
complex, and the range and size of the communities they were working with also
increased, it was harder to maintain the same level of accountability to values that
one might ﬁnd in a new or smaller organization. An example of changing donor/
government preferences is the emphasis in the early 2000s on the effectiveness of
microﬁnance in poverty alleviation programmes. For local NGOs this led to a move
away from the most marginalized groups, who have limited capacity for managing
microﬁnance loans, to more ‘entrepreneurial’ sectors of the community who were
able to show more immediate ‘results’. In the case of KIDS, their major donor
changed their aid preferences so that in the space of two years they moved from
supporting a focus on violence against women to one of looking at the impact of
globalization on the community. This resulted in some soul-searching as KIDS
tried to maintain the donor relationship, and the focus on their key constituency,
women as victims of gender-based violence. The question that arises is how an
agency maintains a focus on its values, ensures that they are relevant, and that the
work continues to be accountable to these values. Related to this is how the values
enable these NGOs to be accountable to their aid recipients. Overall, for this group
of NGOs in southern India, they saw the adherence to values as providing the
clearest basis for accountability to the communities they were working with, and
the basis for their empowerment work.
A related point from these case studies was that the values base of an organiza-
tion was not something which was a given, but was in constant ﬂux and tension
with the often rapidly changing local context. For these NGOs it was the values that
must be worked on, and the activities they were engaged in should be appraised
against them. From the discussion with a range of NGOs it seemed that time,
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growth, and external inﬂuences resulted in some erosion of values. It can be argued
that it is the larger, and very small and newer, NGOs who are most vulnerable to this
trend. This was borne out with the rapid change to NGOs in the last few years when
international donor support had declined, to be replaced with local government
supported programmes with much tighter rules and different foci. This has caused
issues among the NGOs in how they see the accountability to their values in a time
of tighter and less ﬂexible sources of resources, and the pressures and tensions that
emerge when staff have to be laid off. These dilemmas that NGOs faced in how they
asserted their values are linked to theories of power. It is the assertion of values with
a particular group that can be an expression of power; if not in theWeberian notions
of domination, then in Giddens’ views of inﬂuencing the conduct of others. While
the NGOs in this study argued that their approach to empowerment was an assertion
of their values, their limited approach to being accountable to aid recipients
indicated that this accountability was tightly bounded in terms of both the processes
used, and the possible sanctions that could be used against the NGO. Because of
NGOs’ greater endowments in resources both physical and by virtue of their status,
and their relative skill in negotiation, NGOs could exert power in these relation-
ships. This resulted in their capacity for facilitating empowerment being compro-
mised when dealing with disempowered people, especially poor women. Some
NGOs could exert their inﬂuence over the women in a way that led to some level of
dependency, thus limiting empowerment. While this group of Indian NGOs saw
their values as their distinguishing feature in line with much of the literature (inter
alia Lissner 1977; Gerard 1983; Fowler 1996; Edwards and Sen 2000), the real test
was how much these values could be eroded by other accountability pressures, and
more importantly, how these values were reﬂected in the accountability relationship
the NGO had with its aid recipients.
Accountability to the aid recipients
The forms of accountability the NGOs surveyed have to the communities they work
with is detailed in Chapter 5. Those that showed the greatest level of formality in
their accountability processes to the aid recipients had the strongest empowerment
outcomes. Most of the NGOs surveyed saw some level of accountability to the aid
recipients as an important aspect of their work, and this was played out at a practical
level, usually with NGO staff and management having regular meetings with the
SHGs, in order to gauge the relevance and usefulness of their interventions. While
Fox and Brown (1998) argue that these more or less informal accountability
processes can be quite powerful in establishing NGO legitimacy, I would argue
from the ﬁndings of this study, that informal accountability processes at best link
the NGO instrumentally (that is, through its work) but not structurally or politically
to the recipients. The evidence was that it was the more structural (formal) links that
delivered stronger empowerment outcomes, in line with Joshi and Moore (2000)
who argue that the presence of formal processes establishes a right for the aid
recipients to claim services and the like from the NGO, and it is this ‘right’ that is
the basis for empowerment.
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Many of the NGOs in this study, such as IDS and MYRADA, dealt with the
issue of accountability through formal structures such as federations rather than
direct accountability processes. Federation structures per se were not a source of
accountability, but rather, the downward accountability was related to how these
structures were used. NGOs that had formal, semi-formal, or informal account-
ability mechanisms all grouped the SHGs into federations, but their roles varied
considerably. For example, even though MYRADA used a federation structure
there was little evidence that it was used as a mechanism of ‘downward’ account-
ability, while both the union in the case of the SNDT, and the federation in the case
of Grama Vikas, were consciously used as a mechanism for being accountable to
the recipients. Federation structures are not necessarily an accountability mechan-
ism, but more used for participation, devolution of management, and programme
sustainability mechanisms (Howes 1997). The role of the federations, or what
MYRADA calls People’s Organizations, was a functional one, which was involved
in practical matters such as income-generation and savings programmes, and dealt
mainly with livelihood matters that affected the members of the group, while the
NGO was involved in advocacy and rights work. In neither case, however, was it
clear to what extent the federations inﬂuence the NGOs strategic direction, which
some NGOs argue is their preserve as public beneﬁt organizations, with no place
for recipients in these processes.
NGOs did not like to be bound to a particular and restricted membership, such as
SNDT’s waste-picker programme and KKPKP, as the members quite naturally will
seek to advance their own interests. Few of the NGOs in the study had members
from the recipient communities on their Boards, as they were afraid that political
forces may emerge and hijack the NGO’s values or priorities for more sectional
interests. Or alternatively having community representatives on their Boards
can weaken the NGO’s effectiveness through conﬂicting interests developing
among various community representatives. SNDT, which had the strongest and
most formal mechanism of ‘downward’ accountability, tended to manage these
tensions through their involvement in decision-making as equals with their waste-
pickers who were the majority of the Board of KKPKP. They preferred this
approach to having a dichotomy of ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’, with the waste-
pickers being treated as the outsiders when it came to Board processes. For
SNDT active inclusion was an integral part of a just way to acting with integrity
and of gaining true legitimacy with the recipient community. SNDT had the power
to reject directions from the waste-pickers on matters of values. For example,
communalism is an issue whereby the waste-pickers, due to their caste status,
could favour a more communalist approach in certain social situations, while
SNDT, being part of a women’s university, had values that were strongly related
to pluralism, diversity and non-violence, and they made this quite clear to the
waste-pickers. The same principle could be applied to the issue of expansion to
other groups in society. For SNDT the issue of expansion of the constituency was
difﬁcult and sensitive, but for them it was one that should not be imposed but
argued with the waste-pickers’ union as equals. With the advent of SWaCH and the
support of the Municipal Corporation, the KKPKP had to broaden its views with
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regard to membership in any case, and accepted other non-union members into
SWaCH.
In other cases the accountability to the recipients became important because the
NGO concerned had grown in size over time, or its focus changed. In order to stay
in touch and remain relevant, these NGOs felt that mechanisms that brought them
closer to the recipients were important. The Development Academy was changing
rapidly in the early 2000s, and it introduced some accountability changes to bring it
closer to the recipients, with two local SHG representatives on the Board (out of
seven). They also used the existing Grain Banks (village community-based orga-
nizations organized by the Academy) to take on a greater role in managing
the range of Academy programmes in a particular village, and also to provide
valuable feedback to the staff who worked with those villages. This, however, was
the exception, with most NGOs not having a clear conception of their aid recipients
being their constituency. This book has argued that this must be a key consideration
if empowerment programmes are to be effectively directed to disempowered
groups in a community.
While these NGOs all stated that they aimed to focus on the poor, few went
beyond a generalized statement such as this to identify a more speciﬁc group of
their aid recipients that might be seen as a constituency. Those that did focus on a
particular group, such as SNDT with waste-picker women, the Development
Academy or Grama Vikas with mainly dalit women) had procedures and practices
in place to ensure that programmes were directed to these particular groups. Other
NGOs’ representatives such as IDS conceded that the level of constituency focus
had weakened over time, with less focus on the most marginalized groups, and
they now had fewer processes to assess whether these groups were being
reached. MYRADA, on the other hand, left the selection of beneﬁciaries to the
villagers themselves, resulting, according to the evidence, in a poorer outcome in
reaching the very poor or the most marginalized groups relative to other NGOs in
the study. This approach of MYRADA in the study area seemed to reﬂect a rather
naı¨ve view of village politics. It ignored the maxim that those in power will attempt
to capture beneﬁts for themselves with forms of rent-seeking behaviour. A more
realistic approach for MYRADA in these communities would have involved an
assessment of who the disadvantaged were on the basis of whether they were food
stamp recipients (the most common form of welfare), and other criteria such as their
assets, caste and education; and only then from that list undertake a joint process of
selection on the basis of need.
For these NGOs the idea of a constituency focus, based on a generic category of
aid recipients such as the very poor, is weak for two reasons: ﬁrstly, NGOs
generally lacked capacity in social analysis, and so failed to give sufﬁcient attention
to complex socio-political issues; and secondly, donor funding patterns have
changed, so these donors are now less concerned with marginalized groups such
as dalits or poverty reduction per se, which was the focus of the 1980s. The result
was that with the Indian Government being the major donor, the focus has moved
quite a way from the marginalized to the ‘rural poor’ as a more general category.
There was also a more fragmented approach in donor priorities (either government
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or INGOs), with speciﬁc issues such as environment, microﬁnance and gender-
based violence all becoming the focus of donor attention. While these issues are
vital in any development programme, this change in focus meant that NGOs ended
up being reduced to just implementing activities, with social analysis and the
subsequent strategic planning in decline. The effect of these changes in aid direc-
tion was to fragment recipient groups, thus weakening the concept of a constituency
of aid recipients for an NGO, and it also ran the risk of leaving out the most
marginalized groups. This is important as I have argued that there should be more
formal mechanisms of accountability to those an NGO is working with, but this is
difﬁcult if the aid recipients are spread among a number of social groups.
Two issues regarding NGO accountability have emerged, and they can be
summarized simply as the ‘how’ and the ‘who’ of accountability. So far much of
the discussion has dealt with the question of ‘how’ accountability should occur. The
question of ‘who’ the NGO should be accountable to relates to their values and
mission and how they see their aid recipients as a constituency. While account-
ability in the case of the Indian NGOs this book covers can be measured
by the range and types of relationships the NGO has with the self-help groups,
the accountability to an NGO constituency more broadly can be argued to be the
‘reach’ of a particular programme to marginalized groups, reﬂecting a view that
accountability can be approached through the work of the NGO. This account-
ability to a broader constituency can be in conﬂict with the accountability to a
particular group, who quite naturally would like to maximize the beneﬁts of the
programme to themselves, rather than see a programme expand to other disadvan-
taged people or groups. This is a juggling act that NGOs have to manage: on the one
hand they have to be responsive and accountable to the group with which they are
working, and give power to that group. On the other hand, they have to be aware of
and responsive to that part of their broader constituency that they are not reaching.
The upshot of this dilemma is that effective empowerment involves giving the
groups greater direct control over the programme, with the perverse effect of
limiting the scope of the programme in terms of a broader constituency or potential
aid recipients.
For example, while SNDT was directed more by the constituency of waste-
pickers than most, it was also involving its staff in extending the reach to other
waste-pickers, and debating with the established groups the importance of this
move. This level of growth and expansion is possible in a union structure (which
the waste-pickers have) as all members beneﬁt by expansion, because their primary
focus is on collective rights, and so strength in numbers is important. Where the
focus is on credit and savings facilities (with material beneﬁts for individuals), new
members who join may be regarded as free-loading on the work done by the
established members who may resist newcomers joining. Indeed, this occurred
with KKPKP, who insisted that new members pay ‘back fees’ from the year union
started – in this case up to ten years – as there was a material beneﬁt in the form of
subsidy involved. Likewise, there may also be opportunistic behaviour from the
privileged groups who have power to exclude those more disempowered, and as we
have seen, this may be one reason for the relatively poor results for some NGOs in
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selecting the most marginalized. The role of the donor (government of INGO)
likewise cannot be excluded in the discussion of NGO accountability to values and
aid recipients, as NGOs have to manage an accountability relationship with their
donors.
Accountability to donors
Accountability to the donor (the source of resources for the NGO) is complex and
can affect how an NGO works to its values and is accountable to its aid recipients.
The Indian NGOs in this study had a range of donors from whom they accessed
resources, and in recent years the set of donors had narrowed to a greater emphasis
on local Indian donors by way of federal and state government programmes. In
general, the donors fell into two main groups, the government (usually state
governments, but sometimes central and local governments); and secondly, private
NGOs – mostly INGOs from abroad, who may or may not have accessed govern-
ment funds for the activities in their own countries. There were no clear character-
istics of the relationship with either group of donors. Some government
departments were easier to deal with than others, which was also true of interna-
tional and local NGO donors, but generally NGOs found the shift to local donors
more difﬁcult to manage, given a shift in focus and a move to more provider
contracting models.
The main concern of all donors was ﬁnancial accountability, followed by
accountability to the agreed objectives and activities of the programme. In some
cases accountability to the government’s priorities was very direct, in which case
the NGO was effectively a contractor. None of the government programmes that
these NGOs were involved with favoured approaches that promoted accountability
to the aid recipients. For national and local governments, social mobilization (and
empowerment) is at best a lesser priority and at worst an illegal or threatening
activity (Sen, S. 1999), with most Indian states having rules against NGOs being
involved in what they refer to as ‘instigation’, or advocacy to seek change in policy
or even push for the enforcement of existing government policy. There was also
pressure for rigorous (and expensive) ﬁnancial audits. The Council for
Advancement of People’s Action and Rural Technology (CAPART), a major
funder, was a difﬁcult agency to deal with. In the past there had been audits of its
programmes, which identiﬁed irregularities including fraudulent activities, such as
payments to non-existent NGOs. As a result, CAPART had tightened its account-
ability and veriﬁcation procedures to the extent of instituting a programme of
checks with the District Administrator, and the Central Bureau of Investigation,
to verify the bona ﬁdes of the NGO ﬁnances and the relevance of the work. Before
2000 these government donors had little effect on the direction of the work, but
more recently the government programmes have changed their criteria, which has
altered the direction of NGO work. The tougher accountability and veriﬁcation
processes did lead to considerable delays in funding; while at the same time
providing opportunities for corruption from ofﬁcials. Examples of delays in pay-
ment from government departments, such as KWDP as detailed in Chapter 3, has
116 NGO accountability
led to a cash ﬂow crisis in a number of the NGOs, resulting in them laying off staff.
In addition, some programmes were asking for a 10 per cent deposit of the value of
the programme as a Bank Guarantee, and as a result many NGOs were very
reluctant to participate in some government programmes, but they often had little
choice. Participating in microﬁnance programmes supported by government devel-
opment banks, such as NABARD and SIDBI, runs the risk of the NGO becoming a
form of commission agent for the banks, in which the NGO bears the risk while the
banks remained safe. As we have seen in Chapter 3, Chinyard, with its micro-
ﬁnance programme, is an example of an NGO bearing a large risk.
Some donors were more interventionist in the programming of the activities and
small agencies were at the mercy of the donor. In KIDS’ case funding was with-
drawn due to strategic changes in the donor organization, who would only support a
certain type of programmes with speciﬁc strategic intent such as globalization,
when previously it was focusing on gender-based violence. These changes in focus
(often at relatively short notice) in strategic direction of INGO donors had dire
effects on the smaller NGOs they had been supporting. The emerging trend was that
INGO donors were becoming more hands-on and operational in their approach, and
some were using local NGOs effectively as contractors for their global advocacy
campaigns. This more hands-on donor intervention can be positive; for example,
UNDP had suggested the Development Academy set up a co-ordinating mechan-
ism when it noted that the Academy’s projects were all independent of each other,
even within the same village. Likewise, many INGOs provided an advisory service
for evaluation and other planning support for their smaller NGOs partners. The
advantage of these mechanisms was that they could be separated from the direct
programme management accountability mechanisms of the donor. This ‘non-
funding support’ was seen as an important part of programming for many
INGOs, but they seem to overstate how the local NGOs saw it: neither the funding
or non-funding support of INGOs to KKPKP was mentioned in the ten-year report
of the waste-picker union (Chikaramane and Narayan 2005). The relationship of
local NGOs with INGO donors was more mixed than with the local government
donors. On the one hand, INGOs were more supportive, and allowed a large degree
of ﬂexibility, such as was the case with SNDT, Grama Vikas, or IDS. On the other
hand they could affect the local NGOs’ strategic directions, and even their very
existence. The relationship an NGO had with its donors, and the inﬂuence donors
had on NGO work, could have an effect on the NGO’s accountability to its values
and aid recipients.
Another way donors can weaken NGO accountability to their values and aid
recipients, is through the promotion of what some might call ‘development fash-
ions’. At the village level many of these ‘fashions’ seemed not to be relevant to day-
to-day life – such as NGO work on globalization, or free trade. While clearly links
can be made to the livelihood of villagers and these global issues, the links may be
not be very evident to a very poor marginalized woman socially isolated by her
gender, caste, and class. Some of the ‘fashions’ can seem to be seductive particu-
larly if they are linked to funding: ‘carrots being foreign funding/assignments
around “fashionable terms” which can result in you being caught in a trap. The
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lingo of globalization can be marginalizing. You need to either counter it or cope
with it’ (SNDT staff). Other examples of this problem were microﬁnance and
natural resource management, both of which were undergoing an unprecedented
boom throughout the 1990s and 2000s. Most of the NGOs surveyed that worked in
rural areas were involved with both of these issues, and so microﬁnance was a
necessary entry point for most NGO activities, mainly because most poor and
marginalized households did not have secure incomes, and were dependent on
high-cost credit for their daily living. By introducing schemes to reduce the cost of
credit, NGOs gained access to communities, and from that access raised awareness
or delivered a range of other services. The access also enabled them to engage with
the community on what the NGO saw as priority strategic issues that affected the aid
recipients’ lives, such as alcoholism, gender-based violence and caste discrimination.
The problem, however, with the rapid growth in microﬁnance support from
donors and government ﬁnancial institutions was that the microﬁnance pro-
grammes themselves became ends at the expense of other social programmes,
and even developed into forms of debt traps. The government of India aimed to
increase the number of self-help groups from 531,000 to 1.4 million by 2004 (The
Indian Express, October 21, 2001: 8). In order to secure this type of donor ﬁnance,
NGOs may have to develop activities that move them away from their core values
and programmes, or from their prime constituency.
These microﬁnance schemes have both advantages and disadvantages for NGOs
and existing SHGs: they were attractive to NGOs, but as mentioned above could
have the effect of diverting NGOs resources from their main activities. However,
strong NGOs, such as Grama Vikas or MYRADA, took advantage of schemes such
as Swashakti to cover some staff costs. In some cases these national programmes
even helped NGOs focus on poor and marginalized groups. For example, the
Government-sponsored SHG programmes
Stree Shakti is the largest government-sponsored SHG programme, with a target of
120,000 self-help groups reaching more than 2,000,000 women. These groups would
be organized by the anganwadi (pre-school) teachers, with the NGOs training the
teachers in self-help group formation. Such a programme can disrupt existing groups
as these new groups will receive a direct government grant of seed money. The second
scheme is Swarna Jayanthi Gram Rosger Stree Yojim, a central government scheme
aimed at those people below the poverty line joining self-help groups organized by
NGOs, in which after a qualifying period they would be eligible for a loan of
Rs250,000 for the purchase of assets such as cattle. One-third of this loan would be
in the form a subsidy payable at the end of the ﬁrst loan cycle. The aim is to reach 100
SHGs per district and ultimately see a total of 1.4 million SHGs nationally. The third
scheme, Swashakti, is a World Bank ﬁnanced programme through the state govern-
ment in which no ﬁnance would be made available, but funding would be available for
NGOs to cover staff costs and training.
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Swashakti programme, which had a strong poverty focus, targeted villages accord-
ing to their sex ratio. The sex ratio was regarded as a good indicator of women’s
marginalization and disempowerment, and within those low sex ratio villages, the
programme targeted below poverty line (BPL) women, women with low literacy
rates, and those from the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes. Accessing this
programme meant that at least those NGOs that took advantage of Swashakti
funding were reaching communities according to strong indicators of poverty and
marginalization. Accountability to the donor steered some NGO programmes away
from their target groups, but there are other cases where some government anti-
poverty programmes (usually with international donor support) had the effect of
focusing the NGO onto those they would see as their primary constituency.
Accountability to the state
In India the state, at all levels, plays a key role in the regulation of NGOs with a
range of procedures and monitoring mechanisms to ensure NGO accountability.
Indian governments insist on two things. The ﬁrst is that NGOs are ﬁnancially
transparent, and the second is that they do not enter the ﬁeld of politics, which
naturally has many grey areas. The NGOs in the study did not see these require-
ments as particularly onerous, and none of them had major difﬁculties with the
government requirements. However, as the history of Indian NGOs covered in
Chapter 2 has shown, these requirements give an indication of the level of suspicion
and sometimes hostility from the state, and the laws before the federal government
could see this situation change quickly (Jalali 2008).
National level: As outlined in Chapter 2, at the national level, the Union
Government had a series of regulations and requirements under the Tax Act and
the Foreign Contributions Regulation Act – FCRA (the latter Act regulates those
NGOs which are registered to receive foreign funding). NGOs receiving foreign
funding were regularly checked by the Central Bureau of Investigation, and had to
establish three years of successful operation before being eligible to receive foreign
funding, and their local programme had to be veriﬁed by the District Collector (the
most senior government ofﬁcial in a district). While these regulations have not led
to any major problems for these NGOs, they have led to considerable delays in
implementing NGO programmes. The regulations also carry the threat of suspen-
sion of FCRA approval if NGOs engage in certain types of advocacy. Generally,
NGOs avoid these threats by garnering the indirect support of individuals and/or
representative organizations in their campaigns. An example of this is the Narmada
Dam advocacy coalition in which the ‘front person’ is a well-known writer,
Arundhati Roy, who has no identiﬁable NGO connections.
State level: at the state level the extent of regulation varied across the country. In
general, these NGOs surveyed did not encounter major problems but the Karnataka
State Government did monitor NGOs for involvement in ‘instigation’. There were
grey areas, however, such as anti-alcohol campaigns that effected government
revenue; as the government could not be seen to be supportive of alcohol
consumption as such, these campaigns were often not seen to be ‘instigation’, but
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the risk remained. On the whole, NGOs such as KIDS and IDS that undertook
limited advocacy campaigns ensured that they were concerned with upholding
existing laws (for example, child rights, alcohol abuse, and gender-based violence)
rather than challenging legislation. Also, the NGO-sponsored federations (in the
case of IDS and Grama Vikas) took on an advocacy role as representative organiza-
tions, which to some extent protected the NGO.
Local level: At the local level there are two main mechanisms by which the
NGOs are accountable. First, through the changes to the FCRA in 2000 the local
administrator or Collector had to provide a statement verifying the bona ﬁdes of the
NGO, and ensured its work was not against local government policy. At the gram
panchayat or village government level there were no formal accountability
mechanisms, therefore different NGOs related to the gram panchayats in different
ways. IDS, for instance, saw it as crucial to regularly brief the gram panchayat
members about their work in order to avoid conﬂict, and they regularly informed the
Sarpanch (village secretary) of all of their work, and stayed in touch with the ward
members. Some NGOs, such as MYRADA, set up parallel mechanisms whereby a
planning group, separate to the gram panchayat, is the consultative forum for
MYRADA’s work. Overall, however, there was some ambivalence about the role
of village government among the NGOs surveyed. Only one NGO felt accountable
to the gram panchayat’, with most seeing the real point of accountability as being
with the District Collector who had to approve any NGO’s presence and work in the
community. Accountability of the NGOs to the state (at various levels) had little
impact on these NGOs’ ability to be accountable to their values and their constitu-
encies. In fact, the regulations against advocacy provided an opportunity for greater
direct participation in advocacy on local issues by the constituency through their
representative organizations established by the NGOs.
Conclusion
All of the NGOs interviewed saw themselves as being accountable bodies, with the
majority seeing their accountability to their values as being their primary concern
and motivation. In turn they believed their values were expressed through their
work. However, few of the NGOs had explicit mechanisms for being accountable to
their values. It is arguable that this lack of accountability mechanisms to values
leaves them vulnerable, as those accountability pressures that require speciﬁc
mechanisms can inadvertently be given a priority, and be seen to dominate or
dilute their values. Few of the NGOs studied had major difﬁculties with account-
ability to the donors, either Indian government or foreign donors. However, a major
concern arising with SHG programmes is that they are with predominately savings
and credit groups with an emphasis on ﬁnancial concerns. While accessing inex-
pensive credit is of importance for women, a number of the NGOs put an overriding
emphasis on credit as an ‘end’ in itself, either explicitly or implicitly. This resulted
in prioritizing the donor, whether it was a bank, government wholesaler, or another
NGO, while diminishing the accountability to either the NGO’s values or their aid
recipients.
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While the requirements of donors in general have tightened over recent years,
none of the NGOs surveyed found them either unfair or onerous: ‘the donor has the
right to receive information and ask questions, but they cannot tell us what to do’
(was one response). In the past INGO donors tended to have a hands-off approach,
and base the relationship on trust or what was referred to as a ‘guilt thing’ from a
colonial legacy. In retrospect, this approach is arguably irresponsible, and following a
number of scandals, is slowly changing, and according to some of the respondents it is
for the better. Fowler (2000b), Edwards (1999a) and others argue that northern donors
have undue control over southern NGOs, but this view is not borne out in practice for
these and others NGOs in India, where it would seem that Indian government funders
are wielding much of the control. In relation to INGO donors, as we have seen, half of
the group of NGOs interviewed had explicitly avoided new donor relationships, and
terminated or rejected donor funding on the grounds that the grant conditions were
contrary to their values. In addition, while the other NGOs were less speciﬁc, they
indicated that they would only enter new donor relationships with some caution.
However, the agencies that were most vulnerable to donor control were the smaller
agencies with less than ten staff, and usually dependent on a single donor for
speciﬁc activities rather than a broader programme. The evidence indicates that,
except for a small number of exceptions, the relationship between INGO and the
local NGO is not a strict patron-client relationship; nor, however, is it a partnership
based on equality. Rather the relationship is built on a series of negotiations on what
are perceived to be the common goals. Accountability from the donor’s perspec-
tive, in general, is to see that their funds are spent efﬁciently and effectively for that
common goal. From the local NGO’s point of view, it was often the in-kind
contribution from donors that was as important as the funding, and represented
the core of the relationship. In general this type of support was not forthcoming
from local, particularly government donors, and thus could emerge as a problem
with the recent shift to government donors.
Accountability to the aid recipients was the area where the NGOs interviewed
had the most difﬁculty. While most agreed that it was very important for pro-
gramme effectiveness, they did not wish to become beholden to a particular, and
arguably, narrower constituency, when their mission was to a broader section of a
community. While several of the NGOs had mechanisms for accountability to the
aid recipients, or were developing mechanisms, only SNDT saw this level of
accountability as a central function of their institution. Most of the others would
prefer the term ‘participation’ rather than ‘representation’ in the strict accountability
sense. The NGOs did not relate their accountability to the aid recipients in terms of
their overall objective of empowerment. While none were surprised with the
ﬁnding that accountability to the aid recipients was a signiﬁcant variable in
empowerment, the overall view was that an increased move in accountability to
them would weaken the NGO’s control over the programme. It could also create
tensions and divert the NGO away from a broader group in a community to a
narrower ‘membership’ base.
Further work is also required in the area of programme management theory to
identify mechanisms for the development of formal or semi-formal accountability
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structures to provide the NGO’s recipients with a greater sense of ownership (and
therefore power) in the programme while maintaining the ﬂexibility to expand their
work to new communities. The example of SNDT and Grama Vikas indicated that
this was possible. Joshi and Moore (2000), however, caution that it is an excep-
tional organization that can do this. Nevertheless, this is an important area for
policy work if empowerment programmes are to meet their real objectives of the
poor being able to challenge power relationships at all levels in their lives.
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7 Conclusion
Introduction
This book has identiﬁed two broad trends in NGO work in India, which are
in tension with each other. For southern India in particular, the economic success
of the region, and the related drop in the headline measures of poverty, have
resulted in international aid agencies withdrawing from the southern states, with
their former work in rural development and poverty alleviation being largely
taken over by both federal and state instrumentalities. These government agencies
have less ﬂexible approaches, and a broader development agenda for rural areas,
than the sharper focus on poverty alleviation and empowerment that INGOs had.
These domestic government agencies also tend to follow the purchaser-provider
model of government contracting for service provision, whereby the NGO is
more of an agent for government programmes than offering up its own programmes
for their support as they did with INGOs. This change has naturally led to a
narrowing of the control that these local NGOs hitherto had. As discussed in
Chapter 3, this has led to difﬁculties for the NGOs in this study; they had to
dismiss staff and look to different funding options as they managed a fairly rapid
change.
The second trend has been that since the early to mid-1990s Indian NGOs
have had a stronger focus on empowerment of poor women in their development
work, and have adopted the savings and credit self-help group model to achieve
this. Generally there has been a strong focus on social transformation and empow-
erment as a path to reducing poverty and marginalization among rural and urban
women. This book has looked at this trend and identiﬁed some features of
how NGOs work with marginalized women to achieve stronger empowerment
outcomes. Strong empowerment for poor women was linked to the NGOs spending
more time (in terms of years) with the women’s self-help groups; and having
stronger and more formal accountability relationships with these SHGs, who
were the aid recipients. In the early 2000s local NGOs in Southern India were
grappling with the conﬂicting implications of these trends. Experience suggested
that if these NGOs were to be true to their values, they had to invest more
time and effort in engaging with the marginalized women they were working
with to be effective. However, the local NGOs’ traditional resource base from
the INGOs was being replaced by government programmes that contracted local
NGOs as delivery agents for service provision, thus creating a dilemma for
them. This chapter will summarize some of these ﬁndings, and look to ways
forward for NGOs in India, which will have resonance with local NGOs in other
rapidly developing countries. This will look at how they can approach and
resource their work, so that the empowerment work can be strengthened and
advanced.
Indian NGOs
Since independence NGOs have played an important role in India’s development;
over this time government relations have alternated between times of mutual
suspicion and hostility, to periods of high levels of co-operation with NGOs
taking a central role in the development agenda. After a period of co-operation
in the 1950s followed by hostility and suspicion through the 1980s into the
1990s, by the early 2000s NGOs were more respected by government, and were
having a more central role in the nation’s development, as evidenced by
increased funding though government programmes. This shift in the approach
of government to NGOs coincided with a number of political and economic
trends that started in the 1980s but accelerated in the 1990s. The spectacular
growth of the Indian economy in the ﬁrst decade of the 2000s, together with this
new rapport with NGOs, has meant the government can resource much of its
own development agenda using local NGOs more than hitherto possible, while
at the same time international donors, both ofﬁcial and INGOs, are rapidly
withdrawing.
These changes have meant that the Indian polity has had to manage the competing
forces of globalization and modernization of the economy, and the emergence of
a strong, mostly urban-based, middle class; as well as a strong religio-nationalist
movement, part of which is based in the rural heartland, and challenges much of
the modernization that has been occurring. The government’s response to
these competing trends has been to invest in rural areas and ensure the beneﬁts
of growth would reach many of these rural communities. The problem that govern-
ments faced was that they were poorly equipped to deliver services to the rural
communities, and so the use of existing local NGOs to deliver these services made
a lot of sense. As a result Indian government agencies invested heavily in NGO
programmes. The effect of these changes has been two-fold: ﬁrstly, government
favoured larger, often urban-based NGOs that had the capacity and experience
in delivering government programmes; and secondly, local NGOs who were not
in a position to take advantage of these government programmes, or wished
to continue their empowerment work, had to re-scale their programmes to reﬂect
their changed resource base, or seek alternative sources of support (see Chapter 3).
The challenge with these changes was that there were fewer incentives for NGOs to
continue empowerment work directly with marginalized groups and it also made it
harder for them to look at processes for being accountable for their work to those
groups.
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NGOs and empowerment
From the empirical work with the 15 case study NGOs in Southern India, there are
two principal ﬁndings: empowerment from the perspective of poor women is
primarily related to improvements in their personal agency, the choices they can
make and how they can act on them. However, there needs to be further work on
how this has affected gender relations in the household, as any changes in this
domain seemed to be weak. The second ﬁnding is that the nature of the account-
ability relationship (in terms of formal processes) of NGOs to the women’s groups
they work with played a key role in securing strong empowerment outcomes. These
ﬁndings support the view that empowerment for the poor and marginalized is less
about access to material resources and outcomes, and more about access to choices
and decision-making that poor women have in both their household and commu-
nity life. Central to these ﬁndings is the idea that empowerment is not an absolute
condition, but rather a relative one. While it may be difﬁcult to conceptualize
degrees of empowerment, these results support the theories of empowerment
(i.e. personal agency) derived mainly from the ﬁeld of community psychology
(e.g. Riger 1993). The processes that led to this type of empowerment can provide
useful pointers to effective poverty alleviation strategies, and ways of working with
marginalized communities in development practice more broadly.
The community psychology framework for empowerment focuses on individual
self-esteem and conﬁdence, which in terms of development practice enables mar-
ginalized groups, particularly women, to assert themselves in a much wider range
of social and political domains in their family and community lives. The research
also suggests that one of the ‘domains’ from which self-conﬁdence and assertive-
ness can emerge and be applied more broadly, is in the accountability relationship
the poor have with the agency facilitating their empowerment – often NGOs, but
they can also be government agencies, or less commonly, private organizations
such as banks or consulting companies. The importance of this ﬁnding is that
it supports a view that empowerment is not something that is provided, but rather is
inherent in the relationship between the organization and the communities
it is working with. This view of empowerment being related to personal agency,
and its relationship with the ‘downward’ accountability mechanisms of the orga-
nization (in this case NGOs) to the intended beneﬁciaries, has not been a strong
focus in development discourse and practice to date.
Measuring agency
The methodology outlined in Chapter 5 focuses on women’s own narratives of the
important changes that had occurred in their lives, which were then put into an
empowerment framework. This framework involved sorting responses into broad
‘domains’ and ranking them, from which a statistical analysis was made. This
methodology can be adapted for assessing a range of development interventions, as
the open-ended approaches used to gather data tend to bring out key issues in the
relevance of particular approaches. The methodology has limitations, as it has an
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interpretive dimension, it requires careful training of enumerators to ensure con-
sistent interpretations of responses and coding, and so large-scale comparisons may
not yield useful results. The methodology is, however, very useful for longitudinal
studies or smaller-scale comparative work, where fewer enumerators would be
involved.
The change the women from the self-help groups reportedmost closely identiﬁed
with, was the notion of personal agency. This change was articulated as an increase
of self-esteem due to both the greater range of choices they had, and their increased
capacity to act on those choices. As discussed in Chapter 5, these choices were
incremental in nature, and ranged from the relatively straightforward capacity to go
out of the house and interact with people outside the immediate family, to broader
notions of engaging in civic processes in the village, and making autonomous
decisions about their personal lives and inﬂuencing others in the family. These
ﬁndings support a variation of Kabeer’s empowerment theory, where she argues
that empowerment is a combination of an increase in access to resources, material
outcomes and personal agency (Kabeer 1999a). Community psychology theory,
however, relates empowerment to the self-esteem, conﬁdence and assertiveness
that an expansion of an individual’s choices and capacity for action brings
(Campbell and Jovchelovitch 2000; Speer 2000); that is, empowerment is primarily
about the expansion of personal agency, with access to resources being less of an
outcome of empowerment. The resources, however, do serve to provide a foundation
for continuing the process of empowerment of the individual.
This ﬁnding from the research varies from Kabeer’s theory relating to resources
and outcomes. The results pointed to a virtuous circle; that is, when women’s
groups engaged with facilitating NGOs, enhanced agency led to greater access to
resources, leading to more agency and so on. In practical terms, the greater level of
conﬁdence and assertiveness of the women in a particular community meant they
were able to gain greater access to social, political, as well as public services, and
economic and other resources. They could do this by virtue of their capacity to
demand these resources from a range of providers; and it was the access to these
resources that then enabled the women to participate more broadly in other domains
that affected their lives. The key resource that the group members identiﬁed with,
however, was not so much the material beneﬁts, but rather the social resource in the
form of the support from the self-help group to which they belonged. This ﬁnding,
that the group itself provides a resource for individual empowerment, is in line with
the view that empowerment has a collective dimension and that it can only occur in
a social context (Speer 2000). It also gives weight to Giddens’ (1979) argument that
power has a collective dimension and is only exercised in a collective framework
(see Chapter 2). The tension identiﬁed by Riger (1993), that the solidarity and
interdependence of a groupmay be threatened by individual empowerment (and the
related increase in personal autonomy), was not found in the results from the group
surveys. There was no evidence that individual empowerment was a major problem
or a cause of group failure. This may well be because the target groups were
relatively poor, and needed to maintain the solidarity the group brought them for
a longer period of time.
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Generally, in Indian village life, women are disempowered in many respects:
they are excluded from public decision-making spaces; they are not part of village
associational life; and generally, are not part of political life in terms of village
meetings, and this was certainly the case in the case study communities. This
exclusion was not only gender-based, but in many areas it was also caste-based,
where dalits and tribal people were at times excluded from physical amenities such
as wells, temples and the like. The research found that through the self-help groups
these marginalized women gained access to these amenities. For them disempower-
ment was the denial of access to these very basic domains of power, while
empowerment was gaining access not only to these but also to new domains of
power (Vijayalakshmi 2001). One reason for the strength and cohesion of the SHGs
in this study is that the very poor women had access to few other alternative
formations and networks outside the home due to the chronic lack of access to
power in their personal and social lives. The work of the NGO provided poor
women with an opportunity to be part of a social grouping – the SHG itself. This
level of social exclusion referred to above may not have been felt by wealthier
women, or those who lived in different social contexts, whomay have had alternative
social groupings to join. One area for further research is to look at the differences in
perceptions of empowerment from different wealth and status groups in society.
Anecdotal evidence from the narratives of the women seemed to indicate that the
more marginalized groups in society (such as dalits) with more restricted choices,
saw empowerment most strongly in agency terms, rather than material terms. This
provides useful information to guide the focus of future development programmes
to the very poor and ensure the stability of SHGs. The results also pointed to
disempowerment as being a consequence of social marginalization as much as, if
not more than material deprivation. Poverty in this context was related to a lack of
access to decision-making, and the associated lack of capacity for the poor to act
autonomously.
The practical implication was that empowerment programmes that fostered
choice, decision-making, personal autonomy, and control, were more likely to
address issues of social marginalization than solely economic programmes. This
is not to say that economic programmes should be ignored, but rather approaches
that foster autonomy and decision-making within constituent groups are required if
social beneﬁts, in terms of empowerment, are to be gained. Traditionally, NGOs
were seen as being well-suited to perform the role of facilitator in these empowering
processes and this research supports the view that by facilitating women to work
together in groups, NGOs can enable the social norms of gender, caste and other
factors of exclusion to be challenged. At the same time it also allowed women to
access new physical and social (decision-making) domains in their lives. However,
there are some caveats on how NGOs can perform this role effectively.
NGOs as empowerment intermediaries
NGOs are commonly used by donors and other funding bodies as agents for the
empowerment for very poor and marginalized communities in developing
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countries. Other non-NGO development agencies, either government or private
(such as banks), tend not to focus on the very poor mainly because of the high
transaction costs involved in terms of the agencies’ time for what are seen as
relatively small outcomes. NGOs, on the other hand, work with the poor and
marginalized because of their values – inter alia, service, altruism, and/or a desire
for a fair or just world. As values-based organizations, NGOs see their motivation
as being a reﬂection of their values (for a public beneﬁt) both in the work they
engage in, and how this work is undertaken. For many NGOs the promotion of
empowerment of the poor and marginalized is a consequence of their values base.
The changes that happened in India in the early 2000s where the funding support
moved from international donors to mainly Indian government sources, which had
an emphasis on broader service delivery rather than empowering the poor, threa-
tened the capacity of NGOs to undertake empowerment work, at least on a
broad scale.
While NGOs can act as facilitators in the empowerment process, the case studies
demonstrated that the results were not uniform across the group of NGOs in
this study, in how the members of the SHGs were empowered. When these
differences were examined two factors emerged that were found to be signiﬁcant
in affecting the NGOs’ capacity to affect empowerment outcomes: the period for
which the SHG had been meeting; and the accountability of the NGO itself to the
group. To recap the discussion from Chapter 6: ﬁrst; the number of years a group
spends together is important as it enabled women to build conﬁdence and trust to
take power and responsibility within the SHG, make choices, and take action. This
issue of the period NGOs engaged with SHGs was contentious, as there is pressure
on NGOs both from INGO and government funders to limit their engagement with
particular groups to a speciﬁc time-period in order to expand their reach to new
communities. Some donors had gone as far as developing templates for SHG
engagement so they could withdraw within a certain time period, often as little as
three years. These tight timescales were counterproductive, as there were poor
results in terms of both the empowerment of members, or whether the SHG was
able to sustain itself, as both can take time for marginalized groups. This dilemma
can lead to NGOs focusing their support to those groups in society who can show
early results, such as those who may be better off in a particular community, or have
already have had NGO interactions, thus excluding the marginalized. While such
an instrumental approach to engaging with SHGs can show early but superﬁcial
changes, not only would it be unsustainable, but more importantly it would move
the focus away from the poor in these communities.
Accountability
The second ﬁnding, and the one this book is mainly concerned with, is that the
accountability mechanisms the NGO has with the group can itself be empowering
for the group and its members (Day and Klein 1987). That is, to be able to hold
somebody to account is to exercise power over them. Because NGOs are non-
membership bodies the process of accountability is not as clear-cut as if they were
128 Conclusion
membership bodies. Nevertheless, among the case study NGOs there were
examples in which the NGOs had mechanisms for being accountable to the
groups they were working with, that allowed (some) power to be exercised over
them by the aid recipients. The two key lessons were that the more formal the
process the greater the level of empowerment, and furthermore, that empowerment
is strongly identiﬁed with personal agency. This has implications for NGO practice,
and it affects their role as public beneﬁt organizations. NGOs in their work with
poor and marginalized communities are in quite a powerful position as they are
bodies over which the groups they work with have little power, given there are few
alternatives for the poor to access many services other than through an NGO. The
consequence of this ‘dependent’ relationship is that the poor are less likely to
demand stronger accountability mechanisms as long as the services are being
delivered in a fair and reasonable manner. Less than a third of the NGOs surveyed
had put in place strong accountability mechanisms that saw a direct accounting of
their actions or decisions to the groups they were working with. That is, few of the
NGOs went beyond merely providing information on the day-to-day activities of
a particular programme (a relatively low level of accountability) to seeking
input from the aid recipients (the SHGs) on a range of issues with respect to
the programmes. While there are no compelling programming reasons why
formal accountability mechanisms should exist for agencies such as NGOs that
are providing services, as a basic sharing of information would be sufﬁcient; the
research found that those NGOs with more formal mechanisms that inform
the agency’s strategic direction, as well as its project work, had the strongest
empowerment outcomes.
The lack of demand for accountability by the aid recipients puts the NGO in the
position of being able to set out the accountability relationship, unlike membership
organizations such as co-operatives or unions, where the members are in some
position to demand accountability, and with that have a position of power within the
organization. This book argues that a voluntary reversal of the power relationship
between NGOs and the people to whom they are providing services is required if
high levels of empowerment are to occur. Such a reversal of power is difﬁcult, even
with the best of intentions, because handing over control can pose a potential threat
to the stability and cohesion of the NGO, and make management and governance
more difﬁcult for larger NGOs. As Joshi and Moore (2000) point out, it is an
exceptional NGO that is prepared to risk the basis of its work, which is about a
broader public beneﬁt, for a narrower constituent interest. Handing more power
over to the recipient groups can also have the perverse effect of moving NGOs
away from their original target groups, who are often more marginalized, to
those who have more endowments. This latter group is in a better position to
access the beneﬁts of a particular programme if it has some control of the
NGO. This paradox points to a balance needing to be found by the NGO, in
which the recipient groups feel they have an inﬂuence, and therefore some power
with regard to an NGO’s work and direction, while the NGO maintains its public
beneﬁt purpose, adheres to its values, and expands its work to new communities if
it wishes.
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These ﬁndings advance the theory of community participation, which argues that
the greater the level of participation of all stakeholders in programme design and
implementation, particularly the beneﬁciaries of the activity, the greater the chance
of successful outcomes for that activity. This research argues that going beyond
participation, to more formal ‘downward’ accountability mechanisms is one way of
NGOs (and other intermediaries) addressing the fundamental adverse power rela-
tions poor and marginalized women face in their day-to-day lives. It points to the
development discourse going beyond notions of participation, with the idea of
accountability as an alternative discourse, not for transparency reasons (important
as they are) as much as the inherent implications for good practice in the connection
of accountability to power, and empowerment processes. The challenge for NGO
practice lies in how NGOs balance their accountability to the aid recipients with
their accountability obligations to their values and public beneﬁt purposes, as well
as to other stakeholders in their work: the donors (the providers of resources) and
governments that regulate their activities.
As we saw in Chapter 6, the issue of the accountability of NGOs to their
constituency and being true to their values is a tension arising from the need to
align NGO values to the priorities of the communities with which they are working.
The case study NGOs from southern India all indicated that their values base did
not come from the people with whom they were working as such, and they
cited instances where they would not comply with the aid recipients wishes
purely on the basis of conﬂicting values, and they have ceased programmes with
some groups for these reasons. The conclusion that can be drawn is that NGOs,
if they are to be intermediaries or agents for empowerment, have to establish
mechanisms that recognize the power relationship they have with the people with
whom they are working and be prepared to hand over some power to them.
Secondly, NGOs should recognize the potential for conﬂicting values, and be in a
position to work through such clashes in ways that empower rather than disem-
power the groups they are working with. While most of the NGOs in the study see
themselves as empowerment agents of the poor, the analysis of both how they
exercised power over, and the status they had with the communities with whom
they were working, tended to compromise empowerment outcomes for most of
the NGOs.
The study found that few of the case study NGOs had a sufﬁciently sophisticated
analysis of this power relationship or empowerment processes to be able to put into
place mechanisms to counter the oligarchic trends that come with being a source of
resources. It also raises the question of whether the processes of empowerment can
ultimately lead to the autonomy of the SHG, or whether the NGO plays a more or
less permanent role in the community. This is probably not a critical issue as the
NGO can offer advice and expertise, something that groups often cannot get from
other services, and this type of arrangement, in which the NGO maintains some
links to the groups, is often requested from the group, and becomes a service of the
NGO. For example, (see Chapter 3) is even starting to charge a fee for this ongoing
support; of course the problem is that this ‘user pay’ approach can leave the poorer
groups without any ongoing support.
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Role of funding agencies
Another limiting factor for effective empowerment processes was the role of the
donor or resource providers. The research found that while many of the NGOs
interviewed had some autonomy, there were also clear power relations between
donors and NGOs, and this affected the ﬂexibility and the opportunities for NGOs
to be accountable to the communities they were working with. While some donors
may seek individual or community empowerment outcomes through their support
to NGOs, the accountability relationship between the donor and the NGOmake this
more difﬁcult to achieve, because the source of resources has a privileged position.
This is increasingly the case where the sources of funding are government agencies
who contract NGO to provide services. This donor privilege arises from the more
formal (often contractual) requirements that are inherent in any funding relation-
ship, meaning the NGO is required to service the needs of the funder, at the expense
of the NGO’s accountability to the aid recipients. Related to donor accountability
is the nature of funding relationships. Most donor and government funding is
bounded by the notion of the project. Projects are both time-bound and seek to
identify (often tangible) outcomes in advance. These two requirements of the
project, in the context of empowerment, implies a de facto pre-determination of
what is empowerment, and how it may be achieved, which may not accord with
what the recipient sees as empowering. This brings us back to a paradox identiﬁed
by Tandon (1995b: 33) that predetermining what is empowering is in itself an act of
power over recipients and so is disempowering. In effect, a project approach
instrumentalizes the notion of empowerment and so devalues it.
The implications of the ﬁndings on empowerment being identiﬁed with agency
and the expansion of an individual’s inﬂuence and power into new social and
political domains is that these changes cannot be easily predicted, time-limited, or
articulated in advance as expected outcomes. Funding bodies’ resources unfortu-
nately are usually predicated on these conditions, and as a result the expectation of
the donor is privileged over the needs of the aid recipient. While the study did not
look at the issue in great detail, it is worth noting that the three agencies – SNDT,
IDS and Grama Vikas – that ranked highly on empowerment outcomes all had long-
term, open and ﬂexible funding relationships at the time of the ﬁeld study. The
donors in these three cases, while demanding detailed ﬁnancial accountability, were
very open to innovative, long-term processes, for which they accepted that measur-
able outcomes would only be realized over time. The research ﬁndings suggest a
more ﬂexible approach to funding support by agencies if empowerment is to occur.
This will be difﬁcult at a time when ofﬁcial donors and domestic government
funders are seeking more certainty in terms of outcomes, and are promoting higher
levels of control in the programme management processes, with purchaser provider
contracts and the like (Kilby 2004a). Similarly, for NGOs there are aspects of
their own approach programme management that can be reassessed for empower-
ment programmes: a focus on ﬂexible time-frames in terms of the engagement with
the communities; a clearer focus on promoting decision-making skills among group
members; and most importantly a conscious focus on more formal accountability
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mechanisms of NGOs to the aid recipients. This ﬂexible approach suggests handing
greater control to the recipient groups which, as this book has noted, raises the new
set of problems touched on earlier in this chapter. The book has also identiﬁed some
innovative approaches to overcome some of these problems. An example of this
innovation is SNDT, which effectively contracts its services to a representative
organization of the poor, the KKPKP (waste-pickers union), but at the same time
remains free to expand its work to other groups it feels it should be working with.
These ﬁndings also have implications for how empowerment and poverty allevia-
tion programmes are prioritized and programmed, suggesting that changes may
need to be made in how certain types of programmes (such as micro-ﬁnance) are
managed.
In conclusion, this book has found that empowerment is not an abstract notion,
but is real in the lives of the poor and marginalized women who see it primarily
in terms of agency; that is, an expansion of both their choices and their capacity
to act on those choices. An important aspect of the expansion in agency, as a
consequence of development interventions, is ‘downward’ accountability from the
facilitating organization, the NGO. This ﬁnding suggests a sharper focus on the
accountability of the facilitating agency to the aid recipients in development pro-
gramming. Thismoves the theory of participation from its being important for project
outcomes to one in which a more formalized relationship between the recipient and
the NGO is a part of an empowering process. This has clear implications for how
poverty alleviation programmes that deal with the structural causes of poverty are
designed, and how development programmes and NGOs are managed. The chal-
lenge that local NGOs in developing countries face is that as they become less
dependent on foreign aid for poverty alleviation programmes, there will inevitably
be a shift, at least in the short term, for national governments to move their funding
away from empowerment programmes to more direct service delivery by NGOs.
This will inevitably leave a gap in resourcing for local NGOs if they are to do
innovative work. The case studies in Chapters 3 and 4 demonstrate that different
and innovative resourcing models are possible and the challenge for INGO donors
and others is to give them the time and space to make the transition.
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